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Cover
Orbis terrae compendiosa descriptio, a 
double-hemisphere projection fi rst pub-
lished in 1569 by the Flemish cartogra-
pher Gerhardus Mercator (1512–94), fa-
mous for the eponymous global projection 
widely used today for, especially, nautical 
charts. This version was engraved by his 
son Rumold (1545–99) and issued in 
1587.
The map is one of thirty rare maps of 
similarly high technical and aesthetic 
value exhibited in Envisioning the 
World: The Earliest Printed Maps, 1472 
to 1700. The exhibit, organized by the 
Sonoma County Museum in Santa Rosa, 
California, is drawn from the collection 
of Henry and Holly Wendt. It was on 
display at the Naval War College Museum 
from 1 July until 30 November 2011. 
For further information, visit www
.envisioningtheworld.com/.
The image is reproduced by the kind 
permission of Henry and Holly Wendt 
and with the assistance of the Naval War 
College Museum. 
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The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 as a forum for discussion of
public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The thoughts and opinions
expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those
of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or the Naval War College.
The journal is published quarterly. Distribution is limited generally to commands
and activities of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; regular and reserve
officers of U.S. services; foreign officers and civilians having a present or previous
affiliation with the Naval War College; selected U.S. government officials and agen-
cies; and selected U.S. and international libraries, research centers, publications, and
educational institutions.
Contributors
Please request the standard contributors’ guidance from the managing editor or
access it online before submitting manuscripts. The Naval War College Review nei-
ther offers nor makes compensation for articles or book reviews, and it assumes no
responsibility for the return of manuscripts, although every effort is made to return
those not accepted. In submitting work, the sender warrants that it is original, that
it is the sender’s property, and that neither it nor a similar work by the sender has
been accepted or is under consideration elsewhere.
Permissions
Reproduction and reprinting are subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and appli-
cable treaties of the United States. To obtain permission to reproduce material
bearing a copyright notice, or to reproduce any material for commercial pur-
poses, contact the editor for each use. Material not bearing a copyright notice
may be freely reproduced for academic or other noncommercial use; however, it
is requested that the author and Naval War College Review be credited and that
the editor be informed.
Periodicals postage paid at Newport, R.I. POSTMASTERS, send address changes
to: Naval War College Review, Code 32S, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Rd.,
Newport, R.I. 02841-1207.
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FROM THE EDITORS
In what must certainly count as the most newsworthy naval development of
2011, the People’s Republic of China obtained its first aircraft carrier. The as-
yet-unnamed vessel—previously Varyag of the Ukrainian navy (and originally
the Soviet navy)—which began sea trials in the Yellow Sea last August, clearly
represents an important milestone in the ongoing modernization and expan-
sion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Less clear is what it tells us
about the future trajectory of Chinese sea power. In “Beijing’s ‘Starter’ Carrier
and Future Steps: Alternatives and Implications,” Andrew S. Erickson, Abraham
M. Denmark, and Gabriel Collins explore this question through a detailed anal-
ysis of what we know about ex-Varyag, how the Chinese may be intending to
employ it, and what implications follow for the PLAN generally, as well as for the
United States and its friends and allies in Asia and the Pacific.
In this time of constrained defense budgets in the United States, it is more im-
portant than ever to appreciate the contribution that our friends and allies
abroad make to the security of this nation and the world. Two articles offer im-
portant insight into the current strategic outlooks of two such countries.
Duk-Ki Kim, in “The Republic of Korea’s Counter-asymmetric Strategy: Les-
sons from ROKS Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island,” assesses the current state of
the threat to South Korea posed by the North, with its increasing reliance on var-
ious “asymmetric” strategies to compensate for its own military and economic
disadvantages relative to the ROK, as well as for the continuing American mili-
tary presence on the Korean Peninsula. He argues that, especially in the light of
the new aggressiveness shown by the DPRK in such recent military provocations
as the sinking of Cheonan by a North Korean minisubmarine and the shelling of
a ROK-held island off its coast, South Korea needs to be prepared to make radi-
cal adjustments in its own preparations to counter or deter DPRK adventurism,
both in a peacetime context and in the event of all-out conventional warfare.
Captain Kim is a senior officer in the Republic of Korea Navy. In his article
“Seeking Balance: Force Projection, Confidence Building, and the Republic of
Singapore Navy,” Swee Lean Collin Koh provides an overview of the history, cur-
rent force structure, and strategic outlook of the naval forces of another nation
that has become an increasingly important partner of the United States in the
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Asia-Pacific region. As Koh rightly notes, studies of the navies of small nations
such as Singapore are not common. But Singapore is particularly deserving of
notice in this context, and not only because of its strategic location near the crit-
ical Strait of Malacca. Singapore’s own naval and other military forces, highly
professional and technologically advanced as they are, are not only more formi-
dable than numbers alone might suggest but capable of projecting power in the
region to an extent that will undoubtedly surprise some.
The history of the Pacific War continues to provide invaluable materials for
the study of naval operational art. In “The Port Moresby–Solomons Operation
and the Allied Reaction, 28 April–11 May 1942,” Milan Vego focuses on Japanese
decision making leading up to the first major clash of Japanese and Allied naval
forces in the battle of the Coral Sea. Among the most serious weaknesses in Japa-
nese, as compared with American, military decision making during this period
were, according to the author, a tendency to compromise between incompatible
plans supported by different commands and the complete inadequacy of intelli-
gence on Allied plans and intentions. Milan Vego is a professor in the Joint Mili-
tary Operations Department at the Naval War College.
Finally, in “Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR)
Operations Lessons Learned and Best Practices,” Cathal O’Connor provides a
useful summary assessment of the recent experience of the U.S. Navy in an im-
portant yet understudied area. Captain O’Connor served as deputy commodore
of Amphibious Squadron 11 during relief operations off Japan following the
earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011.
WINNERS OF OUR ANNUAL ARTICLE PRIZES
The President of the Naval War College has awarded prizes to the winners of the
annual Hugh G. Nott and Edward S. Miller competitions for articles appearing
in the Naval War College Review.
The Nott Prize, established in the early 1980s, is given to the authors of the
best articles (less those considered for the Miller Prize) in the Review in the pre-
vious publishing year. Cash awards are funded by the generosity of the Naval
War College Foundation.
This year’s winner was Toshi Yoshihara, for “Chinese Missile Strategy and the
U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing,” which ap-
peared in the Summer 2010 issue ($1,000).
Three articles were selected for honorable mention: “The Next Geographical
Pivot: The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-First Century,” by Caitlyn L. Antrim
(Summer 2010); “China’s ‘Antiaccess’ Ballistic Missiles and U.S. Active De-
fense,” by Marshall Hoyler (Autumn 2010); and “Talking about Sea Control,” by
Robert C. Rubel (Autumn 2010).
4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWC_2012WinterReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Winter2012Review\NWC_2012WinterReview.vp
Wednesday, November 30, 2011 10:58:57 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 1, Art. 19
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/19
The Miller Prize was founded in 1992 by the historian Edward S. Miller for
the author of the best historical article appearing in the Naval War College Re-
view in the same period. This year’s winner is Angus K. Ross, for “Four Lessons
That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from the Dreadnought Revolution” (Autumn
2010, $500).
NEWPORT PAPER 37
The latest title in our Newport Papers monograph series—Innovation in Carrier
Aviation, by Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles—is
now available. It is a description and analysis of how the three key innovations
essential to the modern aircraft carrier (the steam catapult, angled flight deck,
and mirror-light landing aid) were developed first by the Royal Navy and then
quickly adopted by the U.S. Navy. Purchase a copy online from the Government
Printing Office (at http://bookstore.gpo.gov) or download a pdf version from
our website (click Publications, Naval War College Press, and Newport Papers).
TWO NWC PRESS BOOKS WIN NASOH AWARDS
Two books published in 2010 by the NWC Press in its long-running Historical
Monograph series (which is sponsored by the Maritime History Department)
have won John Lyman Book Awards from the North American Society for Oce-
anic History (NASOH). Albert A. Nofi’s To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy
Fleet Problems, 1923–1940 won in the 2011 U.S. Naval History category, and Hal
M. Friedman’s Digesting History: The U.S. Naval War College, the Lessons of
World War Two, and Future Naval Warfare, 1945–1947 in the Primary Source
Materials, Reference Works, and Guide Books category. Both are available for
sale online by the Government Printing Office, at http://bookstore.gpo.gov.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334,
334, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the
main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time
(841-2236) or use the phone at the main Sims Hall entrance (1-2236).
STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION
Statement of ownership, management, and circulation (required by 39 USC. 3685, PS Form 3526-R, Sep-
tember 2007) of the Naval War College Review, Publication Number 401390, published four times a year
at 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. General business offices of the publisher are located at
the Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of publisher is
President, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of editor
is Dr. Carnes Lord, Code 32, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name
and address of managing editor is Pelham G. Boyer, Code 32A, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road,
Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Owner is the Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.,
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20350-1000. The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and its exempt status for
federal income-tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months. Average number of cop-
ies of each issue during the preceding 12 months is: (a) Total number of copies: 8,716; (b)(1) Requested
subscriptions (outside Newport County): 7,247; (b)(2) Requested subscriptions (inside Newport
County): 202; (c) Total requested circulation: 7,449; (d)(1) Nonrequested distribution by mail (outside
Newport County): 135; (d)(3) Nonrequested distribution by other classes: 88; (d)(4) Nonrequested dis-
tribution outside the mail: 825; (e) Total nonrequested distribution: 1,048; (f) Total distribution: 8,497;
(g) Copies not distributed: 219; (h) Total: 8,716; (i) Percent requested circulation: 88%. Issue date for cir-
culation data: Summer 2011; (a) Total number of copies: 8,854; (b)(1) Requested subscriptions (outside
Newport County): 7,136; (b)(2) Requested subscriptions (inside Newport County): 203; (c) Total re-
quested circulation: 7,339; (d)(1) Nonrequested distribution by mail (outside Newport County): 124;
(d)(3) Nonrequested distribution by other classes: 111; (d)(4) Nonrequested distribution outside the
mail: 1,060; (e) Total nonrequested distribution: 1,295; (f) Total distribution: 8,634; (g) Copies not dis-
tributed: 220; (h) Total: 8,854; (i) Percent requested circulation: 85%. I certify that all information fur-
nished is true and complete.
Pelham G. Boyer, Managing Editor
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Rear Admiral Christenson became the fifty-third Presi-
dent of the U.S. Naval War College on 30 March 2011.
The fourth of six sons of a Navy Skyraider pilot and a
Navy nurse, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Acad-
emy in 1981.
At sea, he commanded USS McClusky (FFG 41), De-
stroyer Squadron 21 in USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74),
Carrier Strike Group 12, and the USS Enterprise (CVN
65) Strike Group. He most recently served as President,
Board of Inspection and Survey. He also served as the
antisubmarine warfare officer and main propulsion as-
sistant aboard USS Cook (FF 1083); as aide to Com-
mander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 1 in USS Long Beach
(CGN 9); as weapons officer aboard USS Downes (FF
1070); as Destroyer Squadron 21 combat systems officer,
in USS Nimitz (CVN 68); and as executive officer of
USS Harry W. Hill (DD 986). He deployed eight times
on seven ships, twice in command of McClusky.
Ashore, he commanded the Surface Warfare Officers
School in Newport, and as a new flag officer he served as
Commander, Naval Mine and Anti-submarine War-
fare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas. He also served at
the U.S. Naval Academy as a company officer, celestial
navigation instructor, assistant varsity soccer coach, and
member of the admissions board; at Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, in the Strategic Initiatives Group; and on
the Joint Staff, in J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) and as
executive assistant to the assistant chairman.
He graduated with distinction and first in his class from
the Naval War College, earning his master’s degree in
national security and strategic studies. He was also a
Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy.
Rear Admiral Christenson has been awarded the De-
fense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (five
awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (two awards),
the Navy Commendation Medal (five awards), and the
Navy Achievement Medal.
NWC_2012WinterReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Winter2012Review\NWC_2012WinterReview.vp
Wednesday, November 30, 2011 10:58:58 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 1, Art. 19
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/19
PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Promoting Global Maritime Partnerships
THE OCEANS OF THE EARTH cover nearly three-quarters of the blue
planet’s surface. They have long been the subject of reflection and
study. At Tufts University’s Fletcher School the oceans are being examined as
source, avenue, and arena: a source for foodstuffs and energy; an avenue for goods,
people, and ideas; and an arena for struggle and warfare. This is a simple but ele-
gant rubric for studying this complex environment, one that aligns well with the
educational focus we have at the Naval War College. As students of the oceans, na-
val officers are keenly aware of the centuries of armed conflict that have often
turned peaceful waters into scenes of destruction and death.
Stability and progress in international relations are the goals on which the
Naval War College’s various Global Maritime Partnership programs are focused.
Although the College’s doors have been open to frequent international visitors
since the end of the nineteenth century, the foundation of our current interna-
tional academic programs can be traced to the desire of Admiral Arleigh Burke,
as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), to enhance the ability of NATO allies and
other treaty partners to work together effectively on issues of common concern.
Burke recalled discussions he had once had with a former Imperial Japanese
Navy officer after the close of World War II. That officer bemoaned the possibil-
ity that despite their remarkable tenacity and operational excellence the Japa-
nese had lost the war because of inadequate scholarship in military schools.
Admiral Burke countered that more interaction among military professionals
(at places like the Naval War College) might have prevented the war from occur-
ring at all. To encourage such potentially beneficial contacts, he directed the for-
mation of a permanent location for professional discussion and debate. In the
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summer of 1956, officers from twenty-three nations gathered in Newport for the
inaugural class of the College’s first full-time international program, the Naval
Command College (NCC). This yearlong course paralleled, to the degree that
security restrictions would allow, the course of study followed by U.S. students.
When highly classified topics, such as nuclear operations, were covered, the
NCC students engaged in professional visits to military, industrial, and govern-
mental institutions around the country.
Today’s NCC welcomes top-performing officers from over sixty nations each
year in a course of study that is almost fully integrated with the academic program
of our U.S. students. In the fifty-five years that have passed since the first course,
the Naval Command College has graduated nearly two thousand officers from
more than a hundred friendly nations. With the success of this program as inspi-
ration, in 1972 a tailored version of the yearlong program, to be completed in only
five months, was established as the Naval Staff College (NSC). Over the years,
more than 2,100 officers, many from the world’s smaller navies, have graduated
from this highly regarded program. The over 4,100 alumni from these two pro-
grams constitute a remarkable network of maritime professionals who share not
only a love of the sea but also deep and personal appreciation for the strengths of
their fellow mariners, their nations, and their cultures.
In addition to these on-campus international education programs, the Col-
lege conducts conferences, symposia, and other research and collaboration ini-
tiatives on a recurring basis. Here are just a few.
The International Seapower Symposium. The largest gathering of naval leaders
in history just occurred in Newport, when the twentieth International Seapower
Symposium (ISS-20) was held at the College on 18–21 October 2011. Address-
ing the theme “Security and Prosperity through Maritime Partnerships,” the ISS
was attended by chiefs of navies and coast guards from 111 nations. This event,
hosted by the CNO, has been held here in Newport every two years since 1969,
the only exception being 2001, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The sympo-
sium offers an incredible arena for the world’s maritime leaders to discuss com-
mon challenges and to promote international maritime security cooperation.
These discussions offer opportunities for future regional and international col-
laboration in seeking solutions to challenges facing the global network of mari-
time nations. The ISS is unique in that it is the only forum in the world that
regularly brings together the heads of navies to enhance maritime security and
collaborative operations. Leon Panetta, the Secretary of Defense, welcomed the
delegates in a video in which he highlighted the purpose of the symposium:
“Lifting all of our nations towards a better future is what this is all about. On be-
half of President Obama, I want to thank you for your service and for your
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collective efforts to promote a more peaceful, a more stable, and a more prosper-
ous world.” The CNO, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, reiterated the value of mari-
ners working together: “Maritime security is impossible for one nation. No one
can do it alone. It’s a team effort. It’s a team sport.” In his keynote address, the
Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, encouraged the assembled leaders to “seek
out ways to work together and take advantage of the common bond between
sailors that share one culture and one sea-going tradition that has been two mil-
lennia in the making.” He went on to acknowledge the value of international
maritime partnerships, declaring, “The best response [to any problem] is one
heard from many voices.”
Discussions at previous ISS events resulted in many successful efforts to
enhance cooperation in countering piracy, providing disaster relief and hu-
manitarian assistance, coordinating search and rescue at sea (including sub-
marine rescue), and planning and conducting coalition military and joint law-
enforcement operations to counter arms, drug, and human trafficking, and
fisheries and pollution violations. Building on a common understanding of
the most pervasive challenges faced by the maritime nations, ISS-20 provided
the delegates with numerous opportunities to foster trust and confidence.
Regional Alumni Symposia. Many of the advantages of the biennial ISS are real-
ized on a more frequent basis through a series of Regional Alumni Symposia
held at venues around the globe. Since 2005 the College has hosted eight sympo-
sia at various regional locations as opportunities to reunite alumni of our resi-
dent international education programs. The most recent event, cosponsored by
the French Navy, was held in Toulon, France, in September 2011. It brought to-
gether alumni from throughout the European region. The symposium’s theme,
“Enhancing Regional Stability: NATO’s New Maritime Strategy and Other Ini-
tiatives,” built on concepts for enhancing global maritime partnerships that had
been discussed in depth during the International Seapower Symposium of 2009.
In Toulon, symposium participants examined existing cooperative structures
and investigated future possibilities for enhanced interoperability and informa-
tion sharing in the region. The aim of this event, as for the other seven symposia
held since the series began, was to use our alumni’s shared experiences in New-
port to enhance trust and confidence and to facilitate ongoing cooperation. The
meetings allow alumni to interact and exchange views with one another, with
the College’s faculty, and with U.S. senior military leadership from the region.
They support the goals outlined in the U.S. Navy’s “Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower” by promoting collaboration, sharing ideas, and encouraging
and facilitating future cooperation. The Regional Alumni Symposia also pro-
vide unique forums at which regional and fleet commanders and their staffs can
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 1 1
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engage directly and informally with a cross section of international graduates
from both the NCC and NSC.
Regional Studies Groups. On our home campus in Newport, we have established
six Regional Studies Groups (RSGs) to facilitate faculty and student research in
support of the College’s mission to provide direct support to the CNO and the
geographical combatant commanders. The Regional Studies Groups now in op-
eration are Europe-Russia Studies, Greater Middle East Studies, Latin American
Studies, Africa Studies, Indian Ocean Studies, and Asia-Pacific Studies (closely
associated with the Van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies).
Each RSG comprises faculty members and students with expertise, experi-
ence, and interest in the U.S. policy and maritime affairs of the designated re-
gion. The RSGs act as catalysts, coordinators, and implementers of research that
serves the needs of the Navy, combatant commanders, and other elements of the
U.S. government responsible for formulating policy, developing strategy, and
devising operational plans for each area. Within the College itself, the groups
serve as focal points for information sharing related to major policy develop-
ments within the regions. The groups also perform important outreach func-
tions by facilitating faculty participation in major conferences and research
activities in the various regions and throughout the United States.
China Maritime Studies Institute. The maritime relationship between the
United States and China will be particularly critical to the world’s maritime se-
curity in the twenty-first century. China’s rapidly expanding overseas commerce
and the growth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy are facts that deserve and
demand considerable study and analysis. Just over five years ago the College es-
tablished an organization, and recruited superb young Mandarin-speaking fac-
ulty, to enable such studies to take place. The China Maritime Studies Institute
(CMSI), established to increase knowledge and understanding of the maritime
dimensions of China’s rise, supports the research needs of the U.S. Navy and the
larger academic community. The CMSI conducts research in functional areas
including energy, global commerce, law of the sea, maritime technologies, mer-
chant marine, naval developments, naval diplomacy, and shipbuilding. The in-
stitute’s many published books and monographs have become “required
reading” for China scholars around the world. Its contributions to the body of
knowledge in the field continue to grow each day.
Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Course. The recognition of
the importance of allies being able to interact smoothly in operational situations
created the demand for a specialized course that would enhance the abilities of
senior offers to work together effectively. The Combined Force Maritime
Component Commander (CFMCC) Course was developed to promote
1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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understanding and regional awareness while cultivating positive relationships
among U.S. and international flag and general officers. At least half of the stu-
dents in these regionally focused courses, which are cohosted by the appropriate
fleet commanders, represent the military forces of the region. To facilitate par-
ticipation and reduce travel requirements, the courses are held in the respective
theaters. CFMCC courses have explored the issue of command above the tactical
level, looking at the art and science involved in operating naval forces in a multi-
national environment. They have focused on cooperation and collaboration us-
ing scenarios based on joint and combined exercises or humanitarian assistance
and disaster response operations. The CFMCC courses have had a significant
impact in helping regional teams address such challenges as piracy, earthquake
response, and tsunamis. For example, graduates from New Zealand and Japan of
the course held in Pearl Harbor in February 2011 returned home to find them-
selves almost immediately leading real-world missions in response to disasters
in their countries. The shared experiences of that CFMCC course were in that
instance of immediate and real benefit to the world.
{LINE-SPACE}
This is only a brief overview of some of the ways the Naval War College is work-
ing, with many international partners, to encourage peace and stability. Individ-
ually, navies can accomplish much good for their nations, but collectively they
can do much of the hard work required to make the ongoing globalization of
benefit to all.
JOHN N. CHRISTENSON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 1 3
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Dr. Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic 
Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College, 
a founding member of the department’s China Mari-
time Studies Institute, and an associate in research at 
Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for 
Chinese Studies. Erickson received his PhD and MA 
in international relations and comparative politics 
from Princeton University. His research has been pub-
lished widely, and he is coeditor of and a contribu-
tor to the Naval Institute Press book series Studies in 
Chinese Maritime Development, the latest of which is 
Chinese Aerospace Power (2011). He is also cofound-
er of China SignPost™ 洞察中国, www.chinasignpost
.com. 
Mr. Denmark is an Asia-Pacifi c Security Adviser at 
CNA and a member of the 21st Century Leadership 
Council at the National Committee on American 
Foreign Policy. He was previously a Fellow with the 
Center for a New American Security and served in the 
Pentagon as Country Director for China Affairs in the 
Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense. He is widely pub-
lished in Asia and the United States and has authored 
several reports on U.S. policy and strategy toward 
the Asia-Pacifi c region and the global commons. Mr. 
Denmark received a master’s degree in international 
security from the Josef Korbel School of International 
Studies at the University of Denver and studied at 
China Foreign Affairs University and Peking University. 
Mr. Collins is a private-sector investment analyst and 
a former Naval War College research fellow. He is co-
founder of China SignPost™ and is a JD candidate at 
the University of Michigan Law School. 
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ust as a newlywed couple wants a “starter home,” a new great power wants a 
“starter carrier.” China’s navy has finally realized its longtime dream of obtaining 
an aircraft carrier and sending it to sea. This is the first step in a long journey that 
will change China’s navy and how it relates to the world.
At 5:40 AM local time on Wednesday, 10 August 2011, more than eighty years 
after the idea was originally proposed, China’s first carrier disappeared into the 
fog under tight security from Dalian harbor’s Xianglujiao Port, in northeast Liao-
ning Province, to begin sea trials in the Bohai and northern Yellow Seas. This 
was yet another coming-out party for China as a great power on the rise. Upon 
its launch, the nation burst with patriotic pride over the achievement. Major 
General Luo Yuan, deputy secretary-general of the China Society of Military Sci-
ences, declared, “Well begun is half done. . . . [T]he effect of having something 
is completely different from the effect of having nothing.”1 Plans are under way 
to commemorate this new era of Chinese sea power, and to boost the economy 
further in the process. Tianjin, one of the country’s four municipalities, plans to 
do its part in October 2011 by opening China’s first aircraft carrier–themed hotel, 
based on Kiev, once the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s flagship and now the centerpiece of 
the Tianjin Binhai Aircraft Carrier Theme Park. A Chinese flagship as capable as 
Kiev once was remains far away, but Beijing has taken the first step and is already 
reaping added influence at home and abroad.
Before foreign strategists start hyperventilating about the “beginning of the 
end,” however, a deep breath is needed. China’s initial carrier foray followed a 
six-year refit and lasted only four days. China’s starter carrier—a vessel originally 
purchased incomplete from Ukraine in 1998—is of very limited military utility; 
it will serve primarily to confer prestige on a rising great power, help the Chinese 
Andrew S. Erickson, Abraham M. Denmark, and Gabriel Collins
Alternatives and Implications
BEIJING’S “STARTER CARRIER” AND FUTURE STEPS
J
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military master basic procedures of naval airpower, and project a bit of military 
power—perhaps especially against the smaller neighbors on the periphery of the 
South China Sea. This is not the beginning of the end; it is the end of the begin-
ning. To realize its ambitions for the future, China had to start somewhere.
Late in 2010, Admiral Liu Huaqing, the father of China’s modern navy, passed 
away. Liu had sought to build China’s navy first into a “green water” force and 
thereafter, eventually, into a “blue water” navy capable of projecting power re-
gionally, though not globally. He insisted that he was not China’s Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, but his concept of “Near Seas defense” was roughly comparable to Ma-
han’s views on U.S. naval strategic requirements (i.e., dominance of the Gulf of 
Mexico, the Caribbean, Panama, and Hawaii). The key to the realization of Liu’s 
vision was an aircraft carrier, and Liu reportedly vowed in 1987, “I will not die 
with my eyes closed if I do not see a Chinese aircraft carrier in front of me.”2 Ad-
miral Liu’s eyes can close now. 
Much of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the Asia-watching strategic commu-
nity in the United States, is hotly debating the implications of Chinese aircraft-
carrier development. Admiral Robert Willard, commander of U.S. Pacific Com-
mand, said in April 2011 that he was “not concerned” about China’s first carrier 
going to sea, but allowed, “Based on the feedback that we received from our part-
ners and allies in the Pacific, I think the change in perception by the region will be 
significant.”3 Australian brigadier general John Frewen contends, “The unintend-
ed consequences of Chinese carriers pose the greatest threat to regional harmony 
in the decades ahead.”4 Former director of Defense Intelligence Headquarters in 
the Japan Defense Agency Admiral Fumio Ota, JMSDF (Ret.), asserts, “The trials 
of China’s first aircraft carrier . . . mark the beginning of a major transition in na-
val doctrine. . . . Aircraft carriers will provide Beijing with tremendous capabili-
ties and flexibility. . . . [A] Chinese carrier could pose a serious threat to Japanese 
territorial integrity. . . . China’s new aircraft carrier increases its tactical abilities 
and the chances of a strategic overreach. Other countries in the region should be 
worried.”5
Yet while the Asia-Pacific region is hotly debating the implications of China’s 
aircraft carrier, there should be little surprise that a Chinese aircraft carrier has 
finally set sail. Indeed, what is most surprising about China’s aircraft carrier pro-
gram is that it took this long to come to fruition. Given the discussions about an 
aircraft carrier that have percolated in China’s strategic community for decades, 
it should have been clear to the entire region that this was a long time coming. 
CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO A CARRIER 
It has been a long, winding road to ex-Varyag’s sea trials. For decades, the story of 
Chinese aircraft-carrier development was one of repeated rejection. In 1928, the 
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commander of China’s British-trained navy, Chen Shaokuan, submitted a pro-
posal that an aircraft carrier be obtained to the Guomindang government, which 
rejected it the following year. Through 1945 Chen made two more detailed re-
quests, but wartime conditions thwarted them. After the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Premier Zhou Enlai and the first commander 
of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Xiao Jinguang, supported aircraft 
carrier development; Mao Zedong himself declared in 1958 that China needed 
carriers.6 These efforts too were fruitless—China had finally consolidated con-
trol over its continental landmass but could not hope to project naval power into 
American- and Soviet-dominated waters just off its coast, particularly as Maoist 
excesses convulsed the nation from within.
Since then, Chinese aircraft-carrier development has been shrouded in inter-
nal indecision and external obfuscation. “China will never build an aircraft carri-
er,” a senior Beijing official told a group of foreign visitors in 1971. “Aircraft carri-
ers are tools of imperialism, and they’re like sitting ducks waiting to be shot.”7 Yet 
even as Beijing was officially denying categorically that it would engage in aircraft 
carrier construction, Liu Huaqing, then deputy chief of staff of the PLAN, was 
already examining this very possibility (see the sidebar).8 “As early as 1970 when 
I worked in the Office of the Leading Group for the Shipbuilding Industry,” he 
would recall in his memoirs, “I organized a special feasibility study for building 
aircraft carriers as instructed by the higher authorities and submitted a project 
proposal to them.”9
A former PLAN official has confirmed to one of the authors that his service 
was by that time already thinking about aircraft carriers. Before the Sino-Soviet 
split of 1960 and, because of technological and doctrinal inertia, for some time 
beyond that, he explained, the PLAN copied developments in the Soviet navy, be-
cause it purchased weapons systems from the Soviet Union. Following the Sino-
Soviet split in the early 1960s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a whole— 
forced to reconsider how it acquired military equipment—realized that it would 
have to rely on indigenous resources and innovation. 
Unfortunately for PLAN leaders, however, China at that time was in the throes 
of the Cultural Revolution and had turned its back on the outside world. Its mili-
tary was focused primarily on preserving internal stability and administering the 
last vestiges of a ravaged state system. The PLA’s culture, like that of its civilian 
leadership, was overwhelmingly ground-centric, informed by experiences in the 
Chinese civil war and the Korean War. China was a traditional continental power; 
PLA leaders were groomed within the ground forces and looked down on their 
counterparts in the PLA’s much smaller naval and air force components. Indeed, 
as late as the mid-1990s the PLAN was commanded by “generals,” not “admi-
rals.”10 Thus, the PLAN’s operations were constrained to littoral (yanhai, 沿海) 
Continued on page 7
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CHINA CARRIER DEVELOPMENT TIME LINE
1928 China’s British-trained navy commander Chen Shaokuan sub-
mits China’s first aircraft carrier proposal to the Guomindang 
government, which rejects it the following year. Chen’s two sub-
sequent requests through 1945 are likewise rejected.
Post-1949 Premier Zhou Enlai and first PLAN commander Xiao Jinguang 
support aircraft carrier development, but conditions do not per-
mit it.
1958 Chairman Mao Zedong declares at a 21 June CMC meeting that 
China needs “railways on the sea” of merchantmen escorted by 
aircraft carriers. Proposal dies due to a lack of funds.
1960 Sino-Soviet split. Reduces Soviet influence on Chinese naval de-
velopment but also hinders it.
1970 As PLAN deputy chief of staff, Liu Huaqing organizes carrier fea-
sibility study per higher authorities’ instructions; financial con-
straints preclude implementation.
Late 1970s Chairman Hua Guofeng expresses support for plans to import 
or jointly build an eighteen-thousand-ton STOVL carrier. Project 
founders when China feels that British suppliers are asking too 
high a price.
1978 Deng Xiaoping consolidates power, unleashes economic re-
forms that will greatly expand China’s overseas and maritime 
interests.
1982–88 Adm. Liu Huaqing advocates for aircraft carrier construction 
during his term as PLAN chief, but political and financial sup-
port prove insufficient. Commissions PLAN Equipment Depart-
ment to conduct a carrier development feasibility study, which 
concludes funding insufficient.
1985 China purchases former Australian carrier HMAS Melbourne.
1992–97 Adm. Liu continues to champion the establishment of a carrier 
program during his time as CMC vice chairman, but President 
Jiang Zemin, who chairs the CMC, disagrees because he fears 
carrier development will disturb the United States and China’s 
neighbors.
1995 Beijing reportedly interested in purchasing Clemenceau from 
France.
1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis underscores volatility of Taiwan’s status, mo-
tivates Beijing to devote additional resources to PLAN antiaccess 
capabilities, further delays aircraft carrier prioritization. 
1995–96 Having built Thailand’s Chakri Naruebet, Spain’s Empresa Nacio-
nal Bazán reportedly attempts to market its SAC-200 and -220 
light CATOBAR designs, but apparently Beijing prefers design 
plans to a prebuilt carrier; no deal is reached.
1998 China purchases the former Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk from a 
South Korean firm.
1998 Chong Lot Travel Agency purchases incomplete Varyag carrier 
hull from Ukraine for U.S.$20 million. 
2000 China purchases the former Soviet carrier Kiev from Ukraine. It 
eventually becomes a tourist attraction at Tianjin Binhai Aircraft 
Carrier Theme Park.
2001 Varyag hull is towed to China, and arrives in 2002 after com-
plex, costly voyage through Bosporus, out the Strait of Gibraltar, 
and around southern Africa and through the Strait of Malacca.
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and coastal (jin’an, 近岸) areas. There was no development of aircraft carriers for 
a long time, as a result of the lack of priority given to their perceived purpose and 
to naval forces generally.
In the late 1970s Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the Communist Party’s Central 
Advisory Commission and de facto leader of the PRC, launched a program of 
“reform and opening up,” which had the effect of exposing China to the out-
side world and linking its rejuvenating economy to the global economy through 
exports, imports, and investment. China’s national interests were no longer re-
stricted to its 960 million square kilometers of claimed territory and surrounding 
territorial waters, but increasingly extended to foreign markets and resources. It is 
within this context that Admiral Liu Huaqing, as PLAN commander (1982–88), 
began thinking beyond coastal defense and called for a more expansive Near Seas 
defense strategy.
The “Near Seas” concept encompasses the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, the East 
China Sea, and the South China Sea (of which China claims the vast majority), as 
well as islands in all three seas. The Near Seas are thus seen as constituting a kind 
of naval defensive perimeter, one that both protects China’s commercial fleet and 
2004 President Hu Jintao becomes CMC chairman; supports greater 
PLAN role, larger regional and global presence. At expanded 
CMC conference on 24 December, Hu introduces new military 
policy that defines PLA’s four “new historic missions.” Hu also 
later endorses a PLAN Far Seas operations concept entailing 
some increase in power-projection capabilities.
2004 China reportedly obtains an unlicensed copy of a Su-33 carrier 
aircraft from Ukraine.
2004–2005 U.S., Indian, and Japanese response to Indian Ocean tsunami 
demonstrates value of deck aviation assets (e.g., USS Abraham 
Lincoln carrier strike group) to humanitarian assistance and di-
saster relief; underscores Chinese inability to contribute in this 
area.
2005 First photos of Varyag in dry dock at Dalian shipyard.
2006 Press reports of impending Su-33 contract between Russia and 
China (never finalized).
2007 At a media briefing during the annual National People’s Con-
gress, a PLA lieutenant general tells reporters that China’s air-
craft carrier program is proceeding smoothly.
2009 First photos of J-15 prototype and Z-8 AEW prototype appear 
on Internet.
2010 Photos appear in late 2010 showing steam emanating from 
Varyag, suggesting that its main power plant is being tested.
2011 PLA chief of staff General Chen Bingde confirms that China is 
developing indigenous carriers. Ex-Varyag begins sea trials on 
10 August.
Sources: Li and Weuve, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions”; Reuters, New York Times 
(various articles); Chinese Internet (various sites); GlobalSecurity.org (various pages).
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defends the mainland (especially the economically vital coastal areas) from for-
eign invasion. Therefore, the Near Seas are seen by Beijing as closely related to 
China’s national interests. Yet China’s maritime interests do not stop in the Near 
Seas but are increasingly seen as extending far beyond China’s long coastline. As 
Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhang elaborated in April 2009, “In order to defend the 
security of the national territory, marine territories, and the waters within the 
First Island Chain, [China’s] proactive defense strategy does not mean that our 
navy only stays within the First Island Chain. Only when the Chinese navy goes 
beyond the First Island Chain will China be able to expand its strategic depth of 
security for its marine territories.”11 The map depicts these features.
Admiral Liu considered the aircraft carrier question within this strategic con-
text and put forward a concept based on the proposition that, given the geograph-
ic expansion of Chinese interests and naval requirements, the security of China’s 
fleet could not be guaranteed by land-based aircraft alone. At Liu’s direction, 
the PLAN Equipment Department researched the technological and resource 
demands of producing an aircraft carrier. This study concluded that the scope 
and complexity of the project, involving not only aircraft carriers but their sup-
port ships and aircraft as well, would pose a daunting challenge for China’s still-
nascent defense-industrial complex. It reviewed the following considerations:
• An aircraft carrier had fi rst to meet PLAN requirements.
• China’s science and technology levels would have to overcome serious 
developmental problems.
• China would have to achieve the capability to produce all the relevant vessels 
and aircraft.
• The PLAN would have to marshal the requisite resources necessary to 
produce the carrier. 
Ultimately, the study concluded, the PLAN had great need for an aircraft carrier 
but funding was insufficient. The PLA budget suffered negative growth during 
this period; there was not enough money to build destroyers, let alone a carrier. 
But PLAN experts felt that their work was not in vain, as they had gained a much 
greater understanding of vital naval systems. They believed that the navy would 
ultimately build an aircraft carrier, but not for the time being. Prior to 1989, the 
PLA purchased limited amounts of equipment from the United States; after 1989 
the PLAN purchased naval vessels from Russia (and systems from Ukraine), but 
aircraft carriers never came into play. 
Calculations began to change after the turn of the century. China’s economy 
had expanded sharply, as had its national interests in the outside world. Around 
2000 the PLAN resumed consideration of an aircraft carrier program. Its experts 
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recognized that issues of complexity remained, but felt that China’s newfound 
wealth and the concomitant rise in its external interests and international pres-
tige called for a renewed effort. As the former PLAN official emphasized to one 
of the authors, “An aircraft carrier is a very complex weapons system, and dem-
onstrates overall national strength. China is the only permanent member of the 
UN Security Council without an aircraft carrier; even Third World nations have 
aircraft carriers. The PLAN will build an aircraft carrier to fulfill a national task: 
to safeguard territorial sovereignty and national interests.” Senior Captain Li Jie, 
a well-known analyst at the Naval Research Institute, the PLAN’s strategic think 
tank, seconded this view: “No great power that has become a strong power has 
achieved this without developing carriers.”12 
In 2004 the president of the PRC and general secretary of the Chinese Com-
munist Party, Hu Jintao, having recently become chairman of the Central Mili-
tary Commission (CMC) as well, supported a larger regional and global pres-
ence for the PLAN. At an expanded CMC conference on 24 December 2004, Hu 
introduced new military policy that defined four “new historic missions” for the 
PLA: first, to serve as an “important source of strength” for the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP) to “consolidate its ruling position”; second, to “provide a solid 
security guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity 
for national development”; third, to “provide a strong strategic support for safe-
guarding national interests”; and fourth, to “play an important role in maintain-
ing world peace and promoting common development.”13 Hu has since endorsed 
a PLAN “Far Seas” operations (远海作战) concept entailing some increase in 
power-projection capabilities.14 The Far Seas, as employed in PLA theory, extend 
to the approaches to the Second Island Chain and beyond. Operating therein en-
tails projecting power over a thousand nautical miles and more from China’s ter-
ritorial waters.15 (See the map for a graphical depiction of these areas.) 
Beijing’s long march toward aircraft carrier status began in earnest in 1998, 
when China’s Chong Lot Travel Agency purchased from Ukraine the unfinished 
hull of the former Soviet carrier Varyag for U.S.$20 million, initially claiming the 
hull would be used as a casino.16 Three years later the hull was towed through the 
Bosporus, out the Strait of Gibraltar, around southern Africa, and through the 
Malacca Strait to its new home in northeast China. There ex-Varyag was outfit-
ted, slowly but deliberately, not with slot machines or blackjack tables but with 
engines, radars, and weapons. There would be no gambling with this strategic 
opportunity.
Ten years after gliding ignominiously into Dalian harbor, ex-Varyag has left it 
again, reborn as a symbol of China as a rising naval power on the world scene. 
According to a PLAN officer with whom one of the authors has spoken, the ship 
will undergo sea trials for roughly a year and become fully operational no later 
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than 2015. But questions remain. What are the new carrier’s capabilities? How 
will China use its new carrier? 
INTRODUCING CHINA’S STARTER CARRIER
Ex-Varyag is currently undergoing a series of predelivery tests and modifications 
by Dalian Naval Shipyard and the Chinese defense industry, including trials in a 
rectangular area off Dalian, within China’s territorial waters. This has been an in-
cremental process. First, under PLAN supervision, the shipyard checked all major 
systems and equipment (main propulsion, auxiliary, damage control, deck, elec-
trical, interior environmental safety protection, navigation, and spares) to ensure 
that the carrier’s hardware met contract requirements for sea trials. Testing of the 
engines, for instance, explained the appearance of smoke at the pier. Then, several 
days before the first sea trials, design and construction teams continued to work 
while PLAN personnel rehearsed the task of getting the ship under way as realisti-
cally as possible and made preparations.17
The PLAN is apparently satisfied now with the quality of the ship’s refurbish-
ment; China’s defense industry and its oversight organizations have been restruc-
tured to address previous concerns about inadequacies in development and pro-
duction of military systems. Following completion of the test and trial program, 
there will be a ceremony to name the vessel, and it will be commissioned and ac-
cepted into PLAN service. The crew members can then leave the auxiliary vessel 
(hull number 88), currently being used to house them and to serve as a base for 
their training, and take up residence on board the carrier itself. 
Training 
The carrier’s series of sea trials are being conducted close to home in order both 
to make the vessel a bit less accessible to prying eyes (and unauthorized digital 
cameras), and to keep it near home port should mechanical problems material-
ize. For the next several years, the focus will be on testing equipment and getting 
the crew used to operating such a large ship and then, having achieved some 
proficiency in these basic skills, on flight testing and training. Key questions that 
may arise in the course of future sea trials include:
• How reliable is the vessel’s propulsion system? The ship’s main propulsion 
plant is the highest-probability risk factor for complications during trials.
• When will PLAN Aviation attempt to land aircraft on the ship at sea? Will 
China use its top J-15 pilot to achieve a landing for a quick publicity coup? 
Intermediate possibilities include helicopter operations (which could be 
facilitated by the availability of helicopter pilots with shipborne operating 
experience, courtesy of the Gulf of Aden antipiracy mission), or, in the case 
of fi xed-wing aircraft, “touch and go” approaches. 
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Aircraft operations are of course the fundamental reason for having a carrier 
capability, but actual landings of fixed-wing aircraft (deck-handling practice and 
even takeoffs, by aircraft lifted on board by crane from a pier, represent a lower 
hurdle) will likely be accomplished gradually.18 This process could be protracted, 
particularly if initial, modest efforts run into problems. However, in determining 
possible operational-capability trajectories, one must consider China’s deck avia-
tion options broadly, taking into account particularly the experience of destroy-
ers and frigates in the nine task forces sent to the Gulf of Aden to date. What is 
certain is that for any nation, mastering carrier operations requires mastering a 
complex system of systems that includes research and development, supply and 
logistics, training, combat air operations, maintenance, and personnel and facili-
ties management.
Capabilities. While ex-Varyag’s capabilities clearly represent a “work in progress,” 
it is not just a “training carrier” per se, as USS Lexington (AVT 16) was in the last 
decades of its storied career. Its hardware does not need to be upgraded radically 
for operational service; it already possesses a Dragon Eye phased-array radar, a 
new point-defense missile system, and a new close-in weapon system. The Drag-
on Eye can reportedly track up to a hundred targets while engaging fifty simulta-
neously, detect targets out to sixty-five nautical miles (120 kilometers), and track 
targets out to 48.6 nautical miles (ninety kilometers).19 Together, no matter how 
it is portrayed officially, these factors make it more than a training ship and rather 
a modestly capable warship. 
Trajectory. China’s defense-industrial base, which has long favored pragmatic 
incrementalism, not surprisingly has adopted a “crawl, walk, run” approach to 
carrier development. By this logic, the first domestic aircraft carrier hull, already 
reportedly under construction (and perhaps others as well), will closely resemble 
the Russian Kuznetsov class (of which Varyag was originally a member), albeit 
with largely internal improvements that are invisible to casual observers. This 
would be not wholesale copying but emulation and incremental improvement.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “the PLA Navy will likely build 
several additional carriers in Chinese shipyards.” Specifically, “construction of 
China’s first indigenous carrier, which would likely have a . . . displacement and 
design [similar to those] of the [ex-Varyag], could begin as early as 2011. If China 
commences construction in 2011, the PLA Navy could have its first indigenous 
carrier achieving operational capability as early as 2015.”20 The nature of China’s 
second domestic aircraft-carrier hull should offer a good indicator of where its 
program is headed overall: Will it suggest the breaking of new ground, a branch-
ing out, or a continuation of incremental improvements on a basic design?
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Equipment. Not enough is known publicly about the original machinery or the 
ship’s condition when the Chinese obtained it to make detailed judgments. But 
given China’s strong and growing shipbuilding capabilities and the ultimate use 
of ex-Varyag as China’s first aircraft carrier, it seems doubtful that anything was 
too problematic for Chinese technicians to work with effectively. Moreover, it 
seems unlikely that China would put so much work into ex-Varyag if the hull 
were fundamentally unsound. The engineering plant is now likely complete and 
fairly robust, although without firsthand accounts such conclusions are highly 
speculative. Any secondary systems associated with flight operations not yet in-
stalled should come shortly.
China’s growing proficiency in building massive ore carriers and oil tankers 
suggests that Chinese yards can fabricate hulls up to supercarrier size. It is also 
very likely that China’s burgeoning steel industry will be able to produce plat-
ing of sufficiently high quality to build carriers (in contrast to India, which has 
struggled to produce domestically high-quality steel for its indigenous carrier 
programs). As an example of the Chinese shipbuilding industry’s rising ability to 
procure and assemble vessels from quality materials, the Japanese shipowner MOL 
has ordered four large liquefied-natural-gas (LNG) carriers from the Hudong-
Zhonghua shipyard for delivery between 2014 and 2016.21 MOL’s order is the first 
Japanese purchase of LNG carriers from a Chinese shipyard, but the vessels will 
be co-operated by Chinese firms and used to haul LNG from Papua New Guinea 
to terminals in China.22 The yard has already delivered five LNG carriers and had 
a sixth vessel under construction as of December 2010, scheduled for delivery 
in 2012.23 Public sources currently do not say whether more LNG carriers are 
under construction in Chinese yards. However, the ability to fashion a carrier’s 
hull has little bearing on capacity to build and integrate its systems, fittings, and 
machinery and then turn it into a floating air base that carries planes, fuel, muni-
tions, catapults, and at least several hundred personnel. Perfecting the internal 
components of this immensely complex vessel and then learning to operate it as 
part of a battle group will likely require many years of trial and error, a process that 
cannot draw directly on China’s growing shipyard capacity. It is also, however, a 
venture that will help China develop its defense shipbuilding industry more com-
prehensively, a concept supported by Li Jie, who notes that a carrier construction 
program benefits “the entire development of a nation’s naval forces; with carriers, 
in fact all naval arms armament is led forward in systematized fashion.”24
Aircraft. News reports, as well as the former PLAN official, have confirmed that 
China has purchased from Ukraine the Su-27K carrier-capable fighter and that 
the indigenously produced J-15 Flying Shark fighter is based on the carrier-
capable Sukhoi Su-33. In its latest report on China’s military, the Defense Depart-
ment states that the J-15 “is reportedly an unlicensed copy of a Russian Su-33, 
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which China obtained from Ukraine in 2004.”25 Press reports indicate that the 
Su-33 was nonflyable;26 China likely exploited this airframe extensively and ap-
plied to it the improved radar and avionics that it employs on the J-11B, the 
indigenous version of the Su-27. The J-15 is currently undergoing flight testing.27 
China currently possesses a small number of carrier-capable fighter proto-
types, and Chinese media report that the PLAN has begun to train a first genera-
tion of naval aviators, presumably using runways on land. Additionally, at least 
one prototype Shanying (Mountain Eagle) JT-9 trainer exists with a tailhook (to 
engage flight-deck arresting gear). This aircraft is different from the grey-painted 
Jiaolianji (training aircraft) JJ-7B trainers currently in service with the PLAN’s 
7th Air Division. The land-based JJ-7B is equipped with ventral fins but no hook 
and is thus equipped for land basing only; the prototype JT-9 version, with a tail-
hook and no ventral fins, suggests plans to field a carrier-capable trainer. The JJ-
7B has an export designator, Fighter Trainer China (FTC)–2000, although none 
have been purchased by foreign militaries thus far.28
Personnel. Regarding aviators and “ship drivers” alike, it is first necessary to “train 
the trainers.” In keeping with the pattern observed in helicopter operations by 
initial Gulf of Aden counterpiracy task forces, China’s first batch of carrier pi-
lots will almost certainly be experienced “high-powered sticks,” not “nuggets” 
fresh out of the flight school. When ex-Varyag first deploys with a contingent of 
(presumably) J-15s, perhaps about ten, all pilots will likely be commanders, cap-
tains, or senior captains. Likewise, particularly senior and distinguished officers 
will probably command both ex-Varyag and the first domestically built carrier 
and fill key billets in the programmatic aspects of China’s carrier program. Bai 
Yaoping, one of the nine graduates of China’s first aviator/ship commander class, 
has been listed among the top choices to command the country’s first carrier. 
Currently the assistant commandant of the Dalian Naval Academy, Bai report-
edly has “specially handled the aircraft carrier command personnel and combat 
service personnel’s training.” Perhaps even more likely to be selected for this de-
manding responsibility is Bai’s classmate Li Xiaoyan. Hailed as a “celebrity cap-
tain” for his distinguished career, Li served in a South Sea Fleet destroyer division 
as executive-officer-in-training of Nanning and executive officer of Nanchang. 
He also served as captain of escort vessel Jiangmen and the destroyer Shenzhen. 
In 2000, while Shenzhen’s captain-in-training, Li “and his comrades in arms set 
records for the first navigation across the . . . Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and 
the Atlantic Ocean, the first crossing of the Indian Ocean, and the first time going 
around the Cape of Good Hope in a Chinese navy ship formation. In 2007, when 
he led the ship’s participation in multi-country maritime exercises, Li’s position 
was chief of staff of a certain South Sea Fleet destroyer division.”29
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In May 1987, with CMC approval, China convened its first, and to date only, 
class of “aircraft pilot vessel captains.”30 A rigorous process selected, from nearly 
a thousand naval aviators, ten for a course of three and a half years at the Guang-
zhou Naval Arms Command College. The nine students who passed the course 
were awarded undergraduate degrees with specializations in vessel command in 
1990. Subsequently assigned to destroyers and frigates, they reportedly represent 
the “backbone” of China’s carrier program. These elite graduates typically hold 
the rank of senior captain or rear admiral today, suggesting that the first genera-
tion of Chinese carrier command-
ers will probably hold higher 
ranks than their American coun-
terparts. The “top-heavy” leader-
ship structure of initial Chinese 
carrier operations (to maximize 
the exposure of relevant person-
nel to them) will likely confuse 
foreign observers.31 A weekly journal affiliated with the Guangdong Provincial 
CCP Committee attributes to Li Jie the idea that “we cannot eliminate the pos-
sibility of the navy borrowing from the first aircraft carrier using a rotation for 
training captains to do a good job of preparing for the reserves of aircraft carrier 
command operations that go into service later on.”32
In 2008, a second group of fifty naval aircraft students entered Dalian Naval 
Academy for a four-year program in “ship-borne aircraft flight specialization in 
automation.”33 In the past, Dalian has not trained pilots but rather surface warfare 
officers, engineers, and political officers; one of the degrees it offers is in “ship-
board helicopter command.”34 Dalian cannot be regarded as directly comparable 
to Annapolis; the PLAN has a more numerous and diverse set of naval education 
institutions than does the U.S. Navy. But Dalian is emerging as a cradle of deck-
aviation integration; no other Chinese institution of professional military edu-
cation offers the appropriate size or capabilities. A program of ship navigation 
and command automation (managing shipboard flight operations) at Dalian 
is apparently followed by flight training at Huludao Naval Flight Academy. Less 
clear is the division of labor between Huludao (at which officer candidates and 
lower-level naval aviation commanding officers pursue preassignment majors in 
naval aerial flight, command and staff, and shipborne helicopter command), and 
Yantai Naval Aviation Engineering Academy (at which officer candidates major 
in technical subjects involving aviation engineering).35 At present, naval aviator 
candidates receive basic college education for two and a half years at Yantai fol-
lowed by a year of specialized flight training at Huludao.36 
China’s starter carrier will confer prestige on 
a rising great power, help the Chinese military 
master basic procedures, and project a bit of 
power—perhaps especially against the smaller 
neighbors on the periphery of the South China 
Sea.
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Regardless of the exact specifics, the Defense Department states, “The PLA 
Navy has initiated a land-based program to begin training navy pilots to operate 
fixed-wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier. This program will probably be fol-
lowed in about three years by full-scale ship-borne training aboard [ex-Varyag].” 
In addition, “China is also looking abroad for operational expertise.” Interest-
ingly, “in May 2009, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim announced that 
the Brazilian Navy would provide training to PLA Navy officers in aircraft carrier 
operations. However, Brazil’s limited capabilities in this area and the extensive 
problems associated with Brazil’s own carrier program raise some questions as to 
the implications of the offer.”37 However they are trained, China’s first-generation 
carrier pilots will likely be a small, elite team handpicked to develop and showcase 
Chinese capabilities. It will take years for China’s carrier community to populate 
full-size squadrons.
Accident Risks. Despite this methodical, high-level attention to deck aviation de-
velopment, accidents are highly likely: carrier aviation is a risky, costly business. 
A former U.S. naval aviator, Captain Robert C. “Barney” Rubel, USN (Ret.), notes 
that between 1949, when jets started being deployed in large numbers by the 
Navy, and 1988, when the combined Navy/Marine Corps accident rate was re-
duced to the levels already achieved by the U.S. Air Force, the naval services lost 
almost twelve thousand aircraft and 8,500 aircrew.38 In 1954 alone, the Navy and 
Marines lost 776 aircraft and 535 crewmen, and carrier-based tactical aviation 
suffered higher proportionate losses than the naval services as a whole.39 To be 
sure, China has resolved some of the most fundamental physical issues involved 
in launching and landing aircraft from small, moving airfields, but the process 
remains immensely difficult, and even a less aggressive carrier operator than the 
United States is almost certain to suffer substantial unexpected losses as it builds 
its operational knowledge and human capital. It remains uncertain what finan-
cial and political costs China will incur, but clearly the first Chinese carrier avia-
tors and ship captains face steep challenges. 
Ex-Varyag itself is smaller than American carriers (roughly sixty-five thou-
sand tons vice a hundred thousand—see the table). Also, instead of the catapult 
used by American carriers to launch planes into the air, China’s new carrier fea-
tures a “ski jump,” a bow ramp that helps aircraft take off. Without catapults 
ex-Varyag will likely be unable to launch the heavier aircraft needed for ground 
strikes, intelligence collection, or midair refueling—relegating the ship primarily 
to extending air cover beyond China’s shores. This largely accords with Chinese 
writings on the utility of carriers, which emphasize their importance in provid-
ing air cover for naval operations. The “extended air cover” role indicated by the 
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technical aspects of ex-Varyag generally conforms to Admiral Liu’s conception 
of Near Seas defense. 
Aircraft Carrier Development Options
The smaller the carrier, the less capable and efficient it is likely to be. Any nation 
pursuing carrier development seriously may choose among several basic types. In 
descending order of size, technological sophistication, and operational capacity, 
they are the following.
Catapult-Assisted Takeoff but Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR). Originally created 
by the United Kingdom but perfected by the United States, this is what the Amer-
icans and French currently use for their aircraft carriers and what the British 
will use on their next design. It is considered necessary for heavy aircraft capable 
of long range or heavy payloads. China has no such capability at this time but 
would likely have to acquire it to achieve the means to conduct high-intensity 
carrier operations. Development of catapults would be a major new undertak-
ing for China, far more challenging than refurbishing a former Soviet carrier or 
making its own version of a Russian fighter. Catapults have to be extremely well 
designed and constructed to function effectively—in the words of one American 
specialist that were relayed to the authors, “99 percent is a failing grade.”40 A car-
rier also needs to be able to generate tremendous energy to power catapults while 
steaming into the wind for flight operations.
Embarking the highly capable J-15 airframe, a future Chinese CATOBAR car-
rier would likely have the physical capability to launch a long-range strike pack-
age. But although the J-15 has been modified to land on a ship, its front end has 
not been strengthened for catapult launch (and would likely rip right off if so 
stressed). Whether China can develop the combat and combat-support—such 
as tankers and airborne early warning (AEW)—airframes and train the pilots to 
perform these difficult missions in a high-stress environment remains to be seen, 
but acquiring the ship infrastructure would be a major necessary first step. 
Short Takeoff but Arrested Recovery (STOBAR). This design combines an un-
catapulted, rolling takeoff, typically assisted by a ski jump, with a traditional ar-
rested recovery system, to maximize capacity to “bring back” aircraft laden with 
unexpended weapons and fuel.41 This is the system the Soviet Union used in the 
Kuznetsov class and hence is where China is starting its own carrier development 
efforts. The STOBAR design cannot launch the heavy aircraft that a catapult-
equipped ship can, making it better suited for air defense or light-loaded, short-
range strike. Given the complexity of carrier operations in general, particularly 
long-range strike missions, it would make sense for China’s initial carrier 
operational concepts to focus more on the air-defense mission. This consid-
eration also suggests that China’s initial intention in terms of capability is to 
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acquire a ship that can credibly show the flag and launch large aircraft, however 
lightly loaded. It further suggests that heavy strike missions are not a major prior-
ity in the PLAN’s initial carrier program.
Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing (STOVL). This design uses a rolling takeoff—
again, often assisted by a ski-jump ramp—but brings aircraft back on board ver-
tically. This is the system Spain and the United Kingdom have used on their most 
recent designs (though the British are moving back to CATOBAR). As a general 
rule, and speaking theoretically, aircraft capable of vertical landing can also take 
off vertically, but the performance penalty for doing so is high; load and range are 
far less than can be achieved with even rolling, ski jump–assisted takeoff. China 
may yet pursue this course, but only as a supplement to STOBAR and possibly 
CATOBAR. STOVL carriers would be excellent for supporting humanitarian and 
disaster-relief missions in the Asia-Pacific region or noncombatant evacuations 
farther away if China wished concurrently to make a show of force but in a less 
inflammatory way than a full-size, strike-capable STOBAR or CATOBAR carrier 
would represent. 
The key variable to watch will be whether China develops a STOVL or vertical-
takeoff aircraft like the “J-18” that is periodically mentioned in the media. A de-
cision to devote significant resources to a STOVL carrier and aircraft program 
would suggest that China is more concerned about showing the flag, lower-
intensity combat, and nontraditional security than it is about projecting sub-
stantial airpower far from home. Given China’s rising naval budgets, its current 
program to build additional hulls of the seventeen-to-twenty-thousand-ton Type 
071 landing platform dock (LPD), and its growing interest in nontraditional se-
curity, a Chinese STOVL carrier may well emerge in coming years. The vessel 
would likely resemble the U.S. Wasp class or new Japanese heavy helicopter de-
stroyers (i.e., with a flat deck that would allow vertical takeoffs and landings).42 
A key challenge, however, would be developing a STOVL aircraft and the accom-
panying propulsion systems. For example, Pratt & Whitney’s F135 engine for the 
F-35 Lightning program cost roughly U.S.$7.5 billion and suffered from delays, 
hinting at the technical challenges that exist even for one of the world’s premier 
builders of military jet engines. 
Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL). Periodically proposed for U.S. aircraft car-
riers, to date this approach has been used by the United States only on amphibious 
assault ships. Unlike their STOVL counterparts, VTOL carriers cannot accommo-
date any type of fixed-wing aircraft, as they lack a ski-jump ramp at the bow and 
the ability to generate wind over the deck (i.e., to steam into the wind at high 
speed).43 Beyond conduct of naval diplomacy and humanitarian operations, pro-
vision of close-in support for marines on shore, and limited convoy escort, VTOL 
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carriers have few operational uses. China may also pursue this course, but again 
only as a supplement to STOBAR, and possibly CATOBAR. Given that STOVL 
carriers can effectively operate helicopters, as well as STOVL/VTOL aircraft like 
the Harrier or F-35B, with heavier loads than would be possible on VTOL ships, 
if China desires this capability, STOVL would make far more sense than VTOL. 
CONSTRUCTION PLANS
Given the sheer scale and historic significance of this undertaking, China’s reti-
cence regarding the purposes, and even the basic fact of the construction, of an 
aircraft carrier has been remarkable. When General Chen Bingde, chief of staff 
of the PLA, finally broke Beijing’s official silence on the matter in June 2011 by 
remarking that “[an] aircraft carrier[s] [is/are] now under construction, but not 
yet completed,” he raised far more questions than he answered.44 General Chen’s 
statement might indicate an intention to develop additional carriers, but the na-
ture of the Chinese language, combined with ex-Varyag’s unofficial status at the 
time, adds uncertainty as to his intended meaning.
In its annual public reports on China’s military power, the Defense Depart-
ment has since 2006 addressed the possibility that China was actively working 
Carrier Type
Typical Displace-
ment (tons fully 
loaded)a
Example Vessel Sample Aircraft 
Max T/O Weight for 
Fixed-Wing A/C (lbs)
CATOBAR 80,000+ USS Nimitz F/A-18F, E-2C, C-2    100,000b
STOBAR 67,500+ Varyag Su-33/J-15   ~62,000c
STOVL 16,700+
Príncipe de Asturias 
(Spain)
AV-8B, F-35B ~45,000
VTOL/
Amphibious
13,950+ Hyuga (Japan) SH-60, AW-101 helos ~40,000
Sources: U.S. Navy, Spanish Navy, New York Times, Naval Air Warfare Center, IDSA, Sukhoi, Boeing, Naval Technology.
MAJOR TYPES OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Notes:
a. There are exceptions to these overall figures, but they do represent a larger pattern. Mission drives size. Some of the elements that drive toward a larger size 
also drive toward CATOBAR, which itself drives toward a larger size.  
b. This is TC-13 steam catapult’s highest capacity, but the heaviest aircraft actually launched from a CATOBAR vessel is the A-3 Skywarrior, with a maximum 
takeoff (T/O) weight of 82,000 lbs.
c. Based on maximum takeoff weight of the Su-33, per correspondence with a retired Russian naval officer. This assumes launch from either of two normal 
positions on the carrier Kuznetsov (to provide a maximum takeoff distance of 345 feet), with 70 percent of internal fuel and four air-to-air missiles (typically 
two R-27 and two R-73) and without external fuel tanks. By contrast, launching from a third possible position—between the third and fourth arresting wires, 
closer to the port side of the deck, and with no deflector (maximum T/O distance 640 feet)—would preclude simultaneous landing operations. Moreover, Major 
General Timur Apakidze, the father of Russian STOBAR aviation, is said to have asserted unofficially that launching from this third position is foolhardy if wind 
over deck is less than fifty knots, a typical constraint as Kuznetsov’s poorly designed and maintained steam turbines could rarely propel the ship at more than 
twenty-five knots, with a typical maximum speed of eighteen to twenty knots. For these reasons, as of 2001 no launches had been made even from the third 
position of a fully loaded Su-33 (maximum payload 14,330 lbs., takeoff weight 73,850 lbs.). The officer believes that ski-jump launch and a T/O weight limit of 
62,000 pounds would present even more challenges for China than for Russia: the Su-33’s main design aim was to fit Kuznetsov’s deck, with weapon-carrying 
capabilities secondary; the J-15, by contrast, has apparently been designed to possess significant air-to-surface strike capabilities.
Capability
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to acquire an aircraft carrier. In its 2011 edition, the Pentagon projected that 
ex-Varyag “will likely serve initially as a training and evaluation platform, and 
eventually offer a limited operational capability.”45 The report elaborates that “the 
ship could become operationally available, although without aircraft, by the end 
of 2012. However, it will take several years for an operationally viable air group 
of fixed and rotary wing aircraft to achieve even a minimal level of combat capa-
bility.”46 The report adds, “China likely will build multiple aircraft carriers with 
support ships over the next decade.”47
Li Jie says ex-Varyag will be a viable weapons system, albeit with much less op-
erational capability than its American peers. He acknowledges that ski-jump car-
riers cannot launch aircraft that are as heavy, carrying as much fuel or weaponry, 
or do so at the same high rates as can a CATOBAR ship.48 In fact, Rear Admiral 
Yin Zhuo calls ex-Varyag’s use of a ski jump a “mistake” because it precludes the 
ability to launch AEW aircraft.49 Accordingly, and as noted, China’s second do-
mestic (and third operational, after ex-Varyag) hull is likely to offer truer indica-
tions of where China is heading with carrier design.
Here China will face a dilemma common to militaries when fielding new 
systems: whether to stay on schedule by limiting capabilities or to pursue more 
complex, higher-performance technologies, for which foreign assistance is un-
available, and thereby risk jeopardizing the schedule. It has been argued above 
that China will tend toward the former—that it will “crawl, walk, run”—but if so, 
important questions arise. First, as long as China remains focused on STOBAR 
carriers, how will it provide airborne early warning, given that such ships cannot 
launch fixed-wing AEW aircraft?
Some form of air-based capability is likely needed to support C4ISR (com-
mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and re-
connaissance) capabilities, as a sufficient radar horizon would be very difficult 
to obtain from a sea-based platform.50 Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) might 
offer supplemental capacity. In April 2011 Japanese forces reportedly spotted a 
small Chinese drone (roughly the same size as the fourteen-foot-long U.S. RQ-
2) overflying a PLAN frigate as a Chinese strike group sailed into the western 
Pacific.51 But a capable air-search radar would seem too large to put on a UAV 
or a ski jump–capable aircraft, and (pending major advances in miniaturization 
from China’s defense industry) must be ship based. For the Near Seas, then, China 
might for some time rely on land-based AEW and airborne-warning-and-control-
system aircraft to support operations. This would likely necessitate interservice 
coordination, which has become a major PLA objective. For the time being, how-
ever, PLAN officials worry that their programmatic goals might be undermined; 
it is too early to tell how this complex operational sociology might play out.52 As 
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long as China is limited to STOBAR carriers, its deck-aviation air and surface 
pictures will be restricted by time on station or radar horizon.
Helicopters would appear to be the most obvious near-term approach, al-
though they offer only limited capability. A U.S. E-2 Hawkeye aircraft enjoys a two-
hundred-nautical-mile radar horizon at a twenty-five-thousand-foot elevation; 
a helicopter would likely have a substantially reduced horizon, as it would be 
unlikely to operate at over eight thousand feet. A Z-8 helicopter, previously seen 
only in prototype colors, has recently appeared in PLAN colors on the Internet, 
indicating some progress. A Z-8 
AEW helicopter was also photo-
graphed hovering over ex-Varyag 
the day it left for sea trials, pos-
sibly making China’s first “carrier 
landing.”53
That, in turn, raises the critical and underappreciated question of when China 
will build more helicopters. It currently lacks sufficient numbers to outfit its new 
frigates and destroyers or the aircraft carriers that it is starting to build now, let 
alone helicopter carriers and other types that it might add in time. Delays to date 
suggest that the PLAN is so dissatisfied with existing helicopters that it is willing 
to take risks in this area. The Z-8 has engine problems and is too large to embark 
on destroyers and frigates (it has participated in only one Gulf of Aden deploy-
ment, during which it operated from the Type 071 Yuzhao-class LPD Kunlunshan, 
hull 998). The Z-9 is too small and lacks both range and capacity. The Ka-27 
and Ka-31 Helixes are imported from Russia, incurring a form of dependence 
that China does not want to sustain over the long term. The PLAN appears to be 
awaiting delivery of the Z-15, a Chinese version of the Eurocopter EC-175; a civil-
ian variant is currently in testing. China’s pursuit of two major AEW helicopter 
programs (the Z-8 and the Ka-31) simultaneously is further evidence that its first 
indigenous carrier will be a STOBAR design similar to ex-Varyag;54 if moving 
straight to a carrier with catapults, China could save significant effort by import-
ing Ka-31s from Russia. It has already acquired some (the late 2009 contract was 
for nine), and the first Internet photos appeared in late 2010.55
More broadly, how much will China invest in aircraft suitable for STOBAR—a 
considerable sunk cost with path-dependent aspects—before it considers moving 
to CATOBAR?56 To make such a transition, it would at a minimum have to per-
fect catapults and modify fighters significantly. An April 2011 article in Libera-
tion Army Daily discusses the importance of strengthening aircraft landing gear, 
improving anticorrosion measures, and ensuring that aircraft can fold wings and 
otherwise minimize the space they take up.57
The journey will be long and tortuous, but 
China must start somewhere if it hopes to 
become profi cient in high-intensity carrier 
operation.
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Another key question is whether China will ultimately consider nuclear pro-
pulsion for larger future carriers. Space and acoustic challenges are not as press-
ing for them as they are for submarines, but the demands of nuclear-powered 
carriers can still preoccupy even formidable navies. The United States managed 
years of global deployments with conventionally powered carriers, albeit in an 
era of low fossil-fuel prices unlikely to be seen again.58 For their part, fossil fuel–
powered carriers have disadvantages vis-à-vis nuclear power, including lower 
limits on aviation fuel–carrying capacity. These are well chronicled by Chinese 
naval analysts. Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, for one, believes that ex-Varyag’s use of 
“heavy” fuel oil is a major strategic mistake in the ship’s design, pointing out that
it takes longer for the carrier to restock heavy oil, because its fuel stores are approxi-
mately 4,000 to 5,000 metric tons. . . . One can imagine that for this amount of fuel, 
pressurization alone would take several hours. Moreover, other vessels need to take 
on diesel or kerosene, because they are driven by gas turbines. The replenishment 
has to be done through different lines, making underway replenishment as a whole 
very complicated. If a vessel next to you is being replenished, you cannot launch any 
weapon, because the fuel vapor released is highly explosive and flammable, and safety 
is at risk. As a result, the combat effectiveness of the entire formation will be affected. 
Replenishment for a whole formation takes at least eight to twelve hours. During this 
twelve-hour period, the formation has no operational capability. For a conventional 
combat capacity of this size, it is a mistake at the decision-making level.59 
To be sure, even nuclear-powered carriers are dependent on conventionally pow-
ered escorts and aircraft, although the U.S. Navy is researching alternative fuels 
for even these platforms.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA
In itself, the advent of a relatively small and underperforming aircraft carrier is of 
limited military significance. A single carrier will of necessity spend much of its 
time in port for maintenance, thus depriving its navy of any airpower-projection 
capability at all. Even while under way, ex-Varyag will require a coterie of escort 
and logistics ships for support and protection. Yet that protection would likely be 
insufficient in a conflict with the United States. Given the U.S. military’s adept-
ness at long-range precision strike, the question would be not whether ex-Varyag 
would survive the war but whether it would survive the first day. 
This is not to say that ex-Varyag will have no military utility for China. In-
deed, the remarkable rapprochement enjoyed between the PRC and Taiwan 
since the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s president has decreased Bei-
jing’s concern about Taiwan independence. Meanwhile, China’s contested claims 
of sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, like China’s increasing 
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entanglement with foreign resources and markets, have begun to shift the PLA’s 
defense interests toward what the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence terms “new but 
limited requirements for protection of the sea lanes beyond China’s own waters, 
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and expanded naval diplomacy.”60
Farther afield, then, in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, China has not 
developed high-intensity military capabilities, instead projecting influence in the 
form of peacetime deployments.61 It is in connection with this more distant, lower-
intensity effort that China is likely developing its naval aviation. The validity of 
that strategic assessment would be bolstered by China’s indigenous development 
of additional, potentially larger and more capable, carriers (see below). Thus, it is 
incumbent to look beyond the significant limitations of ex-Varyag and consider 
the implications for China of a more robust and capable naval aviation arm. 
Potential Missions
Chinese aircraft carriers could conceivably  fulfill or contribute to a wide variety of 
missions. The former PLAN official previously quoted has argued that aircraft 
carriers in general will continue to constitute a central element of world naval 
operations for the foreseeable future. Part of this conviction likely stems from 
the PLAN’s growing realization that nontraditional security missions—disaster 
relief or counterpiracy—account for the bulk of likely military contingencies and 
that aircraft carriers greatly aid responses to them. In addition, even a rudimen-
tary naval aviation capability would enhance China’s negotiating leverage in its 
various maritime disputes. While the number and capabilities of China’s aircraft 
carriers will to some extent determine the missions they undertake, the decisive 
factor will likely be a political determination in Beijing as to how to use China’s 
expanding naval power. In the order in which they are likely to be considered, 
beyond training and naval diplomacy, such missions include the following.
Asserting Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. Even a single carrier could 
extend the reach of China’s airpower significantly and could be decisive against 
the smaller and less capable navies of Southeast Asia. Liu Huaqing envisioned 
the maintenance of China’s claims in the South China Sea as a primary carrier 
mission. This task is certainly one in which a carrier flying modern strike fight-
ers like the J-15 would have a much greater military and diplomatic impact than 
amphibious assault ships or helicopter carriers alone. Indeed, Liu worried that 
amphibious vessels did not provide adequate air cover and argued that carriers 
could fill this void.62 According to both the 2000 and 2006 editions of Science 
of Campaigns, an authoritative volume written by scholars at China’s National 
Defense University, carriers can play a crucial role by providing air cover beyond 
the range of land-based air to support long-range landing operations against 
small islands, such as in the South China Sea: “Combat in the deep-sea island 
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and reef region is relatively more independent, without support from the land-
based force and air force. Under this situation, an aircraft carrier is even more 
important in winning victory in the campaign.”63 In November 2008 and June 
2009 the amphibious assault ship Kunlunshan, together with destroyers, frigates, 
and supply ships, conducted long-distance patrols of the disputed waters in the 
Spratly Islands; PLAN marines executed at least one island-seizure exercise.64 As 
one Chinese expert states, “Our carrier will definitely not engage with power-
ful U.S. aircraft carrier fighting groups. But it is enough to be a symbolic threat 
among neighboring countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines who 
have territorial disputes with China.”65 Most recently, a senior Liberation Army 
Daily reporter, Senior Colonel Guo Jianyue, PLA, wrote on a news website run by 
China’s Ministry of National Defense and affiliated with his employer, “Why did 
we build it if we don’t have the courage and willingness to use the aircraft carrier 
to handle territorial disputes?”66
Chinese carrier deployments into the South China Sea are therefore likely to 
be seen as threatening by neighboring countries like Vietnam and the Philip-
pines, which assert competing territorial and maritime claims. Unable to match 
China’s land- or sea-based airpower, they are now seeking ways to protect them-
selves from what they fear will be increasing pressure from Beijing to compro-
mise. Some of China’s neighbors, perceiving ex-Varyag as a confirmation of ris-
ing Chinese naval power and an erosion of the credibility of American security 
guarantees, may seek bilateral accommodations with China. Others may decide 
to deepen military-to-military engagement with the United States and enhance 
their own naval capabilities. For example, Hanoi’s recent decisions to expand co-
operation with Washington and to purchase six Russian-built Kilo-class conven-
tional submarines were, in part, direct responses to the potential threat posed by 
a Chinese aircraft carrier—as well as reflections of its loss of islands in skirmishes 
with China in the Paracels in 1974 and the Spratlys in 1988.
Supporting Sea-Lane Security Operations against Low-Intensity Threats. One 
such threat is piracy. Antipiracy missions emphasize helicopters and embarked 
special forces for boarding vessels but could be enhanced significantly by carrier-
based, dedicated, airborne reconnaissance platforms. Carrier-borne strike fight-
ers would also give China a credible way to deter and attack pirates, as well as any 
other elements that attempted to disrupt Chinese vessels in the South China Sea, 
the Indian Ocean, or beyond.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. Though it has not yet handled any 
disaster-relief missions abroad and may not be genuinely interested in doing so, 
the PLAN could reap substantial diplomatic benefits from a carrier that could 
support intensive helicopter operations following a disaster like the 2004 Indian 
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Ocean tsunami or Japan’s 2011 earthquake. The United States, and to a lesser ex-
tent India and Japan, were given great credit for using deck-aviation assets for hu-
manitarian assistance and disaster relief following the 2004 tsunami; China had 
no such option at the time. Such nontraditional security missions, emphasized 
in the Hu Jintao era as part of a set of “diversified military tasks,” are regarded by 
many PLA experts as among the PLAN’s best opportunities for training for local, 
limited wars under “informatized” conditions.67
A Taiwan Contingency? Liu envisioned a cross-strait conflict scenario as a major 
rationale for carrier development and deftly marketed it to the PLA leadership as 
a cost-effective way to limit the need for new airfields.68 Arguably, the prospect of 
U.S. intervention following Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s rendered 
this vision obsolete and delayed Chinese carrier development. Yet despite recent 
cross-strait rapprochement, the PLAN remains focused primarily on enhancing 
regional “antiaccess/area denial” to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence 
and generally to defend the waters near the mainland from foreign intervention 
or invasion. In a Taiwan scenario, ex-Varyag would have no useful role east of the 
island—land-based aircraft can already cover the entire island, and attempts to 
use a single carrier of modest capabilities to deter or complicate the approach of 
an American naval task force would be ill-advised. South of Hainan, perhaps near 
the Paracels, backed up by land-based air cover, it could conceivably help protect 
China’s southern approaches.
Establishing Sea Control in the First and Second Island Chains. Missile-centric as 
it is and concentrated on areas fairly close to the mainland, the PLA is still clearly 
sized and shaped chiefly to support China’s claims on its maritime periphery, 
as opposed to extraregional, blue-water sea control. The PLA’s current order of 
battle is based primarily on the world’s foremost array of substrategic, land-based 
mobile missiles, such as the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile; on diesel subma-
rines armed with cruise missiles, torpedoes, and sea mines; and on improved 
variants of surface ships and aircraft (such as the J-20, which may become China’s 
first stealth fighter when operational, between about 2017 and 2019), outfitted 
with increasingly capable missiles.
Aircraft carriers could ultimately help the PLAN begin to shift its operational 
focus within the First and Second Island Chains from antiaccess and area denial to 
sea control. The primary distinction is that between the negative and the positive
—whereas the former seeks to deny an adversary access to a specific area for a 
specific amount of time, sea control seeks to assert a navy’s mastery over a given 
body of water in relative perpetuity. A Chinese carrier does have utility between 
the First and Second Island Chains but probably not in an American style. In-
stead, it would provide air cover to a surface group effectively enough to help get 
the antiship-cruise-missile “shooters” within range of the enemy. 
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In some cases, a Chinese carrier could thus facilitate an attack on a U.S. carrier, 
as suggested in a major doctrinal publication:
The naval fleet’s long-range operational forces make up the important part of 
counterstrike operational forces. The joint anti–air raid commander, while organiz-
ing counterstrike operations, should give special attention to the use of naval forces. 
Particularly:
A. Bomber and fighter-bomber airborne units can participate in airborne counter-
strike operations; concretely, they can perform tasks of assaulting . . . sea-based 
targets.
B. Fighter airborne units can perform vessel-guarding tasks.
C. Naval vessel units can perform operational tasks of attacking the enemy’s aircraft 
carriers.69 
Aircraft carriers may contribute to this strategy, by extending the range of Chi-
na’s heretofore land-based tactical air, long-range surveillance, anti–surface ship 
strike, air-defense interdiction, and early warning. Certainly additional capabili-
ties, especially in the area of antisubmarine warfare, would also be required for 
this new mission, but an aircraft carrier, and especially multiple carriers, could put 
China on its way to achieving them. Still, China remains constrained significantly 
by geography and would face a very difficult, complex, protracted transition.
Extended-Range Power Projection. China’s economic health and vitality is de-
pendent on its reliable access to foreign markets and resources via maritime trade 
routes. The most vital of these routes run through the South China Sea and In-
dian Ocean, linking China to energy resources in the Middle East and Africa. 
Indeed, 95 percent of PRC exports to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East—and 
almost 100 percent of China’s imports from Europe and the Middle East—flow 
through the Indian Ocean. Securing access to these resources and markets is 
therefore a top Chinese national interest, and an emerging mission for the PLAN.
Campaign Theory Study Guide, a textbook issued (like Science of Campaigns) by 
China’s National Defense University, draws on a variety of high-quality doctrinal 
publications. To improve the protection of the nation’s sea lines of communica-
tion in the Far Seas in the future, its authors hold, China should “endeavor to 
establish a contemporary, integrated and offensive, new, special mixed fleet with 
an aircraft carrier as core and missile destroyers (or cruisers) and nuclear attack 
submarines as backbone forces.”70
Over the long term, aircraft carriers will thus be essential to defending Chi-
nese interests into the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. According to the former 
PLAN official already quoted, the future relative prioritization given by the PLAN 
to the Near Seas and the Indian Ocean is difficult to determine. “China will never 
change its defensive policy,” in his view, “but the PLA must safeguard national 
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interests.” To this end, more than one carrier group would be required to sail 
regularly through these vital waterways and protect Chinese shipping.
Yet such missions are logistically taxing and operationally complex. To some 
extent, China’s rapidly improving constellation of space-based assets can facili-
tate long-distance operations without presence in other countries. But STOBAR 
carriers would likely be needed to provide sufficient AEW, given the lack of land-
based options, and they would have to exist in sufficient numbers to ensure that 
other missions and refits could be accommodated. Moreover, the projection 
and sustainment of military power over vast distances require a robust support 
system that would likely include a network of military bases, or at least reliable 
“places” (e.g., supply depots), throughout the Indian Ocean. The development of 
such an infrastructure would require a dramatic shift in Chinese strategic think-
ing, which has long prided itself on its principles of “nonintervention” and its 
opposition to “hegemony,” a category in which foreign basing has long been in-
cluded.71 How Beijing can adjust its force posture and traditional policies in this 
regard is apparently a matter of debate. There is also the question of what nations 
would be willing to host Chinese forces and under what conditions. Indian en-
gagement throughout the region is extensive, and numerous other nations, such 
as the United States, France, Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom, have sub-
stantial interests in the Indian Ocean as well. The fact that China has no present 
or prospective allies in the American sense means that it is far more geographi-
cally constrained than is generally appreciated. 
Strategic Benefi ts
Among the likely strategic benefits for China is enhanced regional diplomatic 
influence. A carrier group would offer immense diplomatic payoff in visible na-
val presence in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia, along key sea-lanes in 
the Indian Ocean, and in humanitarian missions throughout the region. Simply 
steaming aircraft carriers anywhere in the Asia-Pacific would send a strong signal 
to the region that China’s power is significant. Visiting ports in the South China 
Sea and the Indian Ocean in particular would send a powerful political message 
of expanding Chinese military might. 
A second potential strategic benefit is the protection, or if necessary rescue, 
of Chinese citizens or economic assets abroad. As Chinese businessmen spread 
throughout the world in pursuit of economic opportunities, they have become 
entangled in and endangered by instability. Safeguarding Chinese citizens has 
therefore become an increasingly important task for China’s government; aircraft 
carriers would improve China’s ability to defend its nationals and high-profile 
economic interests in volatile areas between the Red Sea and China’s coast.
In the future, China’s capabilities will likely be tailored specifically to han-
dling threats to its citizens and economic interests abroad. These include such 
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nontraditional security threats as piracy and terrorism, as well as internal chaos 
in other nations, like that seen in Libya in 2011. This strategic choice would rep-
resent a contrast with the United States, whose military possesses truly global, 
and highly sustainable, expeditionary capabilities that enable it to fight large wars 
virtually anywhere in the world.
Modern carriers also offer multirole versatility, a scalable set of capabilities that 
can handle a range of contingencies. The platforms and operational infrastructure 
that make high-end missions possible can also be scaled down to deal with nontra-
ditional security missions like disaster relief or the suppression of piracy. China’s 
military is improving its capacity for dealing with relatively small-scale threats that 
do not involve potential forcible entry into a hostile area yet require long-range 
deployments. For example, Chinese analysts associated with Senior Captain Li Jie 
have noted how in 1994 the U.S. Army embarked helicopters on board USS Dwight 
D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) for transport and strike support in a peacekeeping mis-
sion in Haiti, an example that undoubtedly resonates in a country that is begin-
ning to acquire the ability and perceive the need to conduct more noncombatant-
evacuation operations in potentially hostile areas.72 Improved abilities to show 
the flag and assist in humanitarian missions and other military operations other 
than war can potentially allow a limited expeditionary military capacity to yield 
substantial diplomatic benefits. It is important, however, to understand that the 
PLA’s naval, air, and ground capabilities for out-of-area operations are likely at 
least fifteen years away from the levels needed for the scalable responses to high- 
and low-intensity threats that the Defense Department possesses today.
Strategic Drawbacks
As Chinese analysts long insisted, aircraft carriers have their negative aspects, and 
the foremost of these is vulnerability—because of their size, configuration, and 
roles, carriers are disproportionately susceptible to attack. They arguably have 
not been tested in the missile age. Since World War II, the closest any carrier has 
come to high-intensity conflict where it faced a real threat of damage or sink-
ing was during the 1982 Falklands War, when Exocet missiles disabled and later 
sank the destroyer HMS Sheffield and the containership SS Atlantic Conveyor. 
The British task force commander, Admiral Sandy Woodward, later acknowl-
edged that had the carriers HMS Hermes or Invincible suffered a similar fate, the 
United Kingdom would have withdrawn them and likely lost the war.73 Moreover, 
had the Argentineans simply fused their bombs correctly (a number of bombs 
hit British ships but failed to explode, because they were improperly fused) the 
British might well have lost. In 1982, asked during a Senate hearing how long 
U.S. aircraft carriers would survive in a major war against Soviet forces, Admiral 
Hyman Rickover famously replied, “About two days.”74 These facts are not lost on 
Chinese strategists, who have “transferred” and “reverse-engineered” history by 
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studying these and other conflicts for lessons and are pursuing what is arguably 
the world’s most missile-centric approach to warfare today.
In a high-intensity confrontation against a foe with submarine, air, and surface-
based antiship capabilities, the life expectancy of a Chinese carrier would prob-
ably be measured in hours. Chinese carriers will likely remain highly vulnerable 
for the foreseeable future, given what many see as a fundamental weakness in 
the PLA’s antisubmarine warfare 
capabilities; the recent acquisition 
of, or expressions of interest in, 
submarines by Vietnam, Indone-
sia, and Malaysia; and the highly 
credible attack submarines of the 
U.S., Indian, Japanese, and Austra-
lian navies.
A second drawback is that carriers and their supporting ships and infrastruc-
tures are extremely expensive. This reality derives in part from the carrier’s vulner-
ability to attack and in part from the supporting systems needed if it is to operate 
with maximum effectiveness. China’s large and active shipbuilding infrastructure 
and labor base are likely to reduce its carrier construction and outfitting costs 
relative to those of, for example, the United States. Still, the final cost of a domesti-
cally built carrier will likely be equal to that of several Type 071 amphibious as-
sault ships or helicopter carriers—which are very well suited for the contingencies 
China is most likely to face and would arouse less fear among its neighbors.
If the PLAN intends to conduct credible carrier operations in distant seas, it 
will need to acquire more advanced air-defense vessels and nuclear-powered at-
tack submarines, enhance its at-sea replenishment capability, and better integrate 
land-based tanker aircraft and airborne warning and control with its carrier avia-
tion. The cost of building a carrier similar to Varyag has been estimated at two 
billion dollars, the total cost of a battle group (including the carrier) at ten bil-
lion.75 China’s rising national power and defense budget (officially $91.5 billion 
for 2011—the Pentagon estimates China’s defense-related expenditures for 2010 
at over $160 billion) enable its navy to develop some level of deck aviation “on 
the side” without becoming “carrier-centric.76 But the PLAN’s personnel, equip-
ment, and operational costs are all rising and may begin to compete with rapidly 
expanding nonmilitary budget priorities (e.g., infrastructure investment, social 
security, and other costs associated with managing a society that is rapidly urban-
izing, globalizing, marketizing, informatizing, privatizing, and aging).77 
Furthermore, an operational Chinese aircraft carrier capability is likely to 
unnerve China’s neighbors and may catalyze more formal security alignments 
aimed at counterbalancing China’s growing military power. An aircraft carrier 
As ever, the determining factor is not the 
weapons system itself but how it is used. As 
Major General Qian Lihua declared, “The 
question is not whether you have an aircraft 
carrier, but what you do with your aircraft 
carrier.”
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is inherently a power-projection tool; even utilized in the most benign way, ex-
Varyag will extend the range of Chinese airpower. China’s neighbors and strategic 
competitors will likely seek to hedge against what they interpret as a signal of Bei-
jing’s desire for a robust naval capability that can shift quickly from soft- to hard-
power missions. Regardless of its actual capabilities and vulnerabilities, a carrier 
is viewed by many as an instrument of the very “gunboat diplomacy” that Beijing 
decries. A Chinese carrier or carriers could in fact drive the defense spending and 
acquisitions of regional neighbors in a way that more deadly but less conspicu-
ous systems like missiles and submarines do not. To the extent that China fails to 
derive significant strategic benefits from its carrier programs, it will suffer “the 
onus without the bonus.”
Fourth, a carrier program yields results only slowly. The long lead time to 
actual operational capability of the ship itself gives potential adversaries time to 
build up countermeasures, which are likely to be much cheaper and available 
relatively quickly. Developing a robust carrier capability in the broader sense also 
takes time. Landing aircraft on a carrier is much more difficult than doing so on 
land. It took the former Soviet Union seven to ten years to make the Su-27K work 
well on its carriers. According to the former PLAN official quoted above, China 
will not need ten years, but it will need several years at least.
WHAT’S NEXT FOR CHINA’S CARRIER PROGRAM?
The former PLAN officer believes that China will eventually have three or four 
carrier groups, with one operating at any given time. Similarly, Li Jie says, “Ide-
ally, there will be three or more aircraft carriers, even five or six.”78 Chinese state-
connected media have speculated that China will eventually need at least three 
aircraft carriers in all.79 Beijing’s timetable for developing additional aircraft car-
riers domestically is unlcear. As this article went to press, the existence of an indig-
enous Chinese aircraft carrier under construction remained unconfirmed.
Moreover, the ultimate number of carriers to be fielded by the PLAN is uncer-
tain. Given the relatively limited scope of Chinese interests and obligations, the 
twelve of the U.S. Navy are certainly more than Beijing needs. In keeping with 
its usual ad hoc, pragmatic approach, China will likely make decisions regarding 
subsequent carriers after conducting trials and experiments with its first one (or 
first “batch”). A key question is, what constitutes an operational carrier? Where is 
the line to be drawn analytically between initial operational capability, however 
limited, and showy exercises for public consumption? Will the carrier become 
“operational” when a senior aviator with several thousand hours of flight time 
lands on its deck at sea? Will ex-Varyag become “operational” upon its initial 
“shakedown cruise,” or “patrol,” in the Near Seas outfitted with helicopters and 
J-15s and escorted by destroyers and oilers? China might conceivably put eight or 
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ten helicopters on ex-Varyag’s deck and send it down to the South China Sea with 
a few escorts far earlier than observers expect, or dispatch with a few helicop-
ters and, say, two J-15s flown by top test pilots. Most likely, the true operational 
capability of China’s carrier will remain ambiguous for some time, not only to 
foreign observers but to the PLAN itself. There is much to be learned and much 
to be done.
In any case, American experts should not expect China to mirror the U.S. Navy 
in the composition of its carrier groups. While U.S. carriers often sail with en-
tourages of support and escort ships, a Chinese carrier may steam with a much 
leaner coterie.80 Indeed, the number and type of escorts and support ships could 
be either significantly larger or smaller than the American model, depending on 
the expected operating environment and tempo. Yet there seems to be a minimal 
need for escort and supply ships during peacetime; the French Charles de Gaulle 
carrier was accompanied by a destroyer, a submarine, and a supply ship during 
an exercise with the Indian carrier Viraat, which was accompanied by two frigates 
and a submarine.81
A further potential difference is apparent in the fact that both ex-Varyag and 
Chinese destroyers possess phased-array radars, leaving uncertain which will play 
the general role handled in the U.S. Navy by Aegis destroyers and cruisers. China, 
apparently satisfied with its Luyang II (Type 052C) design, is building a substan-
tial number of them, suggesting that it might soon possess sufficient ships for a 
variety of escort, detection, tracking, and missile-uplink functions. To this point, 
Li Jie believes that one purpose of China’s Gulf of Aden antipiracy mission is to 
help select frigates for future carrier groups.82
The issue of China’s general capability to construct a carrier has been discussed 
above. With regard to shipyards specifically, however, it appears that the nation 
possesses a total of seven with berths large enough (three hundred meters or 
more). These yards are located in Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and 
Huludao. All are operated by either the China State Shipbuilding Corporation 
or the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, the two state-controlled giants 
that dominate the industry. There are other, private yards with supertanker-sized 
berths. However, the PLAN will most likely call on a state-owned yard to build 
its carriers, given the sensitivity of the project and the fact that all other major 
surface-combatant construction to date has been performed in state-owned yards. 
Shipyards will almost certainly vie to be selected as carrier builders, due to the 
project’s national prestige. The competition between them is unlikely to be as 
tightly cost based as commercial projects; experience in building military vessels 
and competence in systems integration will likely take precedence over price con-
siderations. In that respect, Shanghai’s Changxing Island Shipyard, Dalian, and 
the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry complex near Huludao (where many of 
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China’s submarines are built) are strong candidates. Bohai has the added benefit 
of large, covered building sheds where carrier parts could be fabricated in modu-
lar fashion and out of the view of satellite surveillance. The company says it has 
the “largest indoor seven-step” ship construction facilities in China.83
As for the potential configuration of indigenous carrier hulls, they are not 
likely to be catamarans or small-waterplane-area twin hulls, as artists’ impres-
sions currently being circulated around the Chinese Internet suggest. The rea-
sons are fairly straightforward (aside from developmental risk aversion already 
discussed): while a multiple-hull design handles well at sea, it has a much lower 
hull volume than a monohull of comparable length and overall beam and corre-
spondingly less space for fuel, weapons, aircraft, and propulsion systems. Also, a 
wave-piercing design may produce a very wet deck, creating corrosion and prob-
lems for aircraft operations and the safety of equipment and personnel on deck 
in heavy seas. Moreover, the radar cross section of such a configuration would 
be enormous. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Militarily, a single Chinese aircraft carrier is of minimal significance to America. 
Ex-Varyag’s emerging capabilities will simply be too modest to challenge U.S. 
power projection in East Asia. Unlike China’s robust, burgeoning missile, subma-
rine, and sea-mine capabilities, it has no useful role in high-intensity major com-
bat operations and will not for the foreseeable future. U.S. proficiency at long-
range precision strike and submarine warfare make a single aircraft carrier highly 
vulnerable during wartime. Further, regular maintenance requirements mean a 
considerable amount of time in port.
Politically, however, even a single Chinese aircraft carrier could have signifi-
cant implications for American interests in East Asia. The message to the region 
implicit in the sailing of a Chinese aircraft carrier—the existence of a rising Chi-
na with increasingly capable naval power—will demand a still-more-compelling 
response from the United States. Regional leaders are nervous at the prospect 
of an overbearing or coercive China enabled by a strong naval presence and are 
looking to the United States as a hedge to preserve their independence of action. 
For America’s allies, this has meant increasingly close cooperation on military 
issues. Moreover, several other states in the region, especially in Southeast Asia, 
have in recent years reached out to the United States as well, concerned about 
Chinese assertiveness. Chinese aircraft carrier development is already casting its 
first and largest strategic shadow in the South China Sea.
Yet American strategists must begin to plan for the near-inevitability of a 
PLAN equipped with multiple carriers, most of which will be far more advanced 
technologically than the starter ship. Complicating American planning, however, 
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is a remarkable degree of uncertainty surrounding Beijing’s intended uses of its 
future carriers. Indeed, they could be either important bulwarks of international 
stability or fundamental challenges to American military presence in the region.
Given the Chinese economy’s profound reliance on access to foreign resources 
and markets, Beijing has a substantial interest in the openness of maritime trade 
routes and the preservation of a stable international system. Chinese writings on 
carriers are replete with examples of their utility in nontraditional security situ-
ations. For example, they cite how USS Lexington was able to supply 30 percent 
of the power requirements of the city of Tacoma, Washington, during a power 
shortage in the winter of 1929–30. They write also of the roles carriers played 
in disaster relief in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico in the 1950s, an example 
that almost certainly resonates with a Chinese audience aware that the PLAN 
was able to do little after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, while USS Abraham 
Lincoln (CVN 72), on the scene within days, provided relief. These analysts note 
how carriers’ ability to rapidly swap their normal fixed-wing aircraft comple-
ments for helicopters enhances their multimission capabilities.84 They overlook 
here the point that reconfiguring a deployed carrier’s embarked air wing for hu-
manitarian operations could require either foreign bases or substantial overseas 
base access.85 That issue has still not been addressed fully in China, despite such 
small-scale precedents as the use of the Khartoum, Sudan, airport in March 2011 
to refuel PLA Air Force Il-76 transports evacuating Chinese nationals trapped in 
Libya. Should civilian leaders press a reluctant PLAN to do so, Chinese aircraft 
carriers could contribute in such ways to global “public goods.” Counterpiracy 
operations, global peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief are 
all missions available to a Chinese carrier fleet that would be in concert with 
American interests.
Indeed, the U.S. Navy’s concept of “global maritime partnerships” would be 
much closer to realization with the PLAN as a resourceful and reliable partner in 
preserving a stable and open international system. The prospect of the American 
and Chinese navies—along with those of several other rising Asian naval powers 
—working together to address shared challenges is in many ways the best possible 
outcome for an American fleet confronting a financially constrained future. In 
the words of Admiral Eric McVadon, USN (Ret.), 
One can readily imagine a scenario in which U.S. Navy F-18s from carriers are in 
air-to-air combat with [PLAN] Su-30s over the Taiwan Strait. One can just as readily 
imagine those same F-18s along with U.S. Navy P-3Cs providing air cover and search 
capability, respectively, for PLAN and other ships of an international naval force 
protecting sea lanes from pirates and terrorists in the Gulf of Aden or even the Pacific 
Ocean sea lanes as oil bound for China is imperiled by some future development.86 
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Such an arrangement would reduce a burden currently borne almost entirely 
by American naval power by distributing it through a new, twenty-first-century 
form of collective security in which a great power’s prestige is proportional to the 
public goods it provides. A carrier would allow China (like France with Charles de 
Gaulle) to “punch above its weight,” to make a visible contribution—even if fly-
ing only a modest number of sorties—that destroyers and frigates simply cannot.
But Beijing could also use aircraft carriers in a negative, exclusionary manner 
that would place China in opposition to the continued military presence of the 
United States in East Asia, and more generally to the international status quo. For 
this purpose a Chinese carrier group need not be designed to oppose U.S. forces 
directly—China is developing a wide range of antiaccess weapons systems, many 
missile-focused, for that task—but rather to provide, in a variety of Near Seas 
scenarios, including a conflict over Taiwan, air defense to surface vessels (e.g., 
Luyang II destroyers) that can shoot large numbers of antiship cruise missiles. A 
second role for a Chinese carrier group has been outlined in a variety of Chinese 
doctrinal publications: flying air cover for an amphibious invasion of islands and 
reefs beyond the range of land bases, a scenario that would clearly be relevant in 
a South China Sea conflict.87 
Were China to decide to use its carrier force in an attempt to exclude American 
naval power, the results would be disastrous for regional stability and, ultimately, 
for China itself. The United States has a long history of using military force to 
preserve its access to international sea-lanes; it fought its first four wars after 
independence—the naval war with France in the 1790s, the First Barbary War 
(1801–1805), the War of 1812, and the Second Barbary War (1815)—at least in 
part over just that.88 While reactions are impossible to predict exactly, it is clear 
that Washington would view most gravely any effort to restrict its access to for-
eign sea-lanes. Indeed, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described freedom of 
navigation in the South China Sea as a “national interest” when she addressed the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum in 2010. 
While much will depend on how China decides to use its new and future car-
riers, American strategists should formulate both short- and long-term responses 
to protect American interests and, if possible, avoid competition or conflict with 
China. While immediate actions should focus primarily on political shifts, a long-
term shift in military posture, engagement with the PLAN, and changes to alli-
ances and partnerships in East and South Asia will all be required to respond 
adequately to the prospect of multiple Chinese carriers operating throughout the 
Asia-Pacific. 
In the short and middle terms, American reactions to China’s new carrier should 
focus primarily on shifts in military and political posture. While existing military 
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contingency plans and exercises should be reexamined to take account of a Chinese 
aircraft carrier, few explicit military adjustments will be necessary immediately. The 
former secretary of defense, Robert Gates, signaled America’s intention to increase 
its military presence in Southeast Asia in his 2011 speech at the Shangri-La Dia-
logue in Singapore, where he announced the future stationing of American littoral 
combat ships in that island nation and, more generally, America’s intention to in-
crease its activity in the region. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has signaled his 
intent to continue this approach, 
informing the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee that “[the Defense 
Department] should maintain an 
enduring military presence in the 
Asia-Pacific region that provides a 
tangible reassurance that the Unit-
ed States is committed to Asia’s security, economic development, and the prosperity 
essential to the region’s success.”89
Just as a Chinese aircraft carrier sailing and visiting ports throughout the Asia-
Pacific would send a message, an increase in naval presence by the U.S. Navy 
would likewise reassure the region of America’s ability and will to sustain its re-
gional engagement. That presence should be expanded especially in the South 
China Sea and Indian Ocean; indeed, Gates’s 2011 announcement should be 
regarded as a first step in a broader effort to sustain American military pres-
ence in the region. The frequency of port visits and freedom-of-navigation exer-
cises should be increased, and naval engagement with new and existing partners 
should be regularly and responsibly strengthened.
The long-term challenges potentially posed by China’s aircraft carrier ambi-
tions, however, demand also a concerted examination of political strategy toward 
China and of military posture in the Asia-Pacific. First, a powerful China that 
contributes to the international system is overwhelmingly in the interests of the 
United States in particular and of regional stability and prosperity in general. 
Military engagement with China, especially with the PLAN, must therefore be of 
a top priority for U.S. military and political leadership. The benefits of naval co-
operation and the dangers of confrontation should become core subjects of U.S.-
Chinese dialogues at all levels. Responsible engagement and substantial progress 
should be goals for both sides. To that end, the U.S. military should work with its 
allies and partners in the region to identify opportunities for naval cooperation 
with the PLAN. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counterpiracy opera-
tions, and search and rescue all offer opportunities to promote habits of coop-
eration and reduce strategic mistrust—provided the PLAN’s civilian masters are 
willing to make such contributions to the larger good. 
Senior Liberation Army Daily reporter, Sr. 
Col. Guo Jianyue, PLA: “Why did we build it 
if we don’t have the courage and willingness 
to use the aircraft carrier to handle territorial 
disputes?”
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But American strategists must also plan and account for more negative possi-
bilities. America’s network of foreign bases in Japan and the Republic of Korea has 
traditionally been the foundation of its access to East Asia, and the three nations 
concerned are currently examining how to adapt basing arrangements to twenty-
first-century challenges. Yet more must be done—the United States should exam-
ine possibilities for military access in South and Southeast Asia as well.
The Pentagon has deftly characterized desirable future access arrangements as 
“geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable.”90 
In South and Southeast Asia, meeting these criteria will likely mean agreements 
that are less formalized and more implicit than the explicit, treaty-based arrange-
ments familiar in Northeast Asia. While states like Vietnam, Indonesia, and India 
are concerned about China’s rising naval power and will likely seek to help sus-
tain American access to the region, they have no interest at all in hosting Ameri-
can bases and fear being entangled in a future U.S.-Chinese conflict. Agreements 
will therefore focus on facility capabilities rather than basing agreements, with 
access to be determined by host nations in times of crisis or conflict, on the basis 
of their own political and military calculations. 
The one likely exception would be America’s Australian ally. Canberra has sig-
naled its concern about China’s rising naval capabilities and has identified the 
United States as its key ally for the twenty-first century.91 Given the closeness of 
the two nations and their shared perceptions of potential future security chal-
lenges involving the PLAN, Washington should seek to make Australia a new cor-
nerstone of American posture in the Asia-Pacific, almost on a par with Japan or 
Korea. Access to and facility support by Australia is forthcoming, and will likely 
be crucial in the coming years.92
{LINE-SPACE}
China’s aircraft carrier development path follows the Chinese philosopher Laozi’s 
logic that “a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.” The journey 
will be long and tortuous, but China must start somewhere if it hopes to become 
proficient in high-intensity carrier operations—hence the need for a starter car-
rier, ex-Varyag.
Deng Xiaoping, describing his plan to reform and open China in the late 1970s, 
declared that China would “cross the river by feeling the stones,” meaning that he 
had no overarching plan but would remain flexible and adapt to events as they 
happened, while maintaining a general course forward. Beijing’s approach to air-
craft carriers appears to be taking a similar path—there seems to be no overriding 
design for what shape an aircraft carrier force would ultimately take and what 
missions it would undertake. Instead, the PLAN seems to be adaptive and flexible 
in its approach—purchasing carriers as they become available, while gradually 
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working up its first, refurbished one, slowly assembling the components of an 
escort group, and quietly training its first generation of carrier aviators.
In the nearer term, with respect to its starter carrier, China will likely follow 
the same course. The PLAN will learn a great deal from it and seek to apply the 
lessons to forthcoming platforms. Future iterations will therefore likely be more 
capable and utilized more effectively in operational terms. Similarly, the missions 
these ships are assigned will likely evolve over time, gradually testing the abilities 
of their technologies and crews. Just as the first generations of American naval 
aviators were far different from their descendants today, so too will future genera-
tions of Chinese naval aviators be more professionally sophisticated and capable 
than their predecessors. Having waited over eight decades for a carrier of its own, 
China can afford to be patient and methodical in mastering its operation.
China has every sovereign right to invest its newfound wealth in an aircraft 
carrier or even several. The strategically significant questions concern not the 
number and capabilities of these ships but how they will be employed. If Beijing 
chooses to use its carriers to cooperate with its neighbors and the United States 
and contribute thereby to the health and success of the international system, it 
will likely inaugurate a new era of strategic collaboration. If, on the other hand, 
Beijing chooses to use its carriers to intimidate or threaten its neighbors and the 
United States, to challenge the fundamental openness and stability of the inter-
national system, great-power competition and conflict will become more likely.
As ever, the determining factor is not the weapons system itself but how it is 
used. As Major General Qian Lihua declared in November 2008, “The question 
is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft 
carrier.”93
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ince its provocations against Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November 2010, North 
Korea’s asymmetric threats have emerged as one of the most momentous se-
curity issues for the Republic of Korea (ROK).1 After bitter defeats in the First 
and Second Yeonpyeong Sea Battles, as well as in the Daechung Sea Battle of No-
vember 2009, North Korea recognized its disadvantage in symmetric surface-ship 
provocations. It resorted instead to new and unexpected tactics, utilizing its latest 
small submarine to torpedo ROKS Cheonan on 26 March 2010.
Considered to be the North’s severest military provocation since the Ko-
rean War armistice, the sinking of ROKS Cheonan gravely shocked every as-
pect of Korean society—political, diplomatic, psychological, and military—and 
caused deep ripples across the range of Northeast
Asian security. China, which had been adhering to a neu-
tral stance, commenced shuttle diplomacy, dispatching 
Wu Bangguo, head of the National People’s Congress, to 
both Koreas. However, although much time has passed 
since the incident, in which the North might have taken 
a different path, it has instead underscored its nuclear 
threat by enriching uranium, and China has safeguard-
ed Pyongyang by proposing guidelines for a resump-
tion of the Six Party Talks that would be difficult for 
the United States, Japan, or Russia to accept. The result 
has been a further cooling of North Korean–South Ko-
rean relations, and conflicts between the United States 
and China have also surfaced.
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The problem that besets the Korean Peninsula lies in the unavoidable fact that 
the ROK’s vulnerability has increased as North Korea’s asymmetric threat has ex-
panded and diversified. The current threat is a conventional weapon–based war 
capability that includes chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons, 
long-range artillery (LRA), special operations units, and underground tunnels. 
However, it is rapidly expanding to one of nuclear and high-technology weap-
onry (e.g., cyberwarfare, electronic warfare, hovercraft, and air-cushion stealth 
warships).2 When these separate asymmetric assets are combined, the North’s 
capabilities and military options will be greatly strengthened. They will pose a 
serious threat to the ROK military, because they can be used both as core means 
of attack during wartime and for localized provocations in peacetime.
The ROK is currently facing the difficult question of how to cope with the 
development of these asymmetric capabilities. Based on lessons it learned from 
these most recent attacks, the ROK has focused on not only reshaping its military 
strategies but also strengthening its capabilities to deal with the North’s asym-
metric threats and enhancing “jointness” (합동성) among its services.
The strategic challenge posed by an asymmetric strategy concerns the relation-
ship between the weak/poor and strong/wealthy. Regardless of how strong and 
wealthy a state is, if it fails to comprehend the strengths of the weak and poor, it 
is destined to fail. Asymmetric solutions of “yisojaedae” (以小制大, “conquering 
large forces with small ones”) always exist, enabling the weak and poor to exploit 
vulnerabilities of the strong and wealthy. The former can undermine and debili-
tate the latter’s military superiority by means of a diplomatic strategy that capi-
talizes on that very superiority through “yiyijaeyi” (以夷制夷, “using the enemy 
against itself”). Globalization and networking have been pillars of strength for 
the strong/wealthy, but they offer opportunities against them for the weak/poor; 
weaknesses within globalization and networking can be cleverly used to nullify 
the strengths of their intended beneficiaries. Finally, though major twenty-first-
century militaries have been revolutionized by information technology, their new 
capabilities for battlefield awareness, information sharing, and long-range preci-
sion strikes are ineffective against irregular and guerrilla warfare, subversion, and 
destabilization.
To explore these issues in some detail, this article will analyze the North’s 
asymmetric threat from various dimensions and propose counter-asymmetric 
concepts and strategies for the South.
A NEW ASYMMETRIC THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA
North Korea was one of the early exponents of asymmetric warfare. Combin-
ing Soviet conventional doctrine (operations by mechanized units in the enemy’s 
depth) and Mao Zedong’s concepts of irregular struggle (People’s War, guerrilla 
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and political-psychological warfare), the North has developed a bold form of 
combined regular/irregular warfare for the purpose of rapidly conquering the 
South, before U.S. reinforcements can be deployed on the peninsula. The North’s 
methods emphasize the speed of regular warfare but at the same time recognize 
its limitations.
Background and Development
Having observed the ineffectiveness of America’s high-tech forces in Vietnam, 
Pyongyang aspired to re-create Vietnam and its armed unification on the Korean 
Peninsula. It drastically increased its military in 1970 and greatly improved its 
conventional and asymmetric capabilities. The latter included tunnels, which al-
low the North to infiltrate the Demilitarized Zone.
The end of the Cold War, the ROK’s creation of diplomatic ties with Russia and 
China, an increasing gap in national power, the death of Kim Il-sung, and its own 
deteriorating economy, along with other foreign and domestic issues in the 1990s, 
led North Korea to enhance its capabilities for asymmetric warfare as its new sur-
vival strategy. At a political level, the North adopted the concept of “kangsung 
daeguk” (강성대국, “strong and properous nation”) and the “sungun jeungchi” 
(선군정치, “military-first politics”). At the military level it brought out nuclear 
weapons, missiles, and threats to envelop Seoul in flames. The North has actively 
played its political cards to realize its military goals, and despite numerous dif-
ficulties, it has done so successfully. The nation has staged a continuous series of 
armed demonstrations: launching a long-range ballistic missile on 5 April 2009, 
conducting a second nuclear test on 25 May that year, initiating a distributed-
denial-of-service (DDOS) cyber attack on 7 July 2009, and firing short-ranged 
missiles on several occasions. Later the North changed its strategy to one of “miso” 
(미소, “little smile,” a false suggestion of reconciliation), but receiving only a 
meager response from the ROK, decided to make a new move, torpedoing ROKS 
Cheonan on 26 March 2010, killing forty-six crew members, and bombarding 
the inhabited island of Yeonpyeong on 23 November, killing four people. Experts 
believe that this series of provocations was initiated on the basis of its confidence 
in the development and possession of nuclear weapons.
A Hypothetical Scenario: Mixed and Full-Scale Warfare
As a countermeasure to North Korea’s asymmetric strategies, the South has focused 
on nurturing an elite army of superior quality and strengthening the ROK-U.S. 
Joint Defense System and Rear Integrated Defense System. Meanwhile, the North 
has continuously developed new asymmetric threats that include nuclear and CBR 
weapons, missiles, LRA, special operations units, cyber weapons, electromagnetic 
pulse (EMP) weapons, Global Positioning System (GPS)–disturbance devices, sub-
marines and minisubs, and online political and psychological warfare.
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For limited provocations the North will apply these tactics, separately or com-
bined, to a modest degree, but in the case of full-scale war we expect it to employ 
its assets fully through integration, combination, and mixing. The speed, pres-
sure, shock, scale, and intensity of destruction would be immense.3
It is expected that the North Korean regime will first conduct a simultaneous 
and multifarious cyber offensive on the Republic of Korea’s society and basic in-
frastructure, government agencies, and major military command centers while at 
the same time suppressing the ROK government and its domestic allies and sup-
porters with nuclear weapons. If the North succeeds in developing and deploying 
its EMP weapons, it will be able to paralyze electronic functions as well. More-
over, the North will launch an offensive with its diverse collection of missiles 
(including the recently developed KN-01 and KN-02) and long-range artillery 
against the strategic center of the ROK, inflicting terror and realizing its threats 
to make Seoul an ocean of flames.
The North Korean regime will conduct a rapid front-and-rear combined op-
eration to seize and conquer the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area while carefully 
monitoring the ROK’s and international community’s response. Furthermore, it 
will infiltrate the South by deploying special operations units by land, sea, and air 
in multiple ways not only to disturb and disperse ROK forces but also to conquer 
Seoul and use it for bargaining leverage. Should the South decline its terms, the 
North will immediately expand its operations to sweep and conquer the entire 
nation, seeking to do so before U.S. reinforcements arrive. At this point North 
Korean forces will not be greatly concerned with logistic support, since they ex-
pect to be able to use the South’s resources, especially in Greater Seoul.
Even if the North’s invasion operation does not progress as planned and en-
counters a ROK-U.S. counteroffensive, North Korea has no reason to be pessi-
mistic, since it expects the South to accept an armistice immediately if threatened 
by nuclear missiles. In fact, it will be difficult for the United States to intervene 
actively at all should the North threaten nuclear employment. Moreover, North 
Korea calculates that against a backdrop of nuclear threats, pro-North leftists in 
South Korean society will stir anti-American sentiments, warning of nuclear at-
tacks if the United States intervenes. When the Northern regime initially declares 
war, these parties may create a dangerous possibility of proactive sympathizing 
forces emerging within South Korean society.
Although this hypothetical scenario is gravely pessimistic, it is neither un-
grounded nor irrelevant. From the perspective of preparing for the worst, it is 
crucial that the South increase interest in how to counter not only combined and 
full-scale campaigns but also separate, fragmented, and local asymmetric threats.
Hubris and overconfidence represent serious risks for the Republic of Korea. 
Seoul must not underestimate the strength of Pyongyang’s military just because 
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of its own absolute economic superiority. Moreover, we must not disparage 
North Korean soldiers and surmise that they lack combat abilities merely because 
their country is poor and small, uses ageing and obsolete weapons, and lacks sus-
tainment capabilities. In addition to its variety of asymmetric assets and employ-
ment methods, North Korea has been analyzing lessons from the 2003 Iraq war, 
instructing its people in firearms and suicide bombing, and indoctrinating them 
in the idea of defending the “great leader” with their lives and in an ideology that 
combines these concepts.
THE ROK’S COUNTER-ASYMMETRIC STRATEGIES: ANALYSIS
The South’s overall national power currently surpasses that of the North. Al-
though the North’s territory is about twenty thousand square kilometers larger 
than the South’s, the population of the South is nearly double that of the North, 
and its economic strength is about thirty times superior. Furthermore, the 
South’s foundational regime and governing system are far better than those of the 
North. Whereas the South has pursued a liberal democracy, a market economy, 
and a social welfare system, the North has maintained a communist dictatorship, 
a hereditary regime, and national militarization based on “kangsung daeguk,” 
“sungun” (선군), and “juche” (주체).4 While the South has established neigh-
borly relationships with other nations around the world, acting as befits a major 
economic power and serving as host of a Group of Twenty 2010 summit, the 
Northern regime has been criticized and isolated for its development of nuclear 
weapons, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), counterfeiting 
of U.S. dollars, trafficking in drugs, smuggling, and other internationally out-
lawed activities.
At the military level, despite the fact that the South’s military spending is be-
tween a tenth and fifteenth of the North’s as a percentage of its gross domestic 
product, the ROK military’s actual size surpasses the North’s by approximately 
four times. The ROK has been developing a force of superior quality, whereas 
North Korea has been nurturing quantitative superiority. An overall compara-
tive assessment of asymmetric quality and quantity shows that the two sides are 
roughly equivalent. The ROK is weaker with regard to field artillery and sub-
marines but maintains similar levels in tanks, surface warships, and fighter jets. 
Furthermore, the South has continuously developed its quality-based capabilities 
in network-centric warfare (NCW), whereas the North has focused on nuclear 
weapons and other WMDs.5 Where the South has concentrated on deterrence 
and proactive-defense through combined ROK-U.S. forces, the North has pur-
sued preemptive surprise-attack and lightning-war strategies. The ROK forces 
are controlled by the people and operate under an integrated system. The North’s 
military lacks comparable training opportunities due to the nation’s deteriorating 
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economy, but it has been told that long-term service and “sungun” military-first 
policies have kept individual training levels high.6
The South’s counter-asymmetric strategies can be subjected to “SWOT anal-
ysis,” a tool that—focusing on strength, weakness, opportunity, and threat—is 
widely used for future planning by corporations. From this perspective, North 
Korea’s greatest weakness lies in its internal inconsistency stemming from eco-
nomic problems (insufficient food, energy, and foreign currency reserves), a 
hereditary dictatorship, and the “sungun” policy. In its current system, market 
competition is impossible, and there is a growing likelihood of implosion were 
it to open its economy to the world. Accordingly, the North Korean regime has 
exploited Greater Seoul’s proximity to the armistice line to hold it hostage to 
nuclear blackmail and so strategically counterbalance its weaknesses all at once.
It is crucial that South Korea take into consideration the two main aspects—
conventional and irregular—of the North’s asymmetric strategies and develop 
proper responses to them. The ROK’s national power is superior to that of the 
North. The ROK must utilize this crucial asset by achieving the status of an ad-
vanced military power, through human and hardware reserves, while not exces-
sively burdening the people. This will achieve deterrence at low cost. The ROK 
must also heighten and strengthen the ROK-U.S. relationship into a comprehen-
sive security alliance. Cooperation with China is essential, but not at the cost of 
damaging the U.S. alliance. Lastly, the ROK must maintain friendly relations with 
neighboring powers (especially China), promoting a favorable environment for 
ROK-led deterrence and reunification.
Active protection of Greater Seoul from North Korean WMDs is difficult due 
to its proximity to the front line. Therefore, the ROK must be able to prevent and 
deter North Korean WMD threats by means of its high-tech NCW assets. First, 
taking advantage of its budgetary and technological capacity, the South must se-
cure asymmetry in long-distance, detailed surveillance and reconnaissance as well 
as in multilevel missile defense. Second, the ROK must transform Greater Seoul’s 
locational weakness into a strength, by nurturing and developing its mobile re-
serve forces (especially assets already in the area) along with standing forces, un-
der a “total force” concept. Third, with nuclear, intelligence, and missile-defense 
support from the United States and relying on a solid alliance, the South must 
build, maintain, and operate an independent, superior, and high-tech military.
Finally, the South would do well to reconsider how it rotates high military 
officials on a two-year cycle. Although an excellent system in terms of work, this 
two-year cycle is simply too short to allow officials to contrive innovative ideas 
of asymmetry, and it results in a lack of professional knowledge and motivation. 
The North, in contrast, maintains a long-term-service system, relying on a small 
number of skilled military elites.
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DIRECTIONS FOR ROK COUNTER-ASYMMETRIC STRATEGIES 
Seoul has adopted a “proactive deterrence strategy” to replace the previous pas-
sive and defensive-oriented strategy, which was shown to be ineffective by the 
two deadly attacks of 2010.7 Table 1 summarizes, in order of importance, the 
major North Korean asymmetric threats, including recent ones—nuclear, mis-
sile, and high-tech assets (cyber- and electronic-warfare units, air-cushion stealth 
warships, etc.).
Responses to Nuclear and Missile Threats
The North’s nuclear and missile assets are expected to increase, in both per-
formance and quantity, and to be used to maximize strategic superiority.8 The 
South’s counter-asymmetry response is to rely on extended deterrence by the 
United States while independently pursuing a four-stage nonnuclear deterrence 
strategy (surveillance/reconnaissance, precision strike, interception, protection) 
based on high-tech network-centric warfare. Because the political and psycho-
logical shock of nuclear weapons is substantial, “nuclear versus nuclear” deter-
rence is accepted relatively easily but concepts of nonnuclear deterrence through 
technology seem hollow and ineffective. However, conventional, high-tech NCW 
has the potential for precise destruction of the enemy’s nuclear weapons and mis-
siles before they are fired and for their rapid and accurate interception in flight.
First, we assess the feasibility of the former—offensive deterrence through
network-centric assets. If the South secures a sufficient variety of NCW assets at a 
strategic level, it will be able to conduct simultaneous strikes on nuclear and mis-
sile facilities and other centers of gravity in parallel with “deep” decapitating and 
surgical strikes. The effects of such attacks in the Iraq war have been compared to 
those of nuclear weapons. Preemptive strikes in self-defense must be fully consid-
ered, since even one nuclear missile attack will have catastrophic consequences. It 
TABLE 1
MAJOR NORTH KOREAN ASYMMETRIC THREATS
Category Threat Intensity Frequency
Core
Nuclear blackmail, hostage threats A B
Threats to turn Seoul into sea of flames A B
Major
Threats on Five West Sea Islands A A
Rear disturbance, infiltration threats B B
Cyber-attack threats (DDOS, etc.) C A
Electromagnetic-attack threats C B
Political-psychological offensive threats C A
Mixed Symmetric-asymmetric mixed-attack threats A D
Note: A = high; B = medium; C = low; D = very low.
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is up to surveillance and reconnaissance assets to determine whether indications 
of nuclear missile strike are sufficient to the nation and its leaders to gain legal 
recognition of preemptive strikes as legitimate self-defense.
To implement an offensive deterrence strategy based on high-tech NCW, the 
ROK must first, at a joint level, design and gradually construct, improve, and ex-
pand a system of platforms (satellites, aircraft, manned and unmanned aerial ve-
hicles), high-resolution sensors (electro-optical, infrared, synthetic aperture ra-
dar), and missiles (ballistic, cruise, and long-range precision-guided). Second, it 
must construct a fast and accurate command-and-control network and minimize 
decision-making time. Third, in the longer term, it must pioneer development 
of such innovative approaches as directed energy, nonfatal, and robot weapons.9 
The ROK must also reevaluate the current ROK-U.S. missile agreement with re-
gard to range and payload, increase efforts toward the agreement’s modification 
and supplementation, and expand national defense research and development 
(R&D), in order to select, concentrate on, and amass relevant core technology.
To make feasible the latter defensive aspect of deterrence, the South must initi-
ate a complex Korean missile-defense system. At the national defense level, it is 
vital that the South reexamine and redesign its missile-defense architecture, and 
at the joint level conduct—and, vitally, institutionalize—a three-dimensional 
assessment of its current programs. At the ROK-U.S. level, optimization of the 
missile-defense system, excellence in command and control, and intimate con-
nection with regional American missile defenses are imperative.
It is important that the ROK take note of the Israeli missile-defense experi-
ence. The United States, with its expeditionary forces deployed around the world, 
has been developing its missile-defense system based on three major axes, for 
ground-based, sea-based, and air-based interception. Israel, in contrast, has been 
formulating and developing systems for short-range rocket defense (Iron Dome), 
lower-tier missile defense, and upper-tier defense (Arrow-2, Arrow-3/Block-2, -3, 
-4). This multilevel Israeli defense system is centered on a single axis (ground), as 
best suited to its local forces and as the most economically feasible option.
In terms of hardware, the core asymmetry between the North and South today 
is one of network-centric warfare versus weapons of mass destruction, and at 
its center lies competition in technological development. Therefore, in order to 
secure a strategic, long-range NCW system, the South needs to foster national-
defense R&D, committing itself to the accumulation of core technology. Further-
more, it must construct a cooperative relationship between the people and the 
military at a national level. 
Responses to Long-Range Artillery and Conventional Missile Threats
The Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area is the heart of the South; its population 
density is high, and over 70 percent of the nation’s wealth is concentrated there. 
5950_Kim.indd   62 11/30/2011   11:02:04 AM
68
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 1, Art. 19
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/19
 K I M  63
Meanwhile, military experts assume that the North, while threatening to turn the 
city into a sea of flames, will in fact attempt to solve its weaknesses in sustain-
ment capabilities by seizing Greater Seoul early on so as to utilize its human and 
physical resources.
As a matter of defensive deterrence, the ROK must reevaluate and enhance 
its counterfirepower capabilities in three dimensions. North Korea not only has 
recently moved its LRA to reverse slopes and concealed it in camouflaged tunnels 
but has also continued development and production of KN-01/02 short-range 
missiles.10 The ROK must be able to strike LRA batteries within ten minutes after 
they emerge for firing and restrike until they retreat back to their tunnels. Hence, 
further decreases in the time required for the battle cycle (target identification, 
command and control, precision strike) at a joint level are unavoidable.
In terms of offensive deterrence, the ROK must secure capabilities to launch 
precision strikes against Pyongyang in response to threats to Seoul. Although the 
range of conventional weapons in the past was insufficient, Seoul is now able to 
acquire large quantities of various guided weapons that can reach Pyongyang. 
With such weapons, it can develop effective, simultaneous, and integrated tactics 
for parallel warfare tactics and decapitation directly threatening the Pyongyang 
national command. Pyongyang strike assets were once categorized as strategic; 
now they have become tactical. The relative geographical distances of Seoul and 
Pyongyang from the armistice line have been made irrelevant by long-range 
weapon systems.
A proactive defensive readiness posture that combines the above defensive and 
offensive deterrent measures is urgently needed.11 As the South’s population has 
increasingly become concentrated in Seoul, the city’s strategic value has grown. 
The people, for whom the value of life and property has increased in proportion 
to the nation’s economic and social development, demand the strengthening of 
national security.12 Further, Greater Seoul has recently expanded northward; the 
distance from the demilitarized zone has decreased from between thirty and forty 
kilometers to between fifteen and twenty, and this trend is expected to continue 
in the future. This newly urbanized region was originally an operation area for 
frontal corps; it has become imperative that these units hold the current front 
without conceding territory.13
In order to achieve a state of proactive defense readiness, the ROK must be 
able to manage Greater Seoul’s resources in multidimensional respects. Other-
wise it will be merely a burden and obstacle for ROK forces and a crucial strategic 
resource for the North Koreans. The South must convert Greater Seoul’s proxim-
ity to the front line from an asymmetric weakness into a strategic advantage by 
organizing and husbanding its human and material resources so that they can 
be, when necessary, rapidly converted into powerful, forward-deployed combat 
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units. Therefore, South Korea must implement a rapid Greater Seoul mobiliza-
tion plan that, while minimizing the burden on the people, can nevertheless be 
activated in case of imminent threats. It is important that the ROK review its cur-
rent reserve-force and industrial mobilization programs and bring them to levels 
matching those of the United States and Israel. 
Responses to Threats to the “Five West Sea Islands”
The North’s recent provocations against Yeonpyeong Island demonstrated how 
vulnerable the Five West Sea Islands are. In fact, however, the Five West Sea Islands 
represent a geographic asymmetric disadvantage for the North, which hence may 
consider them a serious strategic threat.14 In fact, the South, by positioning forces 
forwardly on the islands and in the surrounding waters, can, during peacetime, 
impose a strategic blockade (serving to protect Greater Seoul) around the coasts 
of Hwanghae Province (one of the nearest land provinces from the Northern 
Limit Line [NLL] in North Korea). In wartime, the South can prevent sudden in-
filtration of Greater Seoul through the coastal region and can also strike western 
North Korea. Military strategists anticipate that the North will continue to moni-
tor the strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula and contrive new methods 
to offset the NLL. At the current stage, thorough preparation and defense of the 
West Sea NLL and the Five Islands—the front lines 
of the Republic of Korea—are urgent.
First, defensive deterrence against provoca-
tions is necessary. The North has continued to 
devise various provocation and threat scenarios, 
identifying its own weaknesses in each relevant 
factor (operational doctrine, organization, leader-
ship, education, training, logistics, etc.) through 
simulation exercises and establishing specific re-
sponses for every possible situation. ROK forces 
must strengthen and demonstrate proportionate 
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retaliatory capabilities in order to deter North Korean provocations effectively. 
It appears that the North will now reduce provocations against vessels at sea, 
but the South must remain vigilant as intelligence shows the North’s ambition 
of developing and deploying, in collaboration with Iran, new “patrol killer” craft 
and submarines equipped with stealth technology. Seoul expects further provo-
cations using submarines and remains highly sensitive to mixed provocations, 
such as those from both artillery and antiship/land-attack missiles. Therefore, a 
thorough review of naval and marine forces required for proportional retaliation 
against various types of provocations from the North is necessary at a joint level, 
along with accurate forecasting.15 With regard to the possibility of the North de-
veloping stealth patrol killers and small submarines, the need for further R&D is 
urgent.
Next, with respect to provocation deterrence, it is necessary to develop and 
examine scenarios requiring various types of proportional retaliation, assessing 
whether the ROK should not respond in certain situations, so as to avoid escala-
tion, while at the same time providing active support, and to accumulate “combat” 
experience through simulation exercises. Furthermore, the ROK must consider hy-
pothetical situations in which the North provokes the South with a combination 
of various methods, and the ROK must also prepare for proportional retaliation 
along valid lines of self-defense.
Additionally, the South should also examine deterrence measures against of-
fensive actions—that is, more serious provocations. The Five West Sea Islands 
are highly vulnerable now, but should the South convert them into unconquer-
able fortresses, their vulnerability could become a strategic advantage due to their 
closeness to the North. Baekryong Island, from the North’s perspective, is similar 
to Taiwan’s Jinmen Daeo (Quemoy Island) (金門島) in China’s eyes in the years of 
tension and confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. Jinmen’s strategic value has long 
since disspiated, but Baekryong, the ROK’s eighth-largest island and the coun-
try’s northernmost territory, 180 kilometers from Incheon City, lies only twenty-
nine kilometers from North Korea’s Hwanghae Province and 150 kilometers 
from Pyongyang, as shown in the map. For its part, Jinmen Daeo, 250 kilometers 
from Taiwan but less than ten from mainland China, was originally in a weaker 
position than Baekryong, but Taiwan was able to transform it into a strategic 
fortress that defended itself against 470,000 artillery shells fired on it from 23 Au-
gust to 5 October 1958. It is now a tourist site, governed by its people.16 If Seoul 
is able to do the same with Baekryong and the other West Sea Islands, they will 
deter North Korean violations of the NLL and, if necessary, threaten the North’s 
middle region. Moreover, the islands will compel the North to reposition frontal 
forces to the rear areas, in effect deterring North Korean threats of turning Seoul 
into a sea of flames.
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Responses to Special Operations (Light Infantry) Threats
North Korea is known to possess superior irregular-warfare capabilities (special-
operation, mountain, night, and depth-infiltration warfare, etc.) and to combine 
them effectively with regular-warfare tactics. Moreover, it has recently greatly in-
creased its light infantry units;17 intelligence shows that the North has increased its 
special warfare force to approximately two hundred thousand men, apparently in-
tended to execute guerrilla-type depth infiltration warfare by exploiting the weak-
nesses of high-tech forces in mountainous regions. In order to counter such asym-
metric threats, the South must consider two measures—defensive and offensive.
With regard to defensive counter-asymmetric measures in this area, the ROK 
must develop night-surveillance, reconnaissance, and identification equipment, 
along with night-targeting and precision-strike weapons, in order to “light up the 
night.” Scientists have noted that current technology is sufficient for this purpose. 
Moreover, with aerial surveillance and reinforcement and unmanned air recon-
naissance methods, as well as helicopter-based mobility and strike, the ROK will 
be able to “flatten the mountains.” Considering the lack of resources, the South 
should strongly consider prioritizing aerial methods and decreasing procure-
ment of tanks and other ground mobility and strike forces.
Next, the ROK must bolster its mobile reserves and homeland defense sys-
tems. As previously stated, the South must actively prepare against rear infiltra-
tion by the North’s frontal units by upgrading various reserve divisions to match 
the standards of standing forces. The South must establish a counter-infiltration 
operation system, with a combined effort from civil society, government, and 
the military, to improve major current vulnerabilities. This system would review 
countermeasures and strengthen weaknesses against not only ground but also 
underground, aerial, and sea/underwater infiltration. The South should especial-
ly apply lessons learned from the ROKS Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island shell-
ing incidents and prepare forces and operational concepts to effectively counter 
underwater infiltration attempts, and, moreover, develop its capabilities against 
submarines as well as against small, high-speed, stealth patrol killers. The ROK 
forces must perceive North Korean infiltration capabilities as asymmetric assets 
no less dangerous than WMDs, and should continuously review, supplement, 
and develop counter-infiltration measures (policy, strategy, doctrine, weapons/
equipment, organization, exercises, support, etc.) in various aspects at a joint op-
erational level.
The ROK can also sharply improve its own depth-infiltration special-operation 
capabilities by capitalizing on the strengths of a “net-centric operational envi-
ronment” (NCOE). Today, most advanced military powers are actively utilizing 
the nonlinear decentralization capabilities offered by NCOE for unconventional 
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warfare. NCOE has continuously expanded the purpose and range of special op-
erations at a strategic level, by virtue of the ability it gives units to be deployed in 
enemy territory and carry out their missions while maintaining close network con-
nections with friendly forces and rear services.18 These special operation forces will 
not only become a strategic liability to the North itself but also restrain and deter 
enemy infiltration attempts and play an indispensable role in achieving victory in 
war. An organic combination of NCOE, “blitz” warfare by regular ground and air 
forces, and special forces could produce a counter-asymmetric force far superior to 
North Korea’s regular-irregular/mixed-warfare tactics.19
Responses to Cyberwarfare Threats
North Korea’s cyberwarfare should not be ignored. The North perceives cyber-
warfare tactics to be as important as WMDs and has concentrated on their de-
velopment.20  The regime selects young students of ages twelve and thirteen, en-
rolls them in computer courses for the gifted at the First and Second Geumseong 
Senior-Middle Schools, and then matriculates them in either Kim Il-sung Univer-
sity or the Command Automation University (formerly known as Mirim Universi-
ty) after graduation. The Command Automation University selects around a hun-
dred talented students for an intensive five-year course and then sends graduates to 
cyber-related institutions and military units. Also, as illustrated in table 2, the 
121st Unit, originally under the Korean People’s Army General Staff Reconnais-
sance Bureau, was reorganized in 2008 into technical reconnaissance teams, with a 
mission that includes infiltrating computer networks, hacking secret information, 
and planting viruses to paralyze enemy networks. Other such organizations—the 
204th Unit, under the Operations Department of the Unification Bureau, and the 
Psychological Operations Department of the North Korea Defense Commission
—are primarily focused on cyber-psychological warfare.
North Korea is known to operate and manage directly websites—for instance, 
The North Korea Official Page, in collaboration with pro-North and civil orga-
nizations within the South—that execute psychological warfare and organized 
espionage.21 According to a report submitted to parliament by the National Police 
Agency in September 2008, the agency had by that date blocked forty-two foreign-
based, pro-North websites out of a total of seventy-two that propagandize juche 
ideology and the North’s unique socialist state while at the same time inciting 
anti-South and anti-American sentiments. North Korea has also utilized websites 
operated by sympathizing parties in order to initiate espionage. By the end of 
2008 North Korea possessed twenty-four websites, including “Gugukjeonseon” 
(구국전선), and the numbers continue to increase. Recently, pro-North civil or-
ganizations digitized posters and leaflets used in the 1980s by activist students 
and uploaded them to their websites, where they have been highly effective.22
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The South’s security will be seriously threatened should it lose the battle to 
control cyberspace. However, it has not been easy to devise innovative counter-
strategies, because of the special conditions of cyberspace and the substantial in-
vestment and effort required. The best policy available at this point is, first, to 
upgrade, as a strategic matter, the ROK Cyber Command, established in early 
2010. This command will open the way for cooperation among existing national 
cyberwarfare institutions and for collaboration in new policies and connections. 
It can also formulate a system that will enable cyberwarfare operations led by the 
military in time of war; connect and conduct integrated intelligence and regular 
operations; and design an overall cyberwarfare structure, including the concepts, 
doctrine, requirements, education, and training methods needed for the com-
mand to operate effectively.
Countermeasures at the government level are also necessary. The Republic of 
Korea is an information-technology powerhouse. Its world-class “cyber genius-
es,” technological abilities, investment capital, and infrastructure make it asym-
metrically superior to the North. The problem lies with the government’s lack of 
effort and will to organize and systemize such potential for effective use in the 
field of national security. It is urgent that we resolve such an ironic contradiction. 
At a policy level, solutions may include establishing norms for the cyber realm, 
obliging real-name usage, creating a cyber “shinmungo” (신문고, a big drum 
that was struck by petitioners against the government during the Joseon dynasty, 
1392–1897) to allow the people to report suspicious activities, formulating a vol-
untary cyber reserve force and a mobile civil-defense unit, commending regions 
that have greatly contributed to cyber protection, and holding cyber-protection 
technology competitions. 
Furthermore, the ROK must establish and strengthen legal and systematic de-
vices that can block North Korea’s unusual cyber-infiltration tactics and sever its 
TABLE 2
CYBER- AND CYBER-PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE UNIT
Institution/Unit Composition Mission and Activities
121st Unit (Intelligence Bureau) 
Approx. 300 persons, 
10 combat teams, 
110 research teams
Hacking, virus-planting in military units related to 
cyberwarfare
Central Party 
Investigative Group
Approx. 500 persons, 
10 technical teams Technical education and training
Unification Bureau 
Operations Department
50 persons
Cyber-psychological warfare, organizational 
espionage
204th Unit 
(Operations Department, of the 
Unification Bureau)
Approx. 100 persons, 
5 espionage teams
Cyber-psychological warfare planning, execution, 
and research on techniques and technology 
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connections with sympathizers within the South. Although it is important that 
the government protect its citizens’ freedom in cyberspace, irresponsible, antiso-
cial, and antinational behavior must be constrained. Cyberspace has now become 
the fifth battlefield, where an important “nonwar” must be fought and victory 
won through a “minimal damage” strategy.23
Responses to High-Technology Threats 
Along with its nuclear weapons and missiles, North Korea is also developing 
high technology relevant to conventional weapons. Electromagnetic-pulse, GPS-
disturbance, stealth technologies represent a few of its latest asymmetric programs 
intended to offset the South’s developing NCW forces by targeting its weaknesses.
The 2008 ROK national defense white paper stressed that North Korea has 
developed various GPS-disturbance and deception devices and was contemplat-
ing measures against precision-guided weapons.24 It has been discovered that the 
North attempted to export to Iran, Syria, and other Middle East nations GPS-
disturbance devices that can jam high-tech missiles and precision-guided bombs; 
in May 2010, ROK government officials discovered in a North Korean weapon 
export catalogue information indicating that the CHT-02D, the type of torpedo 
that sank ROKS Cheonan, contained a GPS-disturbance device.
The situation may further deteriorate if North Korean jamming devices are, 
or will be, able to affect the ROK’s precision-guided weapons, such as the Joint 
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), its wind-corrected munition dispenser, and 
other systems intended to counter long-range artillery threats against Greater 
Seoul.25 In the second Gulf War in 2003, there were cases in which the Iraqi army 
deployed Russian GPS-disturbance devices against U.S. precision-guided weap-
ons, resulting in ineffectual explosions. The National Defense and Science Insti-
tute has reportedly invested a great deal of ROK currency—more than forty bil-
lion won—over the past six years to develop a Korean guided-glide weapon, the 
Korean GPS-Guided Bomb, which is known to perform better than JDAM.26 Its 
range is from seventy to a hundred kilometers (JDAM’s current range is twenty 
kilometers) and can accurately target underground LRA tunnels with entrances 
less than three meters across (ten meters for JDAM) from a safe distance. The suc-
cessful development of the Korean GPS-Guided Bomb is indeed good news and 
will greatly contribute to national security, but adequate countermeasures against 
North Korean GPS jamming are still pending and continue to require scientific 
and technological effort.
A recent article stated that North Korea has developed and employed stealth and 
camouflage technologies.27 It reported that an exclusively obtained, eighty-page 
North Korean military manual on electronic warfare explained various camouflage 
and deception methods in detail, such as that radar-wave-absorption paint of 1.4 
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to 1.8 mm thickness achieves a wave-absorption rate of 95 percent for three to five 
years. This manual suggests that anti-wave and anti-infrared paint has been applied 
to the entrances of LRA tunnels, obtaining an absorption rate of 99.8 percent of 
radio waves and 99.9 percent of infrared. Further, the manual is reported as stat-
ing that fake tunnel entrances have been created about 150 to 300 meters away 
from the real ones, with nearby angled reflectors to draw enemy radar. The manual 
also includes graphs that analyze differences in facility concealment from various 
distances and heights (such as the twelve-kilometer flight altitude of the U.S. Ar-
my’s RC-135 and ROK Army’s Hawk 800XP) and suggests that the ROK’s ground-
surveillance radars deployed in the frontal region can be deceived by walking at less 
than one kilometer per hour at five-meter intervals. 
North Korea has also developed small stealth submarines. In May 2005, Iran 
publicly announced the production of its first domestically produced submarine, 
“a craft capable of operating stealthily.”28 Witnesses have judged that this sub-
marine, which the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics calls 
Ghadir, is similar in appearance to the North Korean Yugo (유고) class; other ex-
perts believe that Ghadir is about 50 percent longer than the Yugo class and there-
fore is more like the North Korean Sang-o (상어, “Shark”) class. On 8 August 
2010, Agence France-Presse and the Associated Press reported that the Iranian 
navy had launched four domestically produced small submarines, of the “Ghadi 
[sic]” class, that were based on the North Korean Yeon-o (연어, “Salmon”) type, 
and possessed stealth features enabling them to evade sonar and sonobuoys.29
The Persian Gulf is shallow, with an average depth of twenty-five meters and a 
maximum of 170. The West Sea (or Yellow Sea, west of the Korean Peninsula) has 
an average depth of forty-five meters and a maximum of a hundred. This simi-
larity of numbers, against the background of the torpedoing of ROKS Cheonan, 
seems profoundly significant. Bruce Bechtol, an American expert on the Korean 
Peninsula, has stated that “North Korean Yugo-class submarines may become a 
potential threat to the South in the West Sea area since they are able to operate 
in shallow waters” and that “the North Korean submarines provided to Iran are 
most likely Yugo class.”30 From such opinions and statements of experts, we can 
surmise that the Iranian Ghadir submarine is based on the same prototype as 
North Korea’s newly developed submarine that operates off the Nampo Naval 
Base in the West Sea.
A TURNING POINT
Despite its severe economic crisis, the North has managed to develop nucle-
ar weapons and missile technologies and conduct pioneering research on the 
means to counter the South’s network-centric warfare assets. The North has 
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astutely selected and concentrated on low-cost weapons and assets that can 
effectively penetrate the South. A strategy to counter these asymmetric threats 
is needed, and the answer is to both develop high-tech NCW assets and main-
tain superiority in counterstealth, counter-submarine, counterelectronic, and 
counter-cyberwarfare capabilities. The Republic of Korea possesses all the re-
sources and capabilities required. What the ROK needs, and urgently, is an un-
derstanding of its situation and a collective will to solve its problems and push 
forward with its plans.
Today, the two nations on the Korean Peninsula compete under different ide-
ologies, government systems, and strategies. South Korea, with its superior na-
tional power, strives to achieve an asymmetric superiority based on high-tech, 
networked forces, assets of superior quality, and a robust alliance with the United 
States—its core asymmetric factor. Meanwhile, the North, in severe economic 
crisis and suffering the effects of a hereditary dictatorship, pursues quantitative 
superiority along with a focus on nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, 
as well as on tactical asymmetric measures that exploit the South’s weaknesses.
Until now, the North has consistently aspired to achieve an armed reunifica-
tion of the two Koreas. However, against South Korea, a nation boasting a thriv-
ing economy thirty times greater than its own and a superpower ally, the North 
had no choice but to complement its conventional warfare doctrine with asym-
metric concepts. The North Korean underground tunnels, tunnel bases, mixed 
warfare, infiltration tactics, long-range artillery, nuclear weapons, CBR weapons, 
missiles, GPS disturbance, stealth, small submarines (like that which torpedoed 
ROKS Cheonan), and other assets yet unknown are all examples of the North’s 
asymmetric strategy and methods.
Our ancestors applied the “porcupine strategy,” “yiyijaeyi,” and “yisojaedae” as 
examples of what we now call asymmetric strategies. The great commander Ad-
miral Yi Sun Shin invented the “turtle ship” and the “crane wing formation” and 
employed them successfully in battle during the Japanese invasions of 1592 and 
1597.31 As his proud descendants, it is time for the citizens of the Republic of Ko-
rea to shift to a new paradigm, reassess the strengths and weaknesses of their na-
tional defense, and develop counter-asymmetry strategies against the North. Like 
the attacks of 9/11 against the United States, the tragic sinking of ROKS Cheonan 
and the shelling of Yeonpyong Island must together mark a turning point in the 
history of the South’s national defense.
The policy directions suggested here call for an increase in the national defense 
budget, the cooperation and coordination of the people, and determination in 
the political sphere. The words of the Roman strategist Vegetius, Si vis pacem, 
para bellum—should you desire peace, prepare for war—are still valid today.
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The opinions in this article are the personal 
views of the author and do not necessarily 
refl ect the policies and strategies of the ROK 
Ministry of National Defense, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, armed forces, or government. Addition-
ally, this article does not refl ect the position 
of the U.S. government.
1. North Korea’s torpedoing of ROKS Cheonan 
and bombarding of Yeonpyeong Island can 
be understood as efforts to create achieve-
ments for Kim Jung-eun (the apparent pro-
spective successor to Kim Jong-il); to induce 
direct, bilateral North Korean–U.S. talks and 
resumption of Six Party Talks; and to elicit 
support from China. See 조성율 [Cho Seung 
Ryul], “북한의 연평도 포격도발 및 한반
도 미래 전망” [Intentions behind North 
Korea’s Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island 
and Future Prospects on the Korean Peninsu-
la] (a paper presented at Korea Institute for 
Maritime Strategy [KIMS]–Research Insti-
tute for Maritime Strategy [RIMS] seminar, 9 
December 2010, Seoul), pp. 9–14.
2. At this writing it is expected that North 
Korea will complete a base for hovercraft 
and stealth air-cushion warships at Koampo, 
Hwanghae Province, only fi fty kilometers 
from the South’s northwestern islands, in 
December 2011. See “Stealth Hovercraft 
Armada Poised to Invade South Korea,” 31 
May 2011, available at www.lucianne.com/; 
and 윤성원 [Yoon Sung Won], “NLL 인접 
북한 고암포 해군기지 완공 단계” [Con-
struction of Koampo Naval Base near NLL 
Nearing Completion], 29 May 2011, available 
at www.asiatoday.com.kr/.
3. 이윤규 [Lee Yoon Kyu], “북한의 사이버 심
리전 실체와 대응방안” [The Essence of 
North Korea’s Cyber-Psychological Warfare 
and Appropriate Counter-measures], 육
군 [The Army, monthly magazine], August 
2009, pp. 1–6. North Korea pursues a hybrid 
concept involving preemptive surprise at-
tacks and lightning, combined-arms warfare 
combining regular and irregular forces, 
cyber- and psychological warfare, terrorism, 
etc., to offset its technological inferiority 
against conventional ROK-U.S. forces.
4. “Juche” [주체], or the “juche ideology” [주
체사상], is an ideology of national “self-
reliance,” developed in the Kim Il-sung era 
and now used as the theoretical foundation 
of the regime; see www.globalsecurity.org/, 
s.v. “Juche [주체, Self-Reliance or Self-
Dependence].” 
5. 남만권 [Nam Man Kwon], “최근 화생무기 
현안의 문제점과 우리의 과제” [Current 
Issues and Tasks on the Latest CBR Weap-
ons], Korea Institute for Defense Analyses 
Weekly, 29 May 2000.
6. In 2010, according to a comparison of fl ight 
time, South Korean fi ghter pilots fl ew about 
140 hours and North Korean pilots less than 
ten.
7. Song Sang-ho, “ROKS Cheonan Sinking 
Reshapes Military Strategies,” Korea Herald, 
21 March 2011, pp. 4 and 15.
8. 변창섭 [Chang Sup Byun] and Bruce 
Bechtol, “북한, 기존의 국가체제론 변화 
어렵다” [Change Expected to Be Diffi cult 
for North Korea under Current Regime], 
내가 보는 북한-30 [My View of North 
Korea–30], Radio Free Asia, 11 August 2010, 
available at www.rfa.org/. They offered 
several reasons for North Korea’s nuclear 
program. First, because North Korea can 
attain high military status by possessing 
nuclear weapons, Kim Jong-il is develop-
ing them as a means to maintain his own 
power. Second, they argue, the North Korean 
regime is believed to have received at least 
two billion dollars from Syria for plutonium, 
and a substantial amount of diesel fuel as 
well as petroleum from Iran for cooperating 
with that nation’s highly enriched uranium 
program. Lastly, North Korea desires highly 
enriched uranium and plutonium weapons 
as a deterrent or offensive weapon against 
the ROK-U.S. alliance and Japan.
9. National plans refer to required core assets in 
terms of stages. The fi rst stage is surveillance 
and control, including multipurpose satel-
lites, high-altitude unmanned reconnaissance 
aircraft (Global Hawk), early-warning radar 
for ballistic guided missiles, early-warning 
control aircraft (E-737), and a combined 
fi repower-employment system (JOFOS-K). 
The second is precision strike: combined 
long-range attack missiles (JASSM), direct 
precision missiles (JDAM), and bunker bust-
ers (BGU-28). The third stage, interception, 
N O T E S
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involves air-defense missile control centers 
(ADM-Cell), surface interception guided 
missiles (SM-6), and ground-based Patriot 
missiles (PAC-II/III). The fourth stage is 
nuclear protection: EMP defense systems and 
individual/unit defenses.
10. 유용원 [Yoo Yong Won], “북한군 비밀교범 
단독입수: 북한 위장 전술, 레이저 전파
까지 흡수한다” [Exclusive Obtainment of 
Confidential North Korean Military Manual: 
North Korean Camouflage Tactics Able to 
Absorb Radar Waves], 조선일보 [Chosun 
Ilbo], 23 August 2010, available at news
.chosun.com/. Recently, North Korea has 
developed and deployed enhanced Scud 
missiles, along with the new KN-01 ground-
to-surface missile and KN-02 ground-to-
ground missile. Replacing the outdated 
Chinese Silkworm (with a range of 83–95 
kilometers and vacuum-tube circuitry), the 
KN-01 ranges 120–160 kilometers and has 
improved accuracy. The short-range (120 
kilometers) KN-02 uses solid fuel, is mobile, 
has an accuracy (circular error probable) of a 
hundred to two hundred meters, and can be 
launched within five minutes.
11. 권태영 [Kwon Tae Young] and 노훈 [Roh 
Hoon], 21세기 군사혁신과 미래전 [21st 
Century Military Reform and Future War-
fare] (Seoul: 법문사 [Beobmusa], 2008), pp. 
361–62.
12. The ROK Ministry of National Defense 
(MND), 한국적 군사혁신의 비전과 방책 
[Visions and Measures of Korean Military 
Reforms] (Seoul: ROK MND, 2003), p. 30. In 
2030, South Korea’s economy is expected to 
be placed among the “G7” industrialized na-
tions and its information index to enter the 
“G5” (meaning advanced countries in terms 
of information technology, including the 
United States, Japan, the People’s Republic of 
China, and the EU).
13. 김정익 [Kim Jung Ik], “미래 합동작전에
서 지상군의 중심적 역할” [The Central 
Role of Ground Forces in Future Combined 
Operations], in Korea Research Institute for 
Strategy (KRIS), 2008년 육군전투발전: 대
전환기 정예화 선진육군의 비전과 전략 
[2008 Army Combat Development: Visions 
and Strategies for an Advanced Elite Army 
during Times of Transition] (Seoul: KRIS, 
September 2008), pp. 491–92 and 525.
14. As shown in the map, the five islands are 
Baekryong Do, Daechung Do, Sochung Do, 
Yeonpyeong Do, and Woo Do. “Do” [도] 
means “island” (for example, Yeonpyeong Do 
is Yeonpyeong Island).
15. Jung Sung-ki, “S. Korean Navy to Boost Pre-
cision Weapons and Surveillance Aircraft,” 
Defense News, 10 January 2011, pp. 11–12.
16. On the second Taiwan Strait crisis and Jin-
men (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu) Islands, 
see “Second Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and 
Matsu Islands 12 August 1958–01 January 
1959,” available at www.globalsecurity.org/.
17. North Korea has reorganized its frontal 
corps structure, increasing its light infantry 
divisions and elevating infantry battalions to 
regiments.
18. This tactic involves employment of special 
units against strategic targets deep in enemy 
territory to radiate them with directed-
energy weapons and target them with long-
range precision weapons launched from 
the land, sea, and air. Success requires high 
confidence of air supremacy and real-time 
precision strike support.
19. 권태영 [Kwon Tae Young], 육군비전 2030 
연구 [Research on Army Vision 2030 Re-
search] (Seoul: KRIS, November 2009), pp. 
298–302.
20. On 7 July 2009 and 4 March 2011, South 
Korea and the United States suffered concen-
trated DDOS cyber attacks; because North 
Korea was identified as the source of these 
attacks, experts began to reevaluate North 
Korea’s cyberwarfare capabilities. North 
Korea currently operates technical recon-
naissance teams consisting of approximately 
a thousand members under the People’s 
Army General Staff Reconnaissance Bureau; 
professional North Korean hackers have usu-
ally been placed in China, from where they 
continuously attempt to hack the internet 
sites of major South Korean government 
institutions.
21. The North Korea Official Page, available at 
www.korea-dpr.com; Gugukjeonseon [구국
전선], available at www.ndfsk.dynds.org.
22. Lee, “The Essence of North Korea’s Cyber- 
Psychological Warfare and Appropriate 
Counter-measures.”
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23. Conventionally speaking, first-generation 
warfare is the destruction of enemy forces in 
nearby areas through concentrated fires (e.g., 
the Napoleonic Wars); second-generation 
warfare is the destruction of enemy forces lo-
cated farther away through concentrated fires 
(i.e., artillery) (e.g., the First World War); 
and third-generation warfare is characterized 
by short-term manuever battles involving 
“shock and awe” tactics. Fourth-generation 
warfare is political conflict in which available 
asymmetric tools of warfare are utilized to 
defeat the enemy resolve to carry on the fight 
(e.g., Mao Zedong’s People’s War against 
the Kuomintang, the Vietnam War, etc.). In 
the fifth generation, attacks are launched to 
weaken enemy soft power. For more details, 
Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small 
Wars,” World Politics 27, no. 2 (January 
1975), pp. 175–200; New Military Paradigm, 
제4세대전쟁 [Fourth-Generation Warfare] 
(Seoul: 집문당 [Jimmundang], 2010); 전종
순 [Jun Chong Soon], “전쟁없는 전쟁: 제
4세대전쟁” [Fourth Generation: Warfare 
without Warfare], 군사연구 [Military His-
tory Studies], no. 125 (August 2008); and 양
욱 [Yang Wook], “제4세대 전쟁: 한국의 대
비책은?” [Fourth-Generation Warfare: What 
Is the ROK’s Preparation?], 시사저널 [Sisa 
Journal],  no. 1108 (12 January 2011), avail-
able at www.sisapress.com/.
24. ROK MND, Defense White Paper 2008 (Seoul: 
ROK MND, 2008), p. 27.
25. “북한 장사정포대에 대한 공격은 GPS 방
해시 어렵다” [Precision Strike of North Ko-
rean Long-Range Artillery May Be Difficult 
When GPS Is Disrupted], 16 October 2006, 
available at www.dailynk.com/; 고광섭 [Ko 
Kwang Sup], “만약 한국의 GPS 항해 신호
가 불가능하게 된다면” [If It Becomes Im-
possible to Use GPS Navigation Signals], 국
방일보 [Kookbang Ilbo], 10 October 2008. 
North Korea has attempted to export its 
GPS-jamming devices, which are enhanced 
versions of Russian models, to Middle East 
nations, including Iran and Syria. The South 
is correcting this shortfall with a wind-
compensated munition dispenser that uses 
inertial guidance only; it includes the CBU-
87 combined effects munition, CBU-99 
Gator antitank/antipersonnel mine, and 
CBU-97 sensor fused weapon. See “Wind 
Corrected Munition Dispenser (WCMD),” 
FAS Military Analysis Network, available at 
www.fas.org/.
26. 안성규 [Ahn Sung-kyu] and 김병기 [Kim 
Byung-ki], “산 뒤 숨긴 북한 장사정포 잡
는 한국형 JDAM 개발” [Development of 
Korean JDAMs That Can Destroy North 
Korean Long-Range Artillery Hidden behind 
Mountains], 중앙선데이 [JoongAng Sun-
day], 29 August 2010. 
27. Yoo, “Exclusive Obtainment of Confidential 
North Korean Military Manual.”
28. 김필재 [Kim Pil Jae], “북한과 이란의 슈퍼 
어뢰를 가진 스텔스 잠수함 협력” [North 
Korea–Iran Connections Regarding Stealth 
Submarine Super Torpedoes], Independence 
Newspaper, 6 April 2010.
29. 이인묵 [Lee In Muk], “이란, 북한기술도입
해 새로운 잠수함 완성” [Iran Completed 
New Submarine with North Korean Technol-
ogy], 조선일보 [Chosun Ilbo], 9 August 
2010, available at news.chosun.com/.
30. “북한 어뢰의 남한 해군함정 폭침” [North 
Korea Torpedo Sinks South’s Navy Ship], De-
mocracyForums, May 2010, available at www
.democracyforums.com/.
31. For the turtle ship, see the cover illustration 
and caption of the Spring 2010 Naval War 
College Review and, for the Japanese invasion, 
Yoji Koda, “The Emerging Republic of Korea 
Navy: A Japanese Perspective,” in the same 
issue (pp. 13–34).
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SEEKING BALANCE
Force Projection, Confidence Building, and the
Republic of Singapore Navy
Swee Lean Collin Koh
Despite the widespread proliferation of studies on the major navies inAsia, first and foremost that of China, writings on the small navies of
Asia—Southeast Asia in particular—have been few and far between. The slant
toward those major navies is warranted by their influence on the regional na-
val balance of power. However, it scarcely does justice to the small navies of
Southeast Asia, a region of huge maritime geostrategic importance with po-
tential security ramifications for wider Asian and global maritime security.
Southeast Asia is also the scene of an interesting and serious buildup of sophis-
ticated naval capabilities.
This article therefore attempts to redress, at least partially, the dearth of inter-
est in the small navies in Southeast Asia, using the Republic of Singapore Navy
(RSN) as a case study. Though a small navy no doubt, the RSN has been one of
the most prolific in its accumulation of high-tech capabilities, which in some re-
spects have matched or even surpassed those of some of its counterparts. Even
more interesting, in view of the disproportionate size
of Singapore’s maritime domain, is how the RSN grew
from a small-craft navy to one capable of force projec-
tion beyond its immediate littorals within thirty years
or so. These factors made a comprehensive study of
the RSN pertinent and valuable to the field of regional
naval studies. While much of the limited pool of work
that has been done on the RSN revolves around capa-
bilities, this article adopts a holistic perspective,
Swee Lean Collin Koh is an associate research fellow at
the Military Studies Program, Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies in Nanyang Technologi-
cal University, Singapore. He is also currently a doctoral
candidate at the same institution; his dissertation focuses
on naval modernization in the Asia-Pacific, especially
Southeast Asia, but also looks at Scandinavian naval de-
velopments from the Cold War to the present.
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embracing the evolution of its overall posture, Singapore’s naval policies, and
the navy’s force structure and operations. It argues that the RSN has consistently
maintained a confidence-building force posture, a posture evident in the in-
crease in both its force-projection capabilities and the scope of its operations.
First, this article examines the maritime geostrategic context within which Sin-
gapore is situated; this sets the stage for an analysis of the country’s naval think-
ing and policy orientation. The RSN force structure is then discussed, followed
by its operations.
THE MARITIME GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT OF SINGAPORE
Singapore lies within a unique maritime geostrategic setting, one with a double-
edged character in terms of the country’s security. On the one hand, its geograph-
ical location along the confluence of vital Asian sea lines of communications
(SLOCs) in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore makes the country a strategically
ideal hub for international seaborne trade and commerce.1 This factor contributes
to no small degree to Singapore’s socioeconomic prosperity up to this very day. On
the other hand, however, this geostrategic location poses a conundrum for the
country’s maritime security.
First, as a small island state, Singapore lacks strategic depth for effective de-
fense against determined external aggression; one recalls how quickly the impe-
rial Japanese forces overwhelmed the island state’s defenses in February 1942.
Also, being surrounded by the sea, the country is heavily dependent on secure
access to the SLOCs through which international commerce flows. Their disrup-
tion, whether by state or nonstate actors, could bring Singapore’s economy to a
virtual standstill, with disastrous socioeconomic consequences. Further, and re-
lated to SLOC security, Singapore’s close proximity to its neighbors presents
problems with regard to spillovers of maritime security threats of several kinds.
Transnational crimes at sea, including pirate attacks and sea robberies, are an in-
creasing concern not just in Malaysian and Indonesian waters but also in Singa-
pore’s. The country’s proximity also to potential regional flash points—such as
the Indonesian-Malaysian dispute over the Ambalat block and its oil and natural-
gas reserves in the Sulawesi (or Celebes) Sea and, more notoriously, the multilat-
eral dispute in the South China Sea—presents yet another dimension of risk to
Singapore’s maritime security.
History too plays an important role in Singapore’s complex geostrategic con-
text. The country does not exercise authority over broad swaths of seas as its
neighbors do. Theoretically, Singapore has only 150 kilometers of coastline and
three nautical miles of territorial waters, though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
has since 1980 claimed twelve nautical miles of territorial waters and an exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ), a claim that it repeated after winning sovereignty in
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May 2008 over Pedra Branca, a rocky outcrop contested with Malaysia in the
easternmost outlet of the Straits of Johor into the South China Sea.2
Ultimately, whether Singapore can exercise its maritime claims is highly de-
pendent on Indonesia and Malaysia, with whom the island city-state has had
historically complex relations. With Malaysia, Singapore occasionally had
squabbles over customs, immigration, and quarantine issues; water supply; and
Pedra Branca. These three sources of animosity are left over from the breakaway
of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia. For its part, Indonesia in the
1960s, under President Sukarno’s regime, carried out acts of aggression against
its Southeast Asian neighbors. While the most intense combat of this
konfrontasi, as it was known, occurred in Borneo, Singapore was not spared, be-
ing victimized by Indonesian terror attacks. As a result of all this, despite warm-
ing of relations, to this day Singapore is subjected at times to rhetorical assaults
by Malaysian and Indonesian political leaders over such issues as airspace in-
fringement and perceived lack of sensitivity on the part of Singapore’s leaders.
This attitude dates to the 1960s and 1970s, when the island state was widely re-
garded as a carbon copy of Israel within the Muslim seas, an image reinforced by
what was seen as a “do or die,” unilateralist attitude of Singapore’s policy makers,
especially in defense matters.3
Geostrategic context thus dictates the manner in which Singapore perceives
its security, and in turn, the maritime dimension dominates Singapore’s security
planning. Two key aspects of Singapore’s maritime security arise from the coun-
try’s geostrategic context: seaward defense against external maritime aggression
and the safeguarding of sea lines of communications. These factors are pivotal
for Singapore’s continued survival and prosperity. Until the turn of the twenty-
first century, seaward defense and SLOC security in the immediate Southeast
Asian littorals could be regarded as the sole raison d’être of the Republic of Sin-
gapore Navy. This remains largely true (though the threat of a major war has
subsided), but with the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 2001, a
new dimension has been added—that newly emergent threats far away may have
ramifications for national security.4
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have a long history of participating in in-
ternational security operations, such as dispatching military observers to United
Nations peacekeeping duties abroad. But the RSN itself did not, until the begin-
ning of the present century, venture far beyond the region in such missions. To-
day, however, in support of Singapore’s foreign policy of fulfilling its obligations
as a responsible citizen of the international community, the RSN serves as a via-
ble, flexible instrument of diplomacy and widens the scope of SAF participation
in international security operations.5 To be sure, such commitments are cali-
brated and selective, highly sensitive to the security priorities of and constraints
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on Singapore’s defense planners. For instance, the RSN’s involvements in the
northern Arabian Gulf in 2003 and Gulf of Aden in 2009 reflected the major
ramifications for Singapore’s security of those faraway regions. Accordingly, this
new dimension of Singapore’s maritime security should not be exaggerated; in
2010, then–defense minister Teo Chee Hean remarked that the SAF’s preoccupa-
tion remains with national defense and security.6
In sum, then, while Singapore’s maritime security perceptions have broad-
ened beyond the immediate Southeast Asian and even the Pacific Rim, its secu-
rity focus remains primarily local. This posture is reflected in the evolution of
the RSN’s force structure and operations, as later discussion will show. However,
it is first necessary to explore the impact of Singapore’s maritime geostrategic
context on its naval concepts.
SINGAPORE’S NAVAL THINKING AND POLICY
Geostrategic circumstances define a set of priorities for Singapore’s defense
planning, not the least with respect to overall force posture. No official docu-
ment released by the Singapore government outlines how the country perceives
its maritime security circumstances, how its force structure is to evolve, and how
operations are to further the aims of policy. The RSN itself has released impor-
tant material for public viewing, such as a yearbook in 2007, in print, e-book
format, and online, and an official website.7 The quality and depth of informa-
tion offered by these sources are far from what can be found in the elaborate
maritime policy documents released by the Australian, Indian, and U.S. govern-
ments. Nonetheless, they are not simply public relations exercises; together with
press releases and interviews with naval planners, they offer a glimpse into this
tiny force and serve to promote confidence. Fortunately, analysts interested in
the RSN may also rely on the announced overall policy of the Ministry of De-
fence, inferring from it the navy’s priorities and policies. This approach is justi-
fied by the fact that the RSN traditionally works within the SAF triservice
doctrine (army, air force, and navy) and accordingly adheres closely to the gen-
eral policy.
According to the only defense white paper published by the government to date,
in 2000, two Ds are the cornerstones of Singapore’s defense policy—deterrence
and diplomacy.8 These are the twin pillars of RSN policies.9 However, underlying
them is a set of priorities implied by the country’s maritime geostrategic context;
these priorities are, from the most to least important, SLOC protection, seaward
defense, and international security.10 Within these three maritime security prior-
ities operates an interplay of deterrence and diplomacy. SLOC security is
deemed to be the topmost priority in recent years due to the increased salience
of peacetime nonstate threats to maritime security. The Straits of Malacca and
7 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWC_2012WinterReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Winter2012Review\NWC_2012WinterReview.vp
Wednesday, November 30, 2011 10:58:59 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
84
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 1, Art. 19
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/19
Singapore represent the primary area of responsibility, as far as SLOC protection
is concerned. In the South China Sea, other than such nonstate issues as piracy
and sea robbery, the threat to SLOCs is posed by militarized actions of claimants
in the Spratly Islands dispute. Seaward defense is ranked second, though in the
early years of Singapore’s independence it was probably most important, be-
cause since the end of the Cold War the threat of outright interstate military ag-
gression has been reduced. Nonetheless, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 left
a deep imprint in the minds of Singapore’s defense planners, exposing this na-
tion’s geostrategic vulnerabilities.11 Therefore the defense of the sovereign and
territorial integrity of Singapore remains a vital task for the armed forces, and
the only option for the SAF, in turn, is a forward posture, manifested as seaward
defense, beyond Singapore’s immediate waters, by the RSN. International secu-
rity missions, though a facet of the RSN’s operational scope, are the lowest prior-
ity of the three, for reasons discussed earlier.
From these maritime security priorities and from organizational history of
Singapore’s armed forces and navy a set of policies for the RSN has emerged.
Prior to the end of the Cold War, seaward defense and SLOC protection were pri-
mary missions for the RSN, but until the 1980s the SAF had been mainly con-
cerned with strengthening the army and building up air defenses. The RSN was
the funding “stepchild,” which limited its procurements and operations. The
RSN’s approach to seaward defense back then was sea denial; its ability to extend
SLOC protection beyond the Strait of Singapore was greatly constrained by the
forces it had.
After the Cold War, with the arrival of new capabilities and a shift of orienta-
tion toward maritime defense and naval modernization, all underpinned by Sin-
gapore’s economic growth, the RSN’s capabilities were expanded. It could now
reach out beyond the Strait of Singapore and make the whole Straits of Malacca
and Singapore (SOMS) zone a primary area of responsibility. In particular, the
introduction of longer-range naval platforms—missile corvettes—in the early
1990s gave the RSN the ability for the first time to extend its presence into the
Strait of Malacca to the west and, to the east, the South China Sea. In fact, by that
time Singapore’s defense planners envisaged forward defense out to a thousand
miles from the country’s shores, effectively putting both the SOMS and South
China Sea within the RSN’s area of responsibility.12 Also at the beginning of the
1990s, the RSN expanded its doctrine from sea denial in local waters to limited,
defensive sea control, a role that required platforms of greater operational range
and endurance.
What this development meant for the RSN was a need for force-projection as-
sets to sustain its coverage of the SOMS and the South China Sea at least, and
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with surplus capacity to allow for international security operations in distant,
extraregional waters, such as the Gulf of Aden.
However, deterrence through force structure cannot be sufficient for the
needs of RSN policy, with its limited capabilities and Singapore’s geographical
proximity to its neighbors’ waters. It is inevitable that some maritime security
threats will have to be addressed collectively in order to be effective, rather than
going it alone. Diplomacy thus forms a facet of the RSN’s naval policy, and is also
a reflection of both the manner in which Singapore generally conducts its for-
eign policy and the broader ambit of the SAF’s efforts. Singapore’s dependence
as a small state on rules-based international mechanisms is understandable, es-
pecially against potential predation by more powerful, larger countries. Port vis-
its and naval exchanges aside, RSN diplomacy concerns primarily cooperative
measures undertaken with regional and global partners against common mari-
time security problems. Operations undertaken by the RSN over time reflect
these trends, first from the immediate Southeast Asian littoral out to the wider
Pacific Rim, and as capabilities allow, progressively beyond East Asian waters.
This twin-pillared RSN policy (deterrence and diplomacy), however, is de-
pendent on two critical factors. First of all, having a strong economy to sustain the
RSN is as important as having a strong navy to safeguard Singapore’s maritime-
derived wealth. Fortunately, Singapore’s defense spending is prudent, commen-
surate with economic growth, allowing the RSN to modernize and acquire the
needed force-projection capabilities to exercise sea control over the SOMS and the
South China Sea. The second important factor is demography. With Singapore’s
birthrate declining, the SAF faces a perennial problem in manning, and will con-
tinue to in the near- and long-term future.13 In order to sustain the RSN policy,
especially its deterrence pillar, it becomes imperative for the RSN to take full ad-
vantage of technology to enhance the level of automation within its operational
elements so as to maximize combat capabilities. Force constraints wrought by
manpower shortfalls make the need for cooperative activity all the more urgent,
for even with technological multipliers the lack of manpower will prevent expan-
sion of the RSN to a force capable of coping with an increasingly complex array of
maritime security issues.
In sum, the RSN’s twin-pillared policy can be best viewed through the lens of
a navy attempting to evolve into a balanced, high-tech force through maximiza-
tion of its manpower and material resources on hand, closely connected to co-
operation with regional and global partners.
EVOLUTION OF THE RSN FORCE STRUCTURE
It can be observed in the foregoing that the RSN force structure has evolved over
time toward balanced capabilities, primarily to allow its execution of missions in
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three dimensions—air, surface, and subsurface. A fourth dimension, cyber-
space, is also reflected in its recent quest for network-centric capabilities.14 This
evolution has been incremental, shaped by expediency (with respect to man-
power limitations) and economic growth.
Up to the end of the 1980s, the RSN force structure was that of a typical
coastal-defense navy, restricted primarily to its local maritime environs, in this
case the Strait of Singapore. The inventory it possessed then was suited to such
roles—small patrol and missile craft, backed by land-based airpower. The
sea-denial mission was fulfilled by a squadron of West German–built TNC-45
missile craft, known in RSN service as “missile gunboats” of the Sea Wolf class,
armed with Israeli Gabriel Mark 1 antiship missiles (ASMs). These small strike
craft were adequate as fast, if short-range, interceptors, suitable for rapid “hit-
and-run” attacks against a hostile naval force in the Strait of Singapore; their
small size allowed them to blend well with the coastal terrain, especially when
slugging it out against larger and stronger forces. However, aside from up to
eighteen inshore and coastal patrol craft—all gun-armed only, meant for gen-
eral patrol and surveillance in the strait—they were about all the RSN could
muster for sea denial.
The RSN then was far from a balanced force, with serious deficiencies. It had no
submarines or antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities to speak of and was
weak in antiair warfare (AAW), having no surface-to-air missiles but merely guns,
and in mine countermeasures, having only two vintage minesweepers, obsolete
against advanced naval mines. Its force-projection capability was scanty, only a
handful of World War II–era, American-built tank landing ships (LSTs). Its mari-
time aerial-surveillance capacity was only fair (Shorts Skyvan short-takeoff-and-
landing turboprop aircraft equipped with a short-range radar, backed by four
E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft mainly designed for air defense
and maritime surveillance). In short, the 1980s-era RSN, adequate for policing the
narrow Strait of Singapore, was only marginally capable of sea-denial missions
and incapable of sea control. It could not project seaward defense out to the Strait
of Malacca. Beyond that, to the Pacific Rim, it was capable only of port visits to
friendly ports (by the LSTs, which alone could make such voyages).
All this was to change, beginning in the 1990s, when the RSN force structure
underwent significant, albeit incremental, enhancements, to bolster its sea-denial
capabilities and allow limited force projection into the Strait of Malacca.
The most significant addition of the early 1990s was six missile corvettes
based on the West German MGB-62, known by the RSN as the Victory class.
These craft, with greater endurance than the Sea Wolf missile gunboats, pro-
vided the RSN a combat platform truly capable of projecting naval presence in
the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Second, it also provided the
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navy’s first basic ASW capability, thus enabling the RSN to tout itself as three-
dimensional for the first time. However, this new war-fighting capacity was still
far from balanced. Though the corvettes greatly enhanced the RSN’s surface
striking power with their ninety-kilometer-range RGM-84 Harpoon antiship
missiles (which outranged the twenty-kilometer Gabriel Mark 1 and later were
retrofitted aboard the Sea Wolfs), the RSN remained deficient in AAW. Only af-
ter 1991 was there apparent haste to retrofit all frontline RSN combat ships with
the French Mistral SIMBAD short-range surface-to-air missile; the corvettes
themselves were later fitted with the more capable, vertical-launch Israeli
Barak-1 antimissile system.15 The other, somewhat less prominent, addition was
a quartet of Swedish-built mine-countermeasures vessels, significant in light of
the vulnerability of shipping through the straits to naval mining. No significant
improvements were made to the sealift force, though one ex-British landing ship
was acquired.
By the mid-1990s, maritime aerial surveillance was improved with Fokker-50
maritime patrol aircraft, which came with full mission suites for surface and
subsurface search and targeting; these five aircraft extended not just the RSN’s
“eyes” but its “sword” as well, with their reported armament of air-launched
AGM-84 Harpoon ASMs.16 At the turn of the 1990s, the eighteen old patrol craft
were withdrawn from service and replaced by a dozen much larger, better
equipped, locally built Fearless-class patrol vessels, six of which were equipped
for ASW, like the corvettes. All this was accompanied in the second half of the
1990s by the introduction of submarines—probably the most significant addi-
tion to the RSN. Five ex-Swedish Sjöormen-class diesel-electric submarines
(SSKs) entered the RSN.
With the addition of this undersea component, a nascent, balanced RSN ca-
pability was in place by the end of the twentieth century. The Republic of Singa-
pore Navy of 1999 remained primarily a sea-denial force, capable of only limited
force projection, but one that was deemed able to cover the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore and the South China Sea at least to some extent.
The RSN force structure probably experienced its “golden era” at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century, with four significant additions. First of all, six
Formidable-class stealth guided-missile frigates based on the French La Fayette
entered service. They are important because with them for the first time, a true
blue-water combat capability was introduced into the RSN. While they are, like
the Victory corvettes, capable of three-dimensional warfare, their capabilities far
exceed the latters’. A true antiair capability is arguably one of the key features of
the Formidable class; their Aster antimissile system, when tied to its long-range
Herakles phased-array multifunction radar, extended the fleet’s AAW coverage,
which was now incorporated (as noted below) into the national air-defense
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umbrella.17 Each frigate has a more capable antisubmarine suite than that of the
corvettes and can embark an American-built S-70B Seahawk helicopter, which is
designed for standoff ASW and other roles, such as over-the-horizon targeting
for Harpoon antiship missiles.
The second significant addition at the turn of the present century was a group
of four locally built Endurance-class landing platform docks (LPDs)—rated offi-
cially as LSTs—whose capabilities far exceed those of the vintage LSTs and
thereby, for the first time, greatly enhance the RSN’s strategic sealift.18 The third
was the augmentation of the submarine force with two, more-capable ex-Swedish
Västergötland SSKs, known in the RSN as the Archer class. They came equipped
with air-independent propulsion (AIP), which allows the boats to stay sub-
merged longer without snorkeling to recharge batteries. Finally, the RSN now
incorporated for the first time a full-fledged unmanned combat capability, in
the form of Israeli Protector-type unmanned surface vessels, which the RSN first
used operationally in the northern Arabian Gulf in 2003. It was reported at the
time that the RSN was keen on expanding its unmanned capabilities in all three
dimensions, a natural course in view of its quest for increased automation.19 Be-
yond these acquisitions, in December 2010 Singapore was reported to be inter-
ested in replacing its Fokker-50s with surplus U.S. Navy P-3C Orions, a much
more capable aircraft.20 There were also midlife upgrades for the corvettes and
mine-countermeasures vessels.
In sum, the Republic of Singapore Navy has now evolved into a truly balanced
force, with adequate capabilities in surface strike, AAW, ASW, mine counter-
measures, undersea warfare, maritime aerial surveillance, and strategic sealift.
The RSN has progressed from a “sea denial–plus” navy to become—in a limited,
defensive way—a sea-control force. It is capable of projecting presence not only
into the SOMS and the South China Sea for substantial periods but also beyond,
into extraregional waters, albeit with limitations. The RSN has also elevated it-
self into the cyberspace dimension, by becoming an integral part of the SAF’s
network-centric warfare architecture known as the Integrated Knowledge,
Command, and Control (IKC2) umbrella. The stealth frigates, in particular, re-
portedly serve as key IKC2 nodes in support of the RSN and its sister armed ser-
vices at sea.21
Some observations can be made with regard to the evolution of the RSN force
structure, particularly with respect to its impact on regional naval-arms dynam-
ics. First, much was made about the RSN breakthrough in submarine capabili-
ties in the form of AIP and an apparent expansion of its submarine fleet. In fact,
however, there are only two Archer (ex-Västergötland) SSKs, which now supple-
ment but later will replace some of the aging Challenger (ex-Sjöormen) boats.
The inclusion of AIP was only logical for a small navy, extending undersea
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endurance, thus maximizing the patrol duration of each boat. Nonetheless, AIP
can be rightly deemed as destabilizing in that it allows the Archer SSKs to carry
out covert intelligence-gathering missions in regional waters—already a source
of consternation for some neighboring countries. For instance, remarks made in
2000 by Abdurrahman Wahid, then president of Indonesia, singled out Singa-
pore’s newly acquired submarine capability.22 Still, the RSN may eventually be
left with only these two AIP-equipped SSKs, if no new boats are acquired. In
view of routine maintenance needs, probably only one Archer will be opera-
tional at any given time. In effect, the RSN may find itself with a “fleet-in-being”
submarine force akin to that of the Indonesian navy.
The second observation pertains to the RSN’s acquisition of a significant
sealift capability, in the LPDs. However, the RSN was not the first to introduce a
large amphibious assault landing ship; in fact, the Malaysians were the first, with
the procurement of Sri Inderapura, a former American Newport-class LST.23 In
any case, the RSN’s LPDs amply demonstrated their utility for humanitarian
and disaster relief operations off Aceh. Thus, acquiring such warships is not nec-
essarily attributable to a quest for offensive amphibious-assault capabilities.
Most of the other capabilities that exist in the RSN force structure are no
stranger to most other Southeast Asian navies, which could have acquired more
of them themselves had not the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 disrupted their
modernization programs.
Finally, important trends are evident in RSN force-structure development.
First, it has taken a gradualist path, incrementally addressing capability gaps with
respect to multidimensional naval operations. Second, it has adopted a moderated
approach to force structure enhancement—apparently deliberately, to judge by
remarks made by the former Chief of Navy, Rear Admiral Chew Men Leong, in
2009.24 That is, the RSN has eschewed as destabilizing several naval weapons asso-
ciated with sustained, high-persistence, long-range force projection—aircraft car-
riers with organic strike aviation, nuclear-powered submarines, underway
logistics support vessels, land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), and supersonic
antiship missiles.25 Their absence may testify to a desire by Singapore’s naval plan-
ners not to intensify regional naval arms competition, though there have been op-
portunities to do otherwise.26 For example, back in 2001 it was reported in the
press that the RSN had once considered acquiring a fleet replenishment ship but
abandoned the project due to cost.27 Since then, despite economic growth and in-
creased defense appropriations, this project has not been revived. Also, the stealth
frigates were designed with modularity in mind, with weight and space reserved
for installation of new combat systems if necessary. However, there are as yet no
plans to install LACMs. Even the RSN’s submarines, naturally the best platform
for such standoff land-attack capabilities, are not known to be armed with such
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weapons, not even with ASMs. This is interesting in view of the apparent incli-
nation toward LACMs in the wider Asian littoral, such as in the Australian, In-
dian, and South Korean navies.
Thus, the RSN’s definition of “balanced capabilities” is likely a cautiously cal-
ibrated one, dictating a judicious approach to force structure that not only max-
imizes combat capability commensurate with economic growth but probably
also attempts to avoid escalation of regional naval arms competition. In that
connection, there seems to have been incorporated into the navy’s force struc-
ture over time a confidence-building element—in effect, a kind of unilateral na-
val arms control.
ENDURING TRENDS IN THE RSN’S OPERATIONS
The RSN’s diplomacy pillar is reflective of the general foreign policy adopted by
Singapore since its inception. Being a small, relatively weak state, Singapore
places a premium on rules-based mechanisms for interstate interactions, and ac-
cordingly the RSN’s activities are designed to promote and sustain an open, in-
clusive rules-based regional architecture. In recent years, as highlighted above,
the RSN has broadened beyond the immediate Southeast Asian and Pacific Rim
region into international security operations.28 The diplomacy pillar is designed
to complement that of deterrence in two ways. First, as a small navy, the RSN is
unable to deal alone with a complex range of maritime security issues; they will
have to be dealt with through cooperation with foreign counterparts, especially
in the Southeast Asian littorals. Second, Singapore being a small island state with
maritime geostrategic vulnerabilities, reliance on international mechanisms
serves to safeguard national security interests against predation by larger, more
powerful countries. For instance, Singapore has always been a strong proponent
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as the central guiding
mechanism for maritime activity. The RSN’s operations are reflective of both
these considerations, manifested in the range of maritime confidence-building
measures and cooperative measures in which it engages.
Maritime Confidence-Building Measures
Maritime confidence-building measures—information exchanges, communica-
tion and observer arrangements—do not constrain naval force structure, combat
readiness, or modernization, yet they help mitigate sources of misperception and
so reduce the likelihood of inadvertent conflict at sea.29 The RSN currently pur-
sues information exchanges and communication measures. “Information ex-
changes” formalize and regularize open sharing of naval information, whereas
“communication arrangements” involve reciprocal port visits, officer exchanges,
and dialogue.30
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An important multilateral information exchange measure in which the RSN
has actively participated is the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). The
navy even hosted the second WPNS mine-countermeasures seminar, involving
eighteen foreign navies, in 2000. The RSN uses the Codes for Unalerted Encoun-
ters at Sea, under the WPNS rubric.31 Bilateral maritime confidence-building
measures are also particularly crucial within the Southeast Asian littoral. Exam-
ples are the information-sharing initiatives between Singapore and Indonesia,
for instance, Project SURPIC (that is, Surface Picture), by which the two navies
have monitored the SOMS and regularly exchanged information since 2005.32
Traditionally, the RSN’s communication measures have been port visits to re-
gional countries, though larger, oceangoing warships have extended them to
more distant areas. Perhaps often overlooked in this connection has been the
RSN’s consistent effort to enhance transparency, such as its official website for
public access.33 Additionally, Singapore has been submitting regular reports to
the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms since 1993.34
Maritime Cooperative Measures
Most of the RSN’s activities in the area of international collaboration are oriented
toward “maritime cooperative measures” as such, which demonstrate the ability
of neighboring countries to work together to resolve common maritime security
problems, thus deterring potential adversaries, in this case, and assuring extra-
regional countries that seaborne trade will not face direct threats. Such measures
also have a confidence-building element, through reduction of tension in other-
wise politically contentious matters of maritime security concern. Maritime co-
operative measures comprise naval exercises, search and rescue, and actions
against illegal maritime activities, including marine pollution and piracy.35
The RSN has emphasized bilateral ties with regional navies, and as a result,
long-standing maritime cooperative measures exist with its Southeast Asian
counterparts. Traditional maritime cooperative measures first emerged, such as
bilateral naval training exercises, which over time have expanded in scope. For
instance, the Indonesia-Singapore Exercise EAGLE began with at-sea communi-
cations, basic maneuvers, and gunnery training but now includes ASW and
mine countermeasures. Coordinated patrols constitute another area of mari-
time cooperative measures in which the RSN engages with its neighbors, such as
bilateral coordinated patrols with Indonesia in the Singapore Strait, an arrange-
ment that has led to a significant reduction of sea robberies since its implemen-
tation in 1992.36 As for “softer” initiatives, the RSN cooperated with the Indo-
nesian navy in OPERASI SURYA BHASKARA JAYA, a naval, socio-civic activity
aimed at community development in underdeveloped Indonesian provinces.
Such long-term bilateral naval cooperation facilitated post-tsunami operations
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in Aceh. Besides maritime cooperative measures with Southeast Asian counter-
parts, the RSN pursues long-standing bilateral cooperative measures with the
U.S. Navy, like the annual CARAT (Cooperative Afloat and Readiness Training)
exercises, conducted since 1995. In all, compared to a mere six foreign exercises
in the early 1980s, the RSN had participated in more than forty by 2008.37
The RSN is also increasingly active in wider, regional, multilateral maritime
cooperative measures. Long a faithful participant in multilateral naval exercises
under the Five Power Defence Arrangements, it has also in the recent decade
participated in even larger multilateral training initiatives, such as the WPNS-
linked Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) and PACIFIC REACH exercises. These mari-
time cooperative measures go beyond training, especially since the 9/11 terror
attacks. Since 2001, for example, the RSN has participated in the U.S.-initiated
Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism and the multilateral Malacca
Straits Security Initiative.38 As the RSN has acquired platforms more capable of
force projection “out of area,” it has begun joining such international security
operations as the postwar reconstruction of Iraq and the multinational Coali-
tion Task Force 151 in the Gulf of Aden.
As the figure shows, the RSN’s participation in maritime cooperative mea-
sures has increased over the decades as its capabilities have grown, likely for sev-
eral reasons. First, systemic changes in the global security environment have
spurred the RSN to embark on cooperative attempts to address maritime secu-
rity problems having transnational implications. Second, newly acquired capac-
ities have increased the RSN’s confidence in its ability to expand its international
profile. Third, it is not inconceivable that the RSN has intensified its maritime
cooperative measure participation as a conscious effort to build confidence in
the region, as it embarks on its capability buildup, in line with the twin-pillared
policy of deterrence and diplomacy.
Naval Activities in Politically Sensitive Areas
One indicator of whether a navy is being employed offensively is how it acts in
politically sensitive areas—maritime zones where sovereignty is contentious.
Given its maritime geographical constraints, Singapore is obliged to place much
stress on maritime boundary-delimitation arrangements with its larger neigh-
bors. The sovereignty dispute over Pedra Branca serves as an illuminating exam-
ple of Singapore’s diplomatic behavior and naval activity.
Since the end of colonial rule, Singapore’s maritime forces patrolled waters
surrounding that rocky outcrop without Malaysian opposition until 1979, when
Kuala Lumpur officially laid claim to it. The Singapore government responded
in two notable ways: it emphasized dispute resolution without the use of force,
and it continued to conduct routine patrols. Though Malaysian maritime forces
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also patrolled near Pedra Branca and despite the absence of bilateral mecha-
nisms for prevention of naval standoffs, there were no shooting incidents. There
were at-sea encounters, but none escalated out of proportion. In April 1992,
RSN patrol craft warned off a Malaysian Fisheries Department vessel that it al-
leged had encroached into Pedra Branca waters, but this incident involved no
use of armed force and the RSN acted in accordance with international law.39 In
December 2002, the RSN and Police Coast Guard (PCG) patrol craft reportedly
escorted away a Malaysian Marine Police patrol boat without incident, again in
ways consistent with international law.40 The restraint displayed by both coun-
tries’ forces may have facilitated the eventual amicable political-legal settlement
by the International Court of Justice in May 2008.
The RSN may in the future delegate regular patrols to the PCG, which has ac-
quired longer-endurance patrol assets, such as the new Dutch-built Shark-class
coastal patrol craft. Such moves may give these patrols a law-enforcement pos-
ture, as opposed to the overtly militaristic, war-fighting impression that regular
naval forces employed for this purpose inevitably convey.41
{LINE-SPACE}
In the decades since the inception of the Republic of Singapore Navy, continuities
and changes in its policies, force structure, and operations have been apparent.
The RSN’s twin-pillared policies of deterrence and diplomacy can be seen as in-
separable and complementary in nature, reflecting the navy’s purpose of not
merely deterring and defending against maritime security threats but building
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confidence as well. A quest for a balanced force capable of a broad range of roles to
uphold Singapore’s maritime interests in the immediate waters, and later, more
ambitiously, in the broader Pacific Rim and beyond, can be observed. Although its
force structure displays an inclination toward force-projection capabilities, the
nature and pace of its evolution have been judicious, moderated, and incremental.
It also corresponds with the scope of RSN operations undertaken in conjunction
first with its neighboring counterparts and then with regional and global naval
partners. A holistic analysis of its policies, force structure, and operations also
shows that the RSN’s overall force posture has consistently been one of building
confidence among Singapore’s neighbors. For the foreseeable future, as it adapts
to evolving geostrategic conditions and maritime interests, the Republic of Singa-
pore is most likely to sustain this judicious approach, balancing force structure
and its operations to maintain a confidence-building naval posture.
NOTE S
1. Singapore’s port container traffic is one im-
portant indicator of the country’s strategic
position as a maritime hub. In 1995, this traf-
fic was measured at 10.8 million twenty-foot
equivalent units (TEUs), which rose to seven-
teen million by 2000, to 24.1 million by 2005,
and 30.9 million TEUs by 2008. Data com-
piled from the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, Review of Maritime
Transport, 2006, Report by the UNCTAD Sec-
retariat (Geneva: United Nations, 2006).
2. “MFA Spokesman’s Comments on an Exclu-
sive Economic Zone around Pedra Branca,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singa-
pore, 25 July 2008, app.mfa.gov.sg/.
3. For instance, Jakarta was particularly con-
cerned and unhappy about Singapore’s
granting of naval and air force facilities
access rights to the American military, the
U.S. Navy especially; “Jakarta Ruffled over
Singapore-US Navy Deal,” Reuters, 6 January
1992. More recently, the Malaysian govern-
ment accused Singapore’s air force of thou-
sands of airspace infringements since 2008;
“2,508 Violations of M’sian Air Space by
S’pore Jets since 2008, Dewan Told,”
Bernama Daily Malaysian News, 20 June
2011.
4. The new security environment Singapore has
faced, especially since 2001, is characterized
by the emergence of nontraditional threats.
Robert Karniol, “Teo Chee Hean: Singapore’s
Minister for Defence,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
19 November 2003.
5. Rear Adm. Lui Tuck Yew has remarked that
the RSN is an instrument of national security
policy and can contribute actively in nonwar
missions such as peacekeeping and disaster
relief. Lee Siew Hua, “Navy Ready to Play
Bigger Non-war Role,” Straits Times, 7 July
2000.
6. “S’pore Committed to Playing Its Part in In-
ternational Security Operations,” Channel
NewsAsia, 30 September 2010.
7. Republic of Singapore Navy, Onwards and
Upwards—Celebrating 40 Years of the Navy
(Singapore: SNP International, 2007), avail-
able at www.mindef.gov.sg/. (The RSN year-
book for 2007—the complete web address
appears in the online version of this article.)
8. Ministry of Defence, Defending Singapore in
the 21st Century (Singapore: January 2000), p.
12.
9. In 1997, the former Chief of Navy stated that
the RSN had adopted a double-pronged ap-
proach consistent with the defense policy of
deterrence and diplomacy—that is, to de-
velop its own defensive capabilities while at
the same time seeking “security in numbers”
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through maritime security cooperation. “In
Pursuit of Excellence: An Interview with the
Chief of Navy, Rear Admiral Richard Lim,”
Naval Forces 18, no. 2, special issue (1997),
p. 4.
10. During an interview in 2009, then–Chief of
Navy Chew Men Leong remarked that the
navy’s key mission—to ensure the security of
Singapore’s SLOCs and seaward defense so as
to safeguard the country’s sovereignty—
remained unchanged. IMDEX Asia Focus,
“The Republic of Singapore Navy: Interview
with Rear Adm. Chew Men Leong, Chief of
the RSN,” Military Technology 5 (2009), p. 27.
11. In August 1990, following the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, then–first deputy prime minister
Goh Chok Tong remarked that “there is a les-
son in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait for us,”
apparently mirror-imaging Singapore’s
geostrategic vulnerability as a small state rela-
tive to its surrounding larger neighbors. Jose
Katigbak, “Singapore Says It Must Be Strong
to Avoid Fate of Kuwait,” Reuters, 28 August
1990.
12. “The Shrimp with Teeth: Defence Policy
Aims at Forward Force Projection,” Econo-
mist, 12 January 1991.
13. The total fertility rate in Singapore, measured
in number of children born per woman, was
1.70 in 1985–90; it declined to 1.58 in 1995–
2000 and farther to 1.25 in 2005–10. Data
compiled from United Nations, World Popu-
lation Prospects: The 2010 Revision (New
York: Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs,
Population Division, 2011).
14. “Three-dimensionality” has been a long-
standing goal of the RSN in its capacity-
building endeavor. See, for instance, remarks
by then–first deputy prime minister Goh in
August 1990: “Be Prepared Always for Unex-
pected Threats” (speech at the commission-
ing of missile corvettes at Brani Naval Base,
18 August 1990), pp. 3–4, available at Singa-
pore National Heritage Board, stars.nhb
.gov.sg/.
15. During the Persian Gulf War, British Sea
Lynx helicopters sank numerous Iraqi navy
patrol and missile craft with ease, thus dem-
onstrating once again that small combat craft
without effective AAW capability are vulner-
able to standoff aerial and missile attacks. See
“New Missiles to ‘Boost Gun Boats’’ Chances
of Survival,” Straits Times, 19 June 1994.
16. This was not publicly acknowledged prior to
2000. David Boey, “Spotter Planes Pack a Le-
thal Punch Too,” Straits Times, 3 November
2004.
17. Formidable is armed with four eight-cell
Sylver vertical-launch systems (VLSs) that
fire the Aster missile. The thirty-kilometer
Aster-15, which has a fifteen-kilometer
antimissile range (not significantly more than
the Barak-1’s), is the publicized variant car-
ried by the frigates. However, two of the four
VLS modules belong to the A50 variant, de-
signed to house the hundred-kilometer
Aster-30, which is not confirmed to have
been fitted on board the frigates, though the
potential remains; Jane’s Fighting Ships,
jfs.janes.com/. The publicized secondary role
of the frigates is to augment Singapore’s
air-defense umbrella, though Rear Adm.
Ronnie Tay, then Chief of Navy, dismissed in
2004 the idea that the RSN was seeking an
Aegis-type shipboard air-warfare system; see
Robert Karniol, “Country Briefing: Singapore
—Master Plan,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 11
February 2004, and David Boey, “3 New
‘Stealth’ Warships to Help Boost Air De-
fence,” Straits Times, 5 February 2008.
18. See Laura Chua, “Singapore’s Endurance
Class LST,” Naval Forces 20, no. 2 (1999), pp.
26–29.
19. ST Marine designed the Venus unmanned
surface vessel, capable of a variety of mis-
sions. The RSN is also keen on acquiring un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the
Boeing Scan Eagle, which was tested aboard
the LPD, and has reportedly contracted for
the design of a low-altitude, long-endurance
UAV. “Singapore Interested in Endurance
UAV System,” Forecast International Press
Releases, 8 June 2001.
20. “Singapore Interested in Ex–US Navy P-3s,”
Flight Global, 15 December 2010.
21. Teh Joo Lin and David Boey, “First of 6 Stealth
Frigates Enters Service,” Straits Times, 5 May
2007.
22. “Update 1: Wahid Warns Singapore Subma-
rines Not to Stray,” Reuters, 26 April 2000.
23. At 8,450 tons full load, Sri Inderapura does
not differ much from Endurance. It could
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carry four hundred troops and three landing
craft in its stern well dock, while Endurance
carries 350 troops and four landing craft. The
only clear superiority of the latter is helicop-
ter capacity, having full hangar facilities for
two medium-sized helicopters, while the Ma-
laysian vessel has only platform facilities, for
just one. Sri Inderapura was deactivated fol-
lowing a fire in 2009 that put it out of service
completely.
24. Chew remarked that “the SAF will continue
to build up capabilities as required to ensure
strong and robust defence to make sure we
send a deterrence message to would-be ag-
gressors and ensure peace and prosperity for
Singapore within the region. We do what is
required; we do it with great care. Put simply,
I don’t think our capabilities are going to lead
to an arms race. We build what’s required for
our own defence and our deterrence message
is clear.” “The Essence of 3G in the Navy: To-
tal Awareness,” Straits Times, 20 February
2009.
25. Weapons that can be deemed destabilizing
have some or all of these characteristics—that
they decrease warning time, give one country
“breakthrough” capabilities, lead to a broad-
ening of target sets, permit no effective coun-
termeasures, give one side better information
concerning another’s military preparations,
and create hostility. David Mussington and
John Sislin, “Defining Destabilizing Arms Ac-
quisitions,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 17, no. 2
(February 1995), pp. 88–90.
26. In fact, the force-projection capabilities ac-
quired by the RSN somewhat belonged to the
category of defensive sea control, which, ac-
cording to Mearsheimer, emphasizes attack
submarines, land-based patrol aircraft, and
escort ships for barrier defense and convoy-
ing duties. Offensive sea-control missions, in
contrast, are fulfilled by aircraft carriers,
nuclear-powered submarines, and LACMs.
See John J. Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Mis-
step: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence
in Europe,” in Naval Strategy and National
Security, ed. Steve E. Miller and Stephen Van
Evera (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,
1988), pp. 56–57.
27. “Singapore Naval Programs Could Face
Problems,” Defense Daily International, 18
May 2001. Even more notable was that ST
Marine in recent years unveiled a roll-on,
roll-off/passenger–type, multipurpose sup-
port ship targeted for export. Among the
roles envisaged for this interesting vessel is
underway fleet replenishment, implying that
ST Marine possesses the capability to build
such a ship for the RSN in the near future if
the program is ever revived. “Singapore
Launched Fleet Support Vessel,” Kuala
Lumpur Security Review, 8 June 2009, avail-
able at www.klsreview.com/.
28. See “Speech by Mr Teo Chee Hean, Minister
for Defence, at Statesmen’s Forum Organised
by Centre for Strategic and International
Studies” (remarks, “Asia’s Evolving Security
Architecture and the Role of the US” confer-
ence, Ministry of Defence, Republic of Singa-
pore, 18 January 2008), available at www
.mindef.gov.sg/.
29. Duk-Ki Kim, Naval Strategy in Northeast
Asia: Geo-strategic Goals, Policies and Pros-
pects (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 194.
30. Ibid., pp. 195–98.
31. The Codes for Unalerted Encounters at Sea,
devised under the ambit of the WPNS for
at-sea naval commanders of different partici-
pating states operating in close proximity to
each other, are essentially methods to make
intentions clear to the other party, so as to
prevent close encounters at sea from turning
into potentially ugly incidents.
32. David Boey, “Singapore, Indonesia Share Sea
Security Info,” Straits Times, 28 May 2005. In
August 2010, SURPIC II, which builds on the
success of SURPIC I, was launched; Serena
Lim, “Initial Launch of SURPIC II,” Ministry
of Defence Singapore, www.mindef.gov.sg/.
33. The RSN website is Ministry of Defence Singa-
pore: Navy—beyond Horizons, www.mindef
.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/
navy/home.html.
34. See United Nations General Assembly,
Sixty-Fifth Session, First Committee, Trans-
parency in Armaments: Reporting to the
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
(New York: Office for Disarmament Affairs),
p. 8, available at www.un.org/.
35. Kim, Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia, p. 198.
36. In the same year, the two navies established
direct communications. Dominic Nathan,
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“Direct Links for S’pore, Indonesian Navies,”
Straits Times, 25 June 1992.
37. These exercises have grown not only in num-
bers but in scope and complexity. “Interview:
Rear-Admiral Chew Men Leong, Chief of
Navy, Republic of Singapore Navy,” Jane’s
Navy International, 23 May 2009.
38. The initiative comprises both surface and ae-
rial patrols. Among its primary aims are pro-
viding a collective effort among Southeast
Asian littoral states and precluding extra-
regional intervention in the Strait of Malacca.
39. According to Singapore’s Maritime Port Au-
thority, the Malaysian vessel KP Landok first
entered Pedra Branca waters on 21 April at 11
AM and moored to a buoy five hundred me-
ters from the islet. The Port Authority
pointed out that while foreign fishermen, in-
cluding Malaysians, are allowed to fish
around Pedra Branca, foreign government
vessels, unless in innocent passage, must ob-
tain permission to enter Singaporean territo-
rial waters. KP Landok was deemed not to be
in innocent passage and was instructed by the
coastal patrol craft RSS Swift Cavalier to
leave, at 5 PM. KP Landok complied and de-
parted, after circling Pedra Branca once, but
returned at 11:20 AM the following day and
positioned itself within two kilometers of the
islet. At 1 PM, the coastal patrol craft RSS
Swift Knight asked KP Landok to leave; the
latter refused to comply until 4:30. The
Malaysian account was that up to six RSN pa-
trol craft confronted KP Landok and that one
of them issued a warning through a
loud-hailer, just eight hundred meters from
Horsburgh Lighthouse. See “S’pore Protests
to KL over Two Intrusions,” Straits Times, 25
April 1992; and “Johor Councilor Raps
S’pore for Chasing Away Malaysian Boat,”
Straits Times, 25 April 1992.
40. According to the Malay Mail, an unknown
RSN vessel chased a Malaysian Marine Police
boat, PA41, on routine patrol, about four
nautical miles from Pedra Branca. PA41 re-
lented and left under RSN and PCG escort.
The Straits Times account, however, was that
the Malaysian craft was actually ferrying jour-
nalists to the site. See “Even Our Marine Po-
lice Shooed Away,” Malay Mail, 26 December
2002; and “Singapore Refutes ‘Wild’ KL Alle-
gations,” Straits Times, 27 December 2002.
41. Sujin Thomas, “‘Sharks’ to Patrol S’pore Wa-
ters,” Straits Times, 17 July 2009. To assign a
warship equipped for high-intensity war
fighting to fisheries/EEZ patrol not only
wastes capabilities but may create a militaris-
tic impression when none is needed and give
observers a misleading impression of force
disproportionate to what is required. See
Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the
Twenty-First Century (Aldershot, U.K.:
Dartmouth, 1992), p. 46.
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THE PORT MORESBY–SOLOMONS OPERATION AND
THE ALLIED REACTION, 27 APRIL–11 MAY 1942
Milan Vego
The ultimately unsuccessful Japanese attempt to capture Port Moresby in May1942 is commonly referred to as the “battle of the Coral Sea.” Almost all fo-
cus is usually given to the decisive tactical engagement between carrier forces.
However, the Japanese effort was officially code-named Moresby Operation and
was often called the “Port Moresby–Solomons operation.” In formal terms, it
was on the Japanese side a major offensive and joint
operation, planned and executed to achieve an op-
erational objective—the capture of Port Moresby, on
the Australian territory of New Guinea (now Papua
New Guinea). For the Allies, in contrast, “the battle of
the Coral Sea” was a major defensive and joint opera-
tion aimed at preventing an enemy landing at Port
Moresby. Both U.S. and Australian naval forces and
land-based aircraft took part.
The Japanese inflicted larger losses on the Allies
than they suffered and hence won a clear tactical vic-
tory; however, the Japanese failed to achieve the ulti-
mate objective of their operation, and hence, the Allies
won an operational victory. The operation was the
first major setback for the Japanese in their drive,
which started with their surprise attack on Pearl Har-
bor, to expand vastly their control in the Pacific. It is a
powerful example of the value and importance of the
Dr. Milan Vego has been a professor in the Joint Mili-
tary Operations Department at the U.S. Naval War
College, Newport, Rhode Island, since August 1991. A
native of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he obtained political
asylum in the United States in 1976. Dr. Vego has been
an adjunct professor at the Defense Intelligence College
(1984–91) and a senior fellow at the Center for Naval
Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia (1985–87), and at the
former Soviet Army Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas (1987–89). He earned a BA (1970) in modern
history and an MA in U.S./Latin American history
(1973) at the University of Belgrade and his PhD in Eu-
ropean history from the George Washington University
(1981). He holds a license as a master mariner. Dr.
Vego has published eight books, including the textbooks
Operational Warfare (2001) and Joint Operational
Warfare: Theory and Practice (2008; reprint 2009),
and The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese
Plans, Preparations, and Execution, plus numerous
articles in professional journals. He published his most
recent book, Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and
Practice, in December 2008.
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human factor in warfare. More generally, and despite the passage of time, the
Port Moresby–Solomons operation provides a number of operational lessons of
great importance to current and future naval leaders.
THE STRATEGIC SETTING
By the beginning of 1942, the strategic situation in the southwestern and South
Pacific had become extremely serious for the Allies. The Japanese were on the
verge of victory in the Philippines. They were making rapid progress in their in-
vasion of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) and thereby threatened northern
Australia. The Japanese had included the invasion of the Bismarck Archipelago
in their plan, developed in November 1941, as the “First Operational Stage” of
the war in the Pacific. In their view, their major base at Truk, in the central
Carolines, would not be secure as long as Rabaul, New Britain, was in enemy
hands.1 Accordingly, Japanese troops captured Rabaul on 23 January 1942. The
fall of Rabaul alarmed greatly the Australian government and people; Australia’s
Northeast Area was now virtually unprotected. The Japanese next occupied the
rest of New Britain, as well as the Admiralties, New Ireland, and Bougainville, in
the upper Solomons. The vulnerability of Australia was shown on 19 February
1942 when four Japanese fleet carriers conducted a massive raid on the port of
Darwin.2
By February 1942, the Japanese had accomplished all their initial strategic ob-
jectives, and at far less cost than expected. However, instead of consolidating
gains, the Japanese leaders made the fatal mistake of deciding to expand their de-
fense perimeter. Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) in Tokyo had
initiated the staff studies for the Second Operational Stage of the war in January
1942.3 The Plans Division of the First (Operational) Section of the Navy’s Sec-
tion (the Naval General Staff) of IGHQ was a strong advocate of invading Aus-
tralia. As early as December 1941, the Naval General Staff had insisted on
capturing the strategically important points in northern and northeastern Aus-
tralia; this could be accomplished, it believed, with very little expenditure in
men and matériel.4 The Naval General Staff argued that Australia represented
the greatest threat to Japanese control in the South Pacific, because it could serve
as a base for a counteroffensive. Australia also possessed economic resources of
great potential importance to Japan’s war industry.5 General Hajime Sugiyama,
chief of IGHQ’s Army Section (Army General Staff), was opposed to invasion of
Australia. He said, “If we take only part of Australia, it could lead to a war of at-
trition and escalate into total war.”6 The Army General Staff instead intended to
strengthen the defensive perimeter against the growing enemy force in Australia
by capturing Port Moresby and some important positions in the South Pacific.
The Japanese had not included Port Moresby as an objective in their plans for
9 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWC_2012WinterReview_Vego-End.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Winter2012Review\NWC_2012WinterReview.vp
Friday, December 02, 2011 11:07:21 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
100
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 1, Art. 19
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/19
the First Operational Stage of the war. In their view, to secure Rabaul, Port
Moresby had to be taken; after the capture of Port Moresby, the enemy’s air
strength in northeastern Australia had to be neutralized.7 The army also con-
sidered the Solomons archipelago to be a stepping-stone for an eventual enemy
advance toward Japanese-held Rabaul—hence the southernmost island of the
Solomons, Guadalcanal, and the islands of Nauru and Ocean (modern Banaba)
in the Gilberts had to be captured.8
The Combined Fleet started planning for the Second Operational Stage of the
war in January 1942. Its commander in chief, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, and
his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki, had views different from those of
the Naval General Staff. Yamamoto insisted that the Imperial Japanese Navy
(IJN) must retain the initiative and cautioned against complacency.9 He argued
that the IJN must retain the initiative by seizing Midway and capturing the is-
lands of Johnston and Palmyra as advanced bases for an eventual landing on the
Hawaiian Islands.10 Yamamoto considered the capture of New Caledonia, Fiji,
and Samoa to be a “folly.” Yamamoto believed that it would be difficult to hold
the islands some four thousand miles from the Japanese home islands. More-
over, the operation would not be effective, because as long as the American main
fleet was afloat, it could always reach Australia by another route. Yamamoto was
willing only to provide ships for the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi, in the
Solomons, but not for other objectives in the South Pacific.11
The original idea of invading Australia was slowly abandoned by the Naval
General Staff. Ultimately, both general staffs agreed that the best way of isolating
Australia was by capturing Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia. Sugiyama urged on
Admiral Osami Nagano, chief of the Naval General Staff, the need for both ser-
vices to study such an operation, dubbed FS. This option received a more favor-
able view in late February and the beginning of March 1942. On 28 February, a
liaison conference concluded that total isolation of Australia was the key to Ja-
pan’s mastery of the Southwest Pacific.12
The Combined Fleet intended also to destroy the British Eastern Fleet and
capture Ceylon (today, Sri Lanka) and thereby extend Japanese power over the
central Indian Ocean. This in turn would protect the western flank of the East
Indies and thereby allow the Combined Fleet to deal with the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
The Combined Fleet presented this plan to the Naval General Staff, which
brought it to the attention of the army. The army supported eliminating the
British fleet from the Indian Ocean and cooperating with the Germans in the
Middle East but protested that the capture of Ceylon would be premature. Army
leaders were concerned that if they agreed that troops were available, the navy
might divert their scarce resources for Pacific operations. Because of the army’s
objections and the lack of response from Germany, IGHQ decided to limit
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operations in the Indian Ocean to massive raids by the 1st Air Fleet (carrier
striking force) against Ceylon and enemy shipping in the Bay of Bengal in early
April. This operation would tie up five of the navy’s six large carriers until the
end of April. Then at least three carriers (Akagi, So
_
ryu
_
, and Hiryu
_
) would have to
return to the homeland for upkeep and refitting; the 1st Air Fleet would not be
ready to conduct another major operation until the end of May.13
The differences between the navy and the army regarding the objectives in the
Second Operational Stage of the war were heatedly discussed during late Janu-
ary and February 1942. On 7 March, the services tried to resolve the dispute at
the Imperial Liaison Conference in Tokyo. On 13 March an agreement was fi-
nally reached; it was reported to the emperor and distributed in a document en-
titled “Fundamental Outline of Recommendations for Future War Leadership.”
In it the option of invading Australia was dropped.14
On this basis, in mid-March the Combined Fleet formulated a strategic plan for
the Second Operational Stage of the war. The plan contemplated the capture of
Midway Island by using the full strength of the Combined Fleet, with the aim of
luring the U.S. Pacific Fleet into a “decisive battle.” From Yamamoto’s perspective,
a great advantage of this plan was that it would require minimal participation by
the army and so would not risk an army veto in IGHQ. The Combined Fleet plan
was the subject of the discussion at a conference held at IGHQ on 2–3 April. At the
conference the Naval General Staff insisted that the Midway operation include si-
multaneous capture of the western part of the Aleutian chain, and the Combined
Fleet acquiesced. The Naval General Staff also argued that the entire operation
should be delayed until late June, because it was unwilling to divert forces from the
operation to secure Rabaul in favor of operations in the Central and North Pacific.
Yet on 5 April the Naval General Staff, faced with a threat by Yamamoto to resign,
reluctantly agreed to his timetable for a Midway-Aleutians operation.15
In late April, IGHQ’s Army and Naval General Staffs agreed to a compro-
mise plan that envisaged the occupation of strategic points in New Caledonia,
the Fiji Islands, and Samoa, to be carried out sometime after the Port Moresby–
Solomons operation.16 For its part, the Combined Fleet’s staff argued that any
South Pacific project should be delayed until after the Midway-Aleutians opera-
tion.17 The Naval General Staff replied that preparations for operations in the
“South Seas” were already started. It also maintained that Midway was beyond
the effective range of Japanese land-based aircraft and that it would be very
difficult to garrison and supply even if captured, while its loss would not sig-
nificantly affect American morale. In the Naval General Staff ’s view, cutting
the supply lines to Australia would greatly affect morale; it would be more
likely than a threat to Midway to draw the Pacific Fleet into a decisive battle
and thereby shorten the war.18
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The differences between the Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff over
the objectives and timetable of the Second Operational Stage of war were not re-
solved until after the Allied carrier raid on Tokyo—“the Doolittle Raid”—on 18
April. This raid had (as its planners intended) a great psychological effect on the
Japanese strategic leadership. Both the navy and the army had failed in their duty
to safeguard the homeland and the emperor from attack. Yamamoto regarded it as
a “mortifying personal defeat.” The Japanese admirals and generals, suffering
great loss of face, now overreacted and made several strategic decisions that
proved fatal for Japan.19 Specifically, they adopted Yamamoto’s argument to ex-
tend the defense perimeter into the Central Pacific.20 A plan for the Second Opera-
tional Stage of war was approved by IJN Directive No. 86: it set (following raids in
the Indian Ocean in April) the occupation of Port Moresby for early May 1942, of
Midway and the Aleutians for early June, and of Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia
for July.21
On the American side, strategy in the Pacific was largely driven by Admiral
Ernest J. King, appointed as Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy (COMINCH) on
20 December 1941. On 16 March, President Roosevelt relieved Admiral Harold
R. Stark as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO); ten days later, King assumed the
duties of CNO in addition to those of COMINCH. Stark had been very pessi-
mistic about the Allies’ ability to stem the tide of Japanese conquests. He had
been willing to abandon all positions west of the international date line (longi-
tude 180° east), including the Philippines and Australia. In contrast, King was
determined to oppose any further Japanese advance in the Pacific and eventually
to mount a counteroffensive. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who had replaced Ad-
miral Husband Kimmel as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPac) on 31
December 1941, was directed by King to halt the Japanese advance, keep the line
of communications with Australia open, and mount raids with carrier forces
against the enemy’s strongpoints in the Pacific.22
Because of the growing Japanese threat to Australia, the British had suggested
that the U.S. Pacific Fleet assume responsibility for defending the northeastern
approaches to Australia and for securing Australia’s lines of communication
with the United States. At first, the U.S. Navy had been reluctant to assume such
responsibilities, the Pacific Fleet having been greatly weakened by the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor. Yet King agreed on 1 January 1942 to study the problem.
On 27 January 1942, the ANZAC (Australia–New Zealand Army Corps) Area
was established. It encompassed eastern Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, New
Caledonia, New Hebrides (modern Vanuatu), Solomon Islands, Papua New
Guinea, and Fiji. Australia and New Zealand would provide forces and would be
supported by the United States. The combined force would be under command
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of an American flag officer and directly subordinate to the CINC of the United
States Fleet (King).23
King appointed Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary as the ANZAC Area com-
mander. Leary’s task was to cover the northeastern and eastern approaches to
Australia and New Zealand, protect friendly shipping in the area, support the
defense of island positions, and destroy enemy forces in the area.24
At the end of February 1942, the Australian chiefs of staff assessed the coun-
try’s defense in light of the fall of Singapore, the raid on Darwin, and the im-
pending Allied collapse in the NEI. They believed that if the Japanese advanced
into the Coral Sea to cut off Australia’s communications with North America
they might attack Port Moresby and then the Australian mainland. In their view,
Port Moresby was too vulnerable to be reinforced but too important to be aban-
doned. Another option for the Japanese was to advance to the Solomon Islands
and then capture the New Hebrides and New Caledonia.25
In the spring of 1942 the only troops then available for defense of Australia
were about 265,000 militia, poorly trained and equipped. The best Australian
troops were deployed abroad—three divisions in the Middle East and elements
of one division in Singapore, Timor, Ambon, and Rabaul.26 By mid-April, the
Australian army at home had two first-line divisions, an armored division, and
eight second-line militia divisions. The 41st Division was then the only major
force of the U.S. Army in Australia.27
The key for the successful defense of Australia and New Zealand was the secu-
rity of their lines of communication to the U.S. West Coast and Hawaii. In the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff—the main arena for discussing strategic issues facing
the United States—the navy and army had fundamentally different views on
strategy in the Pacific. The U.S. Navy realized by February that the Philippines
were lost. Hence, it believed, the defense of Australia and of communications to
that country was of vital interest to the Allied cause. In contrast, the army’s chief
of staff, General George C. Marshall, was adamant that the principal effort must
be a cross-channel invasion of Europe. The chief proponent of that view was
Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower, appointed as the chief of the War
Plans Division on 16 February 1942. For the army and Eisenhower the main
conditions for winning the war were defense of United Kingdom, continued
participation of the Soviet Union in the war, and preservation of Allied positions
in the Middle East and India in order to prevent the junction of German and Japa-
nese forces.28 In Eisenhower’s view, the Japanese conquest of the NEI removed
one of the major reasons for making a stand in the Southwest Pacific. Because
the Japanese now controlled the region’s oil and tin and practically the world’s
entire rubber resources, the reasons for committing more forces in the theater
were “less compelling than they were three months ago.”29
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King was persistent in his efforts to establish island bases with army troops
and land-based aircraft. He secured a small army force to garrison Bora Bora in
the French Society group. By early January 1942, the army had promised to send
troops to Canton and Christmas Islands in the Gilberts (Kiribati today), thereby
providing additional security to Samoa. It also promised to garrison New Cal-
edonia. On 5 February, King recommended that Funafuti Atoll in the Ellice Is-
lands (Tuvalu today) be made an advance base to cover Fiji and Samoa. He was
concerned with the Japanese activity in the Gilberts and was convinced that the
Allies had to interpose bases between them and southern Pacific islands.30
On 5 March, at a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with President Roosevelt,
the main topic was Pacific strategy. Roosevelt seemed to agree with King’s views
on the strategy to be followed in the Pacific. This in turn led King to direct Rear
Admiral Richmond K. Turner, chief of the War Plans Division, to develop a com-
prehensive plan for the war in the Pacific.31 On 16 March, King suffered a major
setback: the Joint Chiefs decided to implement a War Department plan for rapid
buildup in Europe and restriction of reinforcements in the Pacific to “current
commitments.” Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs approved King’s request for bases
at Efate and Tongatabu. The army believed that three divisions in the southwest-
ern Pacific were sufficient; the Joint Chiefs approved a single Army Air Forces
(AAF) pursuit squadron for Christmas Island, Canton, Tongatabu, and Efate.
Fiji and New Caledonia would have two squadrons each of medium bombers,
about sixty in all.32
THE THEATER
The size and physical characteristics of a maritime theater play important, even
critical, roles in the conduct of war at sea. The Port Moresby–Solomons opera-
tion was conducted over a relatively large part of the southwestern Pacific (see
map 1). The 1,850,000-square-mile Coral Sea is very deep (average depth about
7,850 feet); it is bounded in the west by northeastern Australia and the Great
Barrier Reef, off the coast of Queensland; in the north by southeast New Guinea,
the Louisiade Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, and the Santa Cruz Islands; and
in the east by the New Hebrides and Loyalty island groups and New Caledonia.
Its southern boundary runs along latitude 25° south. The distance from
Cooktown to Espiritu Santo Island is about 1,300 miles, while Guadalcanal is
about 950 miles away from latitude 25° south. Hence, the Coral Sea provided
ample room for carrier operations.
The Coral Sea is generally free of navigational hazards, except for numer-
ous islands and reefs on the western, northern, and eastern fringes, and the 1,600-
mile-long Great Barrier Reef to the west. The only routes through the Louisiade
Archipelago to the Solomon Sea in the north are the then poorly charted Jomard
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Passage, 4.9 nautical miles wide, and the four-mile-wide China Strait off the
southeastern tip of New Guinea. The Coral Sea is occasionally subject to fronts
moving off Australia, bringing towering cumulus clouds, showers, and squalls over
areas fifty to 150 miles wide. 33 However, the weather is dominated by southeast-
erly trade winds. Hence, during the battle of the Coral Sea the Japanese carriers
—moving southward, into the prevailing wind—were able to launch their air-
craft much faster than the Allied carriers, which had to turn into the wind, away
from the enemy carriers, to launch and recover. On the other hand, the south-
easterly wind gave the Allied carriers an advantage during their withdrawal from
the operating area.34
The Japanese controlled a large number of positions in the central and south-
western Pacific prior to the Port Moresby–Solomons operation. The most im-
portant naval and air base in the central Carolines was Truk Lagoon (Chuuk
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today), forty-nine by thirty miles in size. Likewise, the newly acquired base at
Rabaul, about 640 miles south from Truk, was centrally located in the southwest
Pacific. It has a first-class anchorage. A 620-mile land-based-aviation patrol arc
encompassed the Solomons to the east, most of eastern New Guinea to the west,
and half of the Solomon Sea to the south.35
Other important positions occupied by the Japanese in early 1942 were Manus
Island, in the Admiralties; Gasmata, on New Britain; Kavieng, on New Ireland;
Buka Island; Kieta and Buin, on Bougainville; Faisi Island; and Salamaua and Lae
on New Guinea.36 The majority of these bases included airfields or seaplane facili-
ties. Rabaul had then two operational airfields (Lakunai and Vunakanau), used by
both fighters and bombers; a third was under construction. Both Kavieng and
Gasmata had airfields. Kieta had a landing strip, but was not suitable for military
aircraft. Faisi Island could serve as a seaplane base. Salamaua had a seaplane base.
The airfields at Salamaua and Lae were used by fighters and bombers.37 The an-
chorage at Shortland Island (seized by the Japanese on 13 March 1942), southeast
of Bougainville, could shelter a large number of ships; an inlet at the eastern side
of Shortland was suitable for a seaplane base.38
From the Allied perspective, the largest and the most important position was
Port Moresby, on New Guinea. Port Moresby is separated from northeastern
Australia, 310 miles away, by the Gulf of Papua and the ninety-mile-wide Torres
Strait. It was excellently located to support air attacks against the eastern and
southeastern coast of New Guinea and the Admiralties. Port Moresby was vulner-
able to a landing from the sea. The 13,360-foot Owen Stanley Range provided a
degree of security from attack overland.39 Control of Port Moresby would allow
the Japanese to blockade the eastern sea approaches to Darwin and deny the Allies
a forward base in New Guinea. It would also pose a threat of invasion against east-
ern Australia.40 Port Moresby lacked good port facilities to serve as a base when
the Australian troops arrived in early 1941. Port Moresby remained virtually
useless for Allied heavy bombers. The nearest supporting airfields were at
Townsville, some seven hundred miles away in Australia.41 In the spring of 1942
Port Moresby was defended by several thousand poorly trained and equipped
troops. The rest of New Guinea was defended by a local militia called the New
Guinea Volunteer Reserve.42
The principal bases for the Allied ships were Tongatabu, in the Friendly Is-
lands (Tonga); Nouméa, on New Caledonia; Efate, in the New Hebrides; Suva
and Nandi, in Fiji; and Tutuila, in the American protectorate of Samoa. How-
ever, none were suitable for basing aircraft carriers.43 The nearest place usable
for dry-docking aircraft carriers was Pearl Harbor, and for cruisers and destroy-
ers, Sydney, Australia. Nouméa’s harbor could accommodate ships of any size.
Its entrances were protected by mines, except for the Bulan Passage.44 Limited
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harbor facilities existed at Port Moresby; St. James Bay, on Espiritu Santo Island,
in the New Hebrides; and Nouméa.45
Allied air forces used fields at Townsville, Charters Towers, Cloncurry, and
Darwin in northern Australia. Horn Island was an intermediate field for aircraft
flying to and from Port Moresby. The airfields at Port Moresby were small and
were used only for fighter aircraft and as a staging point for bombers en route to
the New Hebrides and the Solomons. They also lacked dispersal areas and hence
were vulnerable to attack by fighters and bombers. Tulagi was a valuable base for
searches by flying boats but was poorly defended and highly vulnerable.46 The
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) operated a few PBY-5 Catalina flying boats
from Gavutu Harbor on Tulagi until 2 May, when these aircraft were withdrawn.
The Allies also started construction of an airfield at La Tontouta, New Caledonia,
as another at Efate, a defended base for fighters and dive-bombers, was nearing
completion.47 The anchorage at Nouméa was not suitable as a seaplane base, be-
cause it lacked antiaircraft (AA) defenses. Catalinas were also able to use anchor-
ages at White Sand Point and Mele Bay, the New Hebrides.48
The Japanese base of operations prior to the Moresby-Solomons operation,
anchored at Rabaul, greatly facilitated the offensive employment of naval forces
and land-based aircraft toward the Solomons, the Louisiade Archipelago, and
southeastern New Guinea. The Japanese naval forces and aircraft based at Rabaul
operated along short and diverging lines of operations. For example, the sea dis-
tance from Rabaul to Lae is about 450 miles. Tulagi is about 550 miles by the sea
southeast of Rabaul. The flying distance from Rabaul to Port Moresby is about
five hundred miles.
In the spring of 1942 the Allied base of operations in the South Pacific stretched
in the general westerly direction. It flanked the lines of communication from the
U.S. West Coast, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal to New Zealand and Australia. Yet
it was unfavorable for preventing the Japanese from gaining control of additional
strongpoints in the South Pacific. The distances separating the Allied bases from
each other and to the enemy bases were long. For example, the sea distance from
Nouméa to Tongatabu, Tonga, is about a thousand miles. New Caledonia and
the New Hebrides are about the same distance from Australia’s coast. The dis-
tances from Samoa and Fiji to Rabaul are 2,230 and 3,540 miles, respectively.
Nouméa and Rabaul are separated by about 1,385 miles of water. The base of op-
erations for the Allied land-based aircraft in northeastern Australia was far from
the newly acquired Japanese bases in the Bismarck Archipelago and the
Solomons. For example, the air distances from Townsville and Cairns to Rabaul
are 1,100 and 980 miles, respectively. Allied aircraft based in northeastern Aus-
tralia operated along long and converging lines of operations against targets off
the eastern coast of Papua New Guinea.
1 0 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWC_2012WinterReview_Vego-End.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Winter2012Review\NWC_2012WinterReview.vp
Friday, December 02, 2011 11:07:31 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
108
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 1, Art. 19
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/19
The Japanese lines of communication within the Bismarck Archipelago and
toward southeastern and eastern New Guinea were almost identical to their line
of operations. Their hub was Rabaul, and they were short and relatively easy to
protect by land-based aircraft and ships. The route between the Bismarcks and
the lower Solomons runs through deep water and is partially sheltered. In con-
trast, the Allied lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand were very
long and highly vulnerable to the attacks by enemy submarines. For example,
the distances from the Panama Canal to Brisbane and Auckland are 7,765 and
6,540 nautical miles, respectively.
OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURES
The Japanese in the southern and southwestern Pacific lacked a single theater
commander having command and control of all naval and ground forces. The
Fourth Fleet (the operational designation of which was the South Seas Fleet) was
responsible for all operations in the South Pacific, Caroline Islands, the Marshalls,
the Marianas, and Palau.49 Its commander was Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue,
with headquarters in Truk; the secondary base was at Kwajalein, the Marshalls.50
All Japanese naval land-based aircraft in the southwest and the South Pacific
were subordinate to the 11th Air Fleet, under Vice Admiral Nishizo
_
Tsukuhara at
Tinian, in the Marianas.51 The 11th Air Fleet consisted of the 21st, 24th, 25th, and
26th Air Flotillas. It was responsible for securing eastern New Guinea, the Bis-
marck Archipelago, the Marshalls, Wake Island, the eastern Carolines, and the area
around the Japanese homeland. It was also to cooperate with the Fourth and the
Fifth Fleets.52 The 24th and the 25th Air Flotillas were attached to the Fourth Fleet
until control returned to the 11th Air Fleet on 17 April. The 24th Air Flotilla was
redeployed out of the area, leaving only the 25th Air Flotilla to support the Fourth
Fleet. Its headquarters, under Rear Admiral Sadayoshi Yamada, was moved to
Rabaul on 29 March and was activated on 1 April. The 25th Air Flotilla was desig-
nated the 5th Air Attack Force (5 AAF) for operational purposes.53
The entire Pacific had been designated as an area of U.S. strategic responsibil-
ity. On 9 March 1942, the Allies formally divided the Pacific theater into three
large “areas” (or in modern terms, theaters of war): the Southwest Pacific Area
(SWPA), the Southeast Pacific Area, and the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA).54 General
Douglas MacArthur was appointed as the Commander, SWPA (COMSWPA); he
formally assumed this responsibility on 18 April 1942. The ANZAC Area was for-
mally abolished on 22 April and Admiral Leary was appointed Commander, Al-
lied Naval Forces, SWPA.
On 3 April, the POA was subdivided into three (in modern terms) theaters of
operations: the North Pacific Area (above latitude 42° north); the Central Pacific
Area (from north latitude 42° to the equator); and the South Pacific Area (south
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of the equator and between the eastern boundary of the SWPA and longitude
110° west).55
Nimitz took officially the post of Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas
(CINCPOA) in addition to that of CINCPac at 1100 on 8 May 1942, when the
battle of the Coral Sea was almost over. Nimitz was directed to appoint a com-
mander for the South Pacific (SOPAC) Area, who, “acting under his authority
and general direction, would exercise command of the combined armed forces,
which at any time might be assigned that area.”56 However, that post was not
filled until 19 June 1942, when Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley assumed com-
mand of SOPAC. He initially established his headquarters at Auckland, New
Zealand. Nimitz exercised command over all U.S. naval forces in the Pacific the-
ater, including those in the Coral Sea, by virtue of his authority as CINCPac, but
the Coral Sea itself was formally part of MacArthur’s SWPA. Nimitz and Rear
Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, Commander, Task Force 17 (CTF 17), had no con-
trol over supporting forces, such as Army Air Forces elements, which were pro-
vided by MacArthur. The resolution of this problem was that when American
carriers and British or Australian forces operated in the same general area, the
carrier task force commander would be in overall command. In all other cases,
the senior commander, of either three nations, would be in command.57
THE PRELIMINARIES
After the capture of Rabaul and other points in the Bismarck Archipelago,
IGHQ directed the Fourth Fleet on 2 February to attack and capture “strategic
areas” in British New Guinea and the Solomons as soon as possible.58 The first
operational objective was to seize the ports of Lae and Salamaua in the Huon
Gulf, on the southeastern coast of New Guinea (the SR operation). On 13 Febru-
ary the Japanese navy and army signed an Army-Navy Local Agreement, setting
execution of Operation SR for 25 February.59 On 16 February, Inoue and Major
General Tomitaro
_
Horii, commander of the South Seas Force (or Detachment),
agreed that the 2nd Battalion of the 144th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by one
mountain artillery battery and other units, would attack Salamaua, while one
battalion would capture Lae.60
In mid-February, Admiral King temporarily transferred Task Force 11 (TF
11), based on the carrier USS Lexington (CV 2), to the ANZAC Area. Admiral
Leary, together with CTF 11, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, was planning to at-
tack Rabaul. B-17 heavy bombers based at Townsville would strike Rabaul at the
same time.61 On 20 February, TF 11 reached a point of about 350 miles south of
Rabaul, where Japanese land-based aircraft detected it. In the ensuing encoun-
ters in the air the Japanese lost eighteen aircraft and the Americans only two;62
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however, the element of surprise had been lost, and hence the carrier attack on
Rabaul was abandoned.63
A major effect of this aborted raid was that Inoue decided to delay the SR oper-
ation until 8 March.64 On 4 March, the 24th Air Flotilla started raids on Port
Moresby, Lae, and Bulolo (some thirty-seven miles southwest of Lae). The next
day the Japanese convoy sortied from Rabaul bound for the Huon Gulf. Two days
later, the convoy split into two groups, one to Lae and the other to Salamaua. On
the night of 7–8 March, the Japanese landed and quickly captured both without
opposition and immediately started to build bases. By seizing control of the Huon
Gulf the Japanese had obtained control of the straits between northeast New
Guinea and New Britain, as well as positions from which they could support fur-
ther advances to the southward.65
Nimitz reacted strongly to the Japanese landings in the Huon Gulf by sending
TF 17, centered on the carrier Yorktown (CV 5), and TF 11 with Lexington (CV 2)
screened by eight cruisers and fourteen destroyers across the Coral Sea and into
the Gulf of Papua. On 10 March, 104 Allied aircraft attacked Japanese shipping in
the Huon Gulf from a position about fifty miles southwest of Port Moresby.66 The
Allied aircraft achieved complete surprise by approaching through the 7,500-foot
pass over the Owen Stanley Range.67 Japanese sources cited losses as four trans-
ports sunk, three ships damaged moderately and three lightly, eleven fighter air-
craft lost, and 130 men killed and 245 wounded. Among damaged ships were one
seaplane tender, two light cruisers, and one destroyer.68 Allied postwar sources
claim much larger Japanese losses: thirteen out of eighteen transports sunk or
damaged, of which several had to return to Japan for repairs.69 About four hun-
dred Japanese were killed in the attack.70 The losses in shipping could not be re-
placed quickly. That was one reason that Inoue decided to postpone the Port
Moresby–Solomons operation for one month; another reason was increased Al-
lied air strength over New Guinea.71
Allied and the Japanese land-based aircraft conducted sporadic attacks on
each other’s airfields starting in late January. The Allies raided Rabaul with small
numbers of aircraft every other night from 24 January to 3 February. Allied at-
tacks on Rabaul intensified in April. B-26 medium bombers struck on 9, 11, 12,
18, and 19 April. On the 11th and 13th attacks on Lae by a small number of me-
dium bombers and fighters caused extensive damage, forcing the Japanese to
move aircraft to Rabaul. After further raids on Rabaul on 22 and 23 April, the
Allies used only two to three medium bombers, leading the Japanese errone-
ously to believe that the enemy’s air strength at Port Moresby was greatly re-
duced. In fact, however, the Allies had reinforced Port Moresby, deploying
additional P-39 fighters and basing B-25 bombers on Horn Island off the York
Peninsula.72
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The 25th Air Flotilla intensified its attacks on Port Moresby in early April
from Rabaul and Lae. The Japanese raids generally used only about half of a
dozen land-based attack aircraft and several fighters;73 for this reason, these at-
tacks were not decisive.74 The 25th Air Flotilla began full-scale raids on Port
Moresby on 17 April, with fifteen fighters and seven attack aircraft, striking al-
most daily until the beginning of May.75
JAPANESE INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY
The Japanese plans for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation were based on
poor knowledge of the whereabouts and movements of enemy naval forces, the
carriers in particular. This was a major reason for several decisions that caused
major problems and setbacks for the Japanese in the course of the operation.
Their main sources of information were visual observation by land-based search
aircraft and submarines, interrogations of captured airmen, analysis of combat
experience, and intercepts of plaintext messages. The Japanese, unable to decode
the Allied radio traffic, lacked direct knowledge of enemy plans and intentions,
but their analysis of open sources, such as the Allied broadcasts and printed me-
dia, was generally good. For sea reconnaissance, the Japanese relied on land-based
medium bombers, flying boats, floatplanes, and aircraft based on ships, though
rarely carriers.
The Japanese had fairly accurate information on the strength of enemy garri-
sons and air elements. For example, on 23 April the Fourth Fleet estimated cor-
rectly that Tulagi had a small garrison but that Port Moresby was defended by
about five thousand troops. The Japanese assessed (again correctly) that Allied
air strength in Australia had been increased, to probably two hundred first-line
aircraft. They knew that the Allies had concentrated air strength in the Port
Moresby, Port Darwin, and Townsville areas and that air activity in those areas
was intense.76
However, the Japanese had very poor knowledge of the overall strength of en-
emy forces in the southern and southwestern Pacific. Their single greatest mis-
take was to assume, in the absence of information to the contrary, that “there
was little probability of the existence of a powerful force in the area after the
withdrawal of U.S. carrier force.”77 Yet they also believed that it was “not unlikely
that the enemy might conduct their own operations against our South Seas Fleet
operational area east or south. The only U.S. carrier believed to be in the area is
the Saratoga.”78 These estimates were based on information from a Japanese
picketboat that the Americans had employed three carriers in their raid on To-
kyo on 18 April. However, from interrogations of captured pilots the Japanese
learned that only two carriers (Enterprise and Hornet) had taken part. This
meant, they assessed, that two others, Yorktown and Saratoga, were available
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—they erroneously believed that Lexington had been sunk by a Japanese subma-
rine in January 1942. They did not know that Saratoga had sustained damage
and was under repair. In any case, having observed no enemy carriers in the
southern area since 10 March, the Japanese assumed that only one large carrier
(Saratoga) would be operating there. They believed that the Royal Navy might
have in Australian waters a battleship, two or three heavy cruisers, one light
cruiser, and several destroyers. They also assumed that “even if the enemy’s sub-
marines are not particularly active, there is a strong chance that at least two or
three would operate in the area.”79
JAPANESE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS
Inoue, of the Fourth Fleet, and his staff were primarily responsible for planning
the employment of naval forces and Base Air Forces (i.e., naval land-based air-
craft) in the southwest and south. General Horii, commander of the brigade-
sized South Seas Force, and his staff planned for the army troops. In connection
with the high-level strategic debates discussed above, an IGHQ directive of 29
January had stipulated that Port Moresby and Tulagi should be seized immedi-
ately after Lae and Salamaua. That is, the Port Moresby–Solomons operation
would be executed in March 1942, supported by land-based aircraft from Rabaul
and seaplanes from newly constructed bases in Lae, Salamaua, and Finschafen.80
The original assumption that the enemy would have no carriers in the area be-
came invalid in the light of the raids of February and March 1942 and growing
enemy air strength in Australia. As we have seen, in Inoue’s view the capture of
Port Moresby and Tulagi would entail much more risk than initially envisaged
and would need strong support by the large carrier force. However, Yamamoto
needed all five large carriers (Kaga had been damaged in a grounding in Febru-
ary 1942) and four battleships for raids against Ceylon and in the Bay of Bengal
in early April (Operation C).81
Inoue sent a message to the Combined Fleet on 20 March pointing out that
considering the experience of the Lae-Salamaua operation, especially the ap-
pearance of the enemy carrier force, “it would be very difficult to assign protec-
tion for the transport convoy by land-based air units, and to protect the airbase
establishment and the landing point after disembarkation.” He continued, “I
would like to see discussion during a central agreement to doubly ensure the
strengthening of land-based air units and the cooperation of a fully equipped
aircraft carrier for the coming operation.” The carrier Sho
_
ho
_
(14,200 tons full
displacement) currently assigned for the operation to the Fourth Fleet was not
sufficient in itself.82
Final plans for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation were developed by the
Fourth Fleet and subordinate commanders during April 1942. The plans were
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considerably affected by Yamamoto’s decisions regarding the timeline of the
Midway-Aleutians operation and the availability of carriers. The Fourth Fleet
also depended on the Combined Fleet for additional cruisers and destroyers and
land-based naval aircraft.
On 5 April, Admiral Ugaki, the Combined Fleet chief of staff, circulated an
outline of organizational changes based on IJN Directive No. 86. Among other
things, the Port Moresby operation, to be code-named “MO Operation,”
would take place in early May, prior to the Midway-Aleutians operation. From
20 April to 10 May the Combined Fleet would attach to the Fourth Fleet the
large carrier Kaga, one seaplane tender, Cruiser Division (CruDiv) 5 (Haguro and
Myo
_
ko
_
), CruDiv 6 (Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako, and Furutaka), and Destroyer Divi-
sions 7 and 27.83 Inoue also learned that 24th and 25th Air Flotillas would re-
turn to the direct control of the 11th Air Fleet commander, Vice Admiral
Tsukuhara.84 In addition, the Combined Fleet attached the light carrier Sho
_
ho
_
from the 4th Air Flotilla to the Fourth Fleet; until then it had been used only for
ferrying aircraft. Initially scheduled to take effect on 10 May, the command
changes were later advanced to 20 April.85
Also on 5 April, Yamamoto directed Inoue that all plans for the Fourth Fleet
had to be completed by 10 May. It was this change, combined with the advance of
the date for the execution of the Midway-Aleutians operation to early June, that
had made it impossible to provide the frontline, large-carrier division Inoue had
been promised in March. Inoue had been a strong opponent of the Midway op-
eration, because the Fourth Fleet would have to garrison and supply the island
after its capture.86 He was now even more distressed that only one large carrier
would be assigned to the MO operation and asked the Combined Fleet to recon-
sider. Inoue specifically requested that Carrier Division 2 (CarDiv 2) (So
_
ryu
_
and
Hiryu
_
) be assigned to the operation, in addition to Kaga; CarDiv 2 was consid-
ered one of the most effective formations in the entire navy. Another problem
with the schedule was that the 25th Air Flotilla would not have sufficient time to
neutralize air opposition in the area prior to the start of the operation; its major
components would not be ready for combat until 20 April.87
Yamamoto, however, was reluctant to assign CarDiv 2 to the Fourth Fleet.
That division, together with CarDiv1, would be part of the pending Midway-
Aleutians operation. Also, both carrier divisions needed refitting and training
upon their return from the Indian Ocean. Yamamoto therefore decided on 10
April to allocate to the South Seas Fleet CarDiv 5, composed of the new carriers
Sho
_
kaku and Zuikaku, plus two destroyer divisions. However, CarDiv 5 was the
least experienced carrier unit in the Combined Fleet. This order became effec-
tive on 18 April.88
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The Fourth Fleet’s planners considered three options for seizing Port
Moresby: a land approach over the Owen Stanley Range, a “barge mobilization,”
and a standard landing operation. Capturing Port Moresby by advancing over-
land was feasible if a road were built over difficult mountainous terrain. Some
army commanders preferred this option to the risks of troops embarking on ships,
which could be sunk.89
“Barge mobilization” meant landing troops in the southeastern part of New
Guinea and then transporting them to Port Moresby by self-propelled barges to
successive points along the coast. These landings would be conducted during the
night to reduce the threat of the enemy’s air attack. The Japanese estimated that,
at an average advance of sixty-eight miles each night, they would need about five
days to reach Port Moresby. The problem was that the sea route to Port Moresby
was navigationally very difficult, due to reefs and other obstacles; the barges
would have to travel far from the shore. Barge mobilization would have been ex-
tremely difficult, but Inoue believed it feasible. Hence, in early April he directed
studies for transportation of food and munitions, embarkation rosters, cooking
arrangements, etc.90 But in the end a standard landing was adopted, despite high
risks for the convoy and covering forces; the strengthening of the Fourth Fleet
had given its planners increased confidence.91
The Japanese conducted extensive reconnaissance of the area of Port Moresby
and the seas routes from Rabaul westward and southward. The army com-
mander had asked the navy to obtain photographs of the landing area at Port
Moresby and the sea area between there and the island of Samarai, in the China
Strait. Army officers accompanied reconnaissance flights over the landing area,
after 10 April.92 Yet after numerous reconnaissance and photographic flights, the
Japanese acknowledged that they still lacked accurate information on facilities
and enemy strength.93
As the Japanese usually did in preparing for amphibious landings, the 24th
Air Flotilla in March conducted reconnaissance flights over the projected
route to determine the best sites for seaplane bases; the 25th Air Flotilla did the
same in mid-April. The Japanese surveyed waterways east of Australia, con-
firmed the accuracy of charts, reconnoitered airfields on Horn Island off Cape
York in northern Australia, and photographed both landing sites at Port
Moresby and potential barge routes.94 For some of these purposes the Japanese
used short-range, single-float, reconnaissance biplanes that operated from
shore bases established by tenders or from the tenders themselves.
On 16 April, Inoue convened a two-day staff meeting to discuss the plan and
arrange final orders. Many subordinate commanders voiced strong misgivings.
One major problem was the vulnerability of the MO Invasion Force along the
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southern coast of Papua New Guinea; enemy air bases were only about three
hundred miles away, and swift currents and numerous islands surrounded by
reefs severely interfered with the passage of ships.95
The MO Invasion Force had three main routes available: the 670-mile-long
westward route via the China Strait; a 950-mile route passing eastward around the
Louisiades; and an 840-mile route southward through the Louisiades via the
Jomard Passage and then across the Coral Sea to Port Moresby. The route through
the China Strait was the shortest and ran mostly over deep water; it was also least
exposed to the enemy air attacks. However, ships would have to sail in a single col-
umn. The eastward route was free of navigational obstacles but was 110 miles lon-
ger than the southward route; it was also more exposed to attack by the enemy
submarines. The southward route was less navigationally difficult than going
westward and more secure than the eastward route; planners adopted it as a
compromise.96
The plan was to organize the convoy of ships, five from the army and six
from the navy. The convoy, after departing from Rabaul, would run through St.
George’s Channel and then south-southwest, turn southwest, and when east-
ward of Woodlark Island (Muyua today) head toward Deboyne Island, and then
enter the Coral Sea through the Jomard Passage, some 420 nautical miles south-
ward from Rabaul. Afterward, and for the remainder of its advance to the land-
ing objective, the convoy would be open to attack by the enemy aircraft based at
Townsville and Cooktown. The planners calculated that if the Jomard Passage
was navigated during the evening and a constant speed of eleven knots was
maintained, the convoy would be exposed to attack in the Coral Sea for the next
twelve hours.97 Hence, it was critical to obtain local sea control in the Coral Sea
by the MO Carrier Force. The basic idea for doing so was to send the MO Carrier
Force sweeping around to the east of the Solomons (to avoid the enemy air
searches) to enter the Coral Sea from the southeast, as the MO Main Force passed
to the westward (see sidebar, “Japanese Order of Battle, May 1942”).98
The Japanese planners also grappled with the problem of the barrier reef
fronting Port Moresby. The reef is a natural fortress, running along the coast
from the eastern tip of New Guinea to Port Moresby, at the distance of from two
to ten miles. Passage by landing craft was impeded at both low and high tides.
Outside Port Moresby the large Sinavi and Nataera Reefs must be penetrated, by
three possible routes: the Liljeblad Passage, the Basilisk Passage, and the Padana
Nafua. The Liljeblad Passage was within firing range of the Pafa Coast Defense
Battery south of Port Moresby, the current is swift, and sunken reefs lie in the
passage and en route to harbor. This route was unsuitable for a large landing
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JAPANESE ORDER OF BATTLE, MAY 1942
CINC, COMBINED FLEET: ADM. ISOROKU YAMAMOTO
COMMANDER, FOURTH FLEET (SOUTH SEAS FLEET): VICE ADM.
SHIGEYOSHI INOUE
(FLAGSHIP CL KASHIMA, RABAUL)
MORESBY (MO) MAIN FORCE
(Vice Adm. Aritomo Goto
_
, Commander, CruDiv 6)
CruDiv 6 (4 CAs—Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka)
DesDiv 7 (1 DD—Sazanami)
Light Carrier (Sho
_
ho
_
—12 A6M Zero fighters and 9 B5N Type 97 [Kate] torpedo
bombers)
TULAGI INVASION FORCE
(Rear Adm. Kiyohide Shima, Commander, CruDiv 19)
CruDiv 19 (1 CM—Okinoshima, minus Tsugaru and Tokiwa)
DesDiv 23 (2 DDs—Kikuzuki, Yu
_
zuki)
2 Transports (Azumasan Maru, Ko
_
ei Maru)
Minesweeper Flotilla 14 (Hagoromo Maru, Noshiro Maru No. 2)
2 Special Minesweepers (Wa No. 1, Wa No. 2)
SC Squadron 56 (Toshi Maru No. 3, Tama Maru No. 8)
Base Units (400 men of Kure 3rd Special Unit, part of the 7th Construction
Bn., two 80 mm AA guns of 3rd Base Unit, one 130 mmMG of 3rd
Base Unit, two 80 mm AA guns of 8th Base Unit)
MORESBY (MO) INVASION FORCE
(Rear Adm. Sadamichi Kajioka, Commander, Torpedo Squadron 6)
Torpedo Squadron 6 (1 CL—Yu
_
bari)
DesDiv 29 (2 DDs—Oite, Asanagi)
DesDiv 30 (3 DDs—Mutsuki, Mochizuki,Yayoi)
DesDiv 23 (1 DD—Uzuki, minus Yu
_
nagi, Kikuzuki, and Yu
_
zuki)
1 Repair Ship (Ojima)
1 Special Minesweeper (Wa No. 20)
TRANSPORT UNIT
(Rear Adm. Ko
_
so
_
Abe)
1 CM (Tsugaru)
11 transports: 5 navy (Mogamigawa Maru, Akihasan Maru, Cho
_
wa Maru,
Goyo
_
Maru, Sho
_
kai Maru), 6 army (China Maru, Daifuku Maru,
Asakayama Maru, Matsue Maru, Mito Maru, Nichibi Maru)
South Seas Force (5,000 men)
Base Units (embarked; some 500 men of 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing
Force, 10th Construction Section, four 120 mm AA guns and two
80 mmAA guns of 8th Base Unit, two 80 mm of 4th Base Unit, part
of the Base Unit–Communication Personnel, Transportation
Section)
MORESBY (MO) SUPPORT FORCE (COVERING FORCE)
(Rear Adm. Kuninori Marumo, Commander, CruDiv 18)
CruDiv 18 (2 CLs—Tenryu, Tatsuta)
2 AVs (Kiyokawa Maru, Kamikawa Maru)
Gunboat Division 5 (2 XAVPs—Nikkai Maru, Keijo
_
Maru)
1 Transport (Sho
_
ei Maru)
Minesweeper Flotilla 14 (Hagoromo Maru, Noshiro Maru No. 2)
Base Units (part of Kure 3rd Special Unit, part of the Communication Person-
nel of 8th Unit)
MORESBY (MO) CARRIER FORCE
(Vice Adm. Takeo Takagi, Commander, CruDiv 5)
CruDiv 5 (2 CAs—Myo
_
ko
_
, Haguro, minus Nachi)
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CarDiv 5 (5th Air Flotilla), Rear Adm. Chu
_
ichi Hara, Commander (2 CVs
—Zuikaku, Sho
_
kaku)
(Sho
_
kaku—21 A6M Zero fighters, 20 D3A Type 99 [Val] dive-
bombers, 19 B5N Type 97 [Kate] torpedo bombers)
(Zuikaku—21 A6M Zero fighters, 21 D3A Type 99 [Val] dive-
bombers, 20 B5N Type 97 [Kate] torpedo bombers)
DesDiv 27 (4 DDs—Shigure, Yu
_
gure, Ariake, Shiratsuyu)
DesDiv 7 (1 DD—Shioakebono, minus Sazanami)
1 Fleet Tanker (To
_
ho
_
Maru)
VICE ADM. TERUHISA KOMATSU, COMMANDER, SIXTH FLEET
SUBMARINES
(Capt. Mitsunage Iwagama)
Eastern Detachment, SubRon 8 (Patrol/Scouting Group) (I-21, I-22, I-24, I-28,
I-29)
SubGru 21 (Raiding Force) (RO-33, RO-34)
SUPPLY FORCE
2 Fleet Tankers (Ishiro
_
, Ho
_
yo
_
Maru)
BISMARCK AREA (R) DEFENSE FORCE
(Rear Adm. Masao Kanazawa, Commander, 8th Base Unit)
8th Signals Unit
8th Submarine Base Force
81st Garrison Rabaul Unit
Gunboat Div 5 (Seikai Maru)
SC Div 56 (Kotobuki Maru No. 5)
MO INVASION ARMY UNITS
(Maj. Gen. Tomitaro
_
Horii)
144th Infantry Regt.
1st Co., 55th Cavalry Regt.
1st Bn., 55th Mountain Engineer Regt.
2nd Co., 47th Mobile AA Bn.
6 Army Transports (part of the MO Invasion Force)
25TH AIR FLOTILLA (5TH AIR ATTACK FORCE)
(Rear Adm. Sadoyashi Yamada, Commander, 25th Air Flotilla)
1st Force (Tainan Air Group, at Rabaul, Lae) (18 Zero and 6 Type 96 fighters)
2nd Force (4th Air Group, at Rabaul, Lae) (17 Type 1 land-attack bombers)
3rd Force (Motoyama Air Group, at Rabaul) (26 Type 96 land-attack aircraft)
4th Force (Yokohama Air Group, at Tulagi, Shortland Island, Deboyne Island)
(12 Mavis reconnaissance aircraft, 9 Zero Model 21 fighters)
Special Duty Force (1 AV—Mogamikawa Maru)
NAURU AND OCEAN ISLAND INVASION FORCE
(Rear Adm. Kiyohide Shima, Commander, CruDiv 19)
CruDiv 19 (Okinoshima, Tsugaru, minus Tokiwa)
DesDiv 23 (2 DDs—Kikuzuki, Yu
_
zuki)
2 Transports (Kinryu
_
Maru, Takahata Maru)
6th Base Naval Landing Party
Kashima Naval Landing Party
1 CL (Tatsuta); 1 CM (Tsugaru) (after 11 May)
Sources: Bates et al., Battle of the Coral Sea, app. 1, p. 8; Japanese Army Operations in
the South Pacific Area, pp. 53, 56–57.
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force. The Basilisk Passage was a standard waterway but was in the direct line of
fire from coastal batteries. The Padana Nafua route avoided these problems and
was considered by the planners the most favorable.99
There was also the problem of sustaining troops once they landed. The Port
Moresby area, poor in water resources, relied on rainwater; it was estimated that
only four or five thousand troops could be stationed there.100 Supplies would
have to reach a Japanese garrison by a long and vulnerable sea route either from
Rabaul or the Huon Gulf or over the Owen Stanley Range. The ever-increasing
enemy air strength in northern and eastern Australia would make it difficult for
the Japanese to hold Port Moresby even if the landing was successful.
On 23 April, Inoue issued Order No. 13 as the basic directive for MO.101 It di-
rected the South Seas Fleet and the South Seas Force to seize Port Moresby, im-
portant positions in southeastern New Guinea, and Tulagi Island in the lower
Solomons; to establish air bases; and to intensify air operation around Australia.
The services reconciled differences in a new Army-Navy Local Agreement on 25
April, and details were worked out by 3 May.102 On 28 April IGHQ issued direc-
tives for the execution of the operation. For the Japanese high command, the
overall strategic objective remained isolation of Australia from the United States
and other Allies. The capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi would be followed by
the occupation of important points in New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa. From
these new bases, the Japanese aircraft and submarines would interrupt, if not cut
off entirely, the flow of the enemy’s troops and matériel to Australia and prevent
it from becoming a base for a counteroffensive.103
On 28 April, Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi, commander of the MO Carrier Force,
issued orders to his forces. As directed by Inoue, his order included strikes against
the enemy’s bases in northeastern Australia. Rear Admiral Hara, commander of
CarDiv 5, was very dissatisfied with the role assigned to his carriers. He was espe-
cially critical of the task of conducting strikes against the enemy’s bases in north-
eastern Australia. In his view, it was too risky to operate carriers within the
effective range of the enemy land bases. Another problem was the presence of reefs
and other navigational hazards in the area, which would limit the maneuvering
area for his carriers. Logistical sustainment under way was also inadequate, be-
cause only a single fleet oiler was assigned to CarDiv 5 and its destroyers. On 29
April, Inoue modified his order and left to Takagi’s discretion whether to attack
enemy air bases or not. Takagi was allowed to cancel the planned strikes if he failed
to achieve surprise. However, the same day, Yamamoto directed Inoue to cancel all
strikes on northeastern Australia. The MO Carrier Force was to focus exclusively
on the enemy carriers, while attacks on Australia’s mainland were to be conducted
by naval land-based aircraft. On 30 April, Inoue formally canceled strikes on the
Allied airfields in northeastern Australia. At the same time he directed Takagi that
V E G O 1 1 3
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CarDiv 5 was to embark eighteen A6M Zero fighters for the 25th Air Flotilla and
ferry them to Rabaul.104
Inoue’s plan was extremely complex (see map 2). The Fourth Fleet planners as-
sumed that the enemy commander would be aware of the movements of the Port
Moresby Invasion Force and would deploy a force into the Coral Sea to intercept it.
The Japanese took as granted, however, that they would achieve surprise. Objec-
tives and events were sequenced with little consideration for potential difficulties
arising from long distances, poor radio communications, bad weather, or unfore-
seen events. The most fateful mistake by the Japanese, one that would be repeated
on many occasions in the Pacific War, was the assumption that the enemy would
passively accept the Japanese narrative and react in a preordained way.105
The capture of Port Moresby was the principal and ultimate objective of the
entire operation. It was an operational objective, in terms of its scale. The Japanese
believed that by controlling Port Moresby they would deny the enemy a major air
base within effective range of Rabaul. From Port Moresby the Japanese could
dominate the whole of New Guinea and threaten northern Australia.106 It would
help secure Lae and Salamaua from the enemy’s air attack. For its part, the Com-
bined Fleet believed that MO operation could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to re-
spond, thereby setting a trap for its destruction.107 However, there was a serious
mismatch between ends and means. Even if successful, the Japanese clearly lacked
sufficient air strength to counter the growing Allied air capabilities in northeast-
ern Australia. Enemy aircraft would be still able to attack Japanese forces in the
western Coral Sea.108
The capture of Tulagi was a supporting and major tactical objective. A seaplane
base there would protect the left flank of Japanese forces moving to seize Port
Moresby. It would allow the Japanese to extend their search coverage farther east-
ward. Also, the Japanese believed, a seaplane base at Tulagi would make it difficult
for the enemy to conduct reconnaissance from Nouméa and Port Moresby to
track Japanese movements.109 The Japanese, in contrast, would be able to search
east of the Solomons and over the eastern Coral Sea. The plan also envisaged the
capture of Samarai Island, as the key to controling the China Strait.110
The Japanese made a major error in trying to capture Tulagi and Deboyne Is-
land (where a seaplane base would be established) in the course of the operaton.
It might have been better to do so beforehand, making the MO operation itself
simpler and more executable. However, the single greatest error in the designing
of the Port Moresby–Solomons operation was failure to initially obtain local
control in the Coral Sea. The main prerequisite of success was the destruction or
serious weakening of the enemy’s operational center of gravity, his carrier force;
only after that was accomplished would the other objectives have been achievable.
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Instead, the Japanese believed that all force elements could be deployed and sent to
the objective area almost simultaneously.
In addition, the plan for logistical sustainment of naval forces was inade-
quate.111 The supply group consisted of only two fleet oilers (some sources say
three). In addition, only one fleet oiler was assigned to the MO Carrier Force.
This greatly increased the time required for the carriers to refuel at sea and
thereby made them more vulnerable to enemy submarine and air attack.
Unity of command in Japanese army-navy operations was rare: separate
command of army and naval units was the general practice; the Port Moresby–
Solomons operation was an exception. Inoue exercised formally full command
and control over all navy and army forces. Under him, Vice Admiral Aritomo
Goto
_
commanded all the invasion forces, and Major General Horii the army
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occupation units. However, the majority of naval units did not belong organi-
cally to the Fourth Fleet. The navy’s land-based aircraft were subordinate to Ad-
miral Tsukuhara, commander of the 11th Air Fleet, and the submarines were
under control of Vice Admiral Teruhisa Komatsu, commander of the Sixth Fleet.
CarDiv 5 and CruDiv 5 were temporarily under Inoue’s command; by the end of
May 1942 they were scheduled to return to their organic forces.112 Vice Admiral
Takeo Takagi was the commander of the MO Carrier Force. However, because he
had little experience in air operations, Rear Admiral Chu \ichi Hara was in tactical
command of CarDiv 5.113
Inoue and his planners divided available seagoing forces into nine elements
for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation and one for the separate Nauru–
Ocean Island operation. A short timeline meant that several units had to be as-
signed multiple tasks (sidebar 1).114 The rationale was speed of execution, but it
meant that the entire force was fragmented and its overall strength was greatly
weakened. Finally, though the outcome of the entire operation hinged on achiev-
ing surprise, there was no deception plan.
The MO operation was to be completed within twelve days, from the first
force deployment to the landing at Port Moresby. No flexibility was incorpo-
rated to provide for delays due to unforeseen events or enemy actions. Specifi-
cally, the landing at Port Moresby would take place on 10 May (X-day). Tulagi
would have been captured on X–7 (3 May). Seaplane bases would be established
at Tulagi on X–6 (4 May), on Deboyne Island on X–4 (6 May), and on Samarai
on X+2 (12 May). Naval construction troops would repair the airfields and re-
ceive the fighters of 5 AAF at Lae on X+2 (12 May). The Nauru–Ocean Island In-
vasion Force, sailing out of Kavieng, would seize these two islands on X+5 (15
May).115
The initial task of the MO Main Force was to provide distant cover for the
Tulagi landing.116 Inoue wanted the light carrier Sho
_
ho
_
to be part of the MO Car-
rier Force. However, at the insistence of General Horii, who was worried about
inadequate AA defense of the MO Invasion Force, Sho
_
ho
_
was assigned to the MO
Main Force.117 The Japanese apparently believed the Allies could react strongly
to the capture of Tulagi and that the MO Main Force could be positioned some
150 miles west of Tulagi, so as to cover either Tulagi or the MO Invasion Force.
In any case, Goto
_
’s force was not strong enough to defend either force against
the determined attack by enemy carriers.118 The MO Support Force (also called
the Moresby Escort Fleet) was to support both Tulagi and Port Moresby land-
ings.119 In addition, it would construct seaplane bases on Deboyne and Samarai
Islands.120
The Zuikaku and Sho
_
kaku carrier groups were organized as a single force,
thereby greatly increasing their offensive capabilities.121 The principal task of the
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MO Carrier Force was to provide distant cover and protection to the MO Inva-
sion Force and destroy the enemy fleet if it appeared.122 However, it was also to
pass within 350 miles of Rabaul to ferry eighteen Zero fighters there on X–8 (2
May).123 Afterward, it would sail east of the Solomons, provide direct support to
the Tulagi Invasion Force, and then on X–5 (5 May) (one day after the flying boats
started to use the Tulagi base) enter the Coral Sea eastward of the Solomons to
support the MO Invasion Force as required. If a strong enemy force was detected,
the MO Carrier Force was to attack and destroy it; otherwise, it would prepare for
a decisive encounter while protecting the MO Invasion Force. After the landing at
Port Moresby, the MO Carrier Force would remain five more days in the area to
counter the appearance of a powerful enemy naval force in the Coral Sea.124
Most submarines that took part in the Port Moresby–Solomons operation be-
longed to the “Eastern Detachment” of Submarine Squadron 8 (SubRon 8). These
submarines were planned to leave for Truk in mid-April.125 The task of SubRon 8
was “to prepare for the enemy fleet, deploy, and wait for the enemy.”126 On X–5 (5
May), four submarines from SubRon 8 would establish a scouting line about 285
miles southwest of Guadalcanal to intercept an enemy force passing from Bris-
bane and Sydney toward Tulagi. Also, one submarine would patrol off the eastern
Australian coast and another near Nouméa.127 Two submarines of SubGru 21 (or
Raiding Force) would reconnoiter the approaches to Port Moresby, attack enemy
ships, and guide the invasion convoy to the outer harbor.128
Though execution of the operation was to be almost simultaneous, the actual
departures of forces taking part were staggered; basing areas were widely sepa-
rated, distances to the objective areas were long, and speeds of advance varied
greatly. The Tulagi Invasion Force and the MO Support Force would sail on 29
April from Rabaul and Truk, respectively. The MO Main Force would leave Truk
on 30 April, and the MO Carrier Force would sortie from Truk the next day. The
MO Invasion Force would sail from Rabaul on 4 May.129
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIES
The U.S. Navy’s communications intelligence (COMINT) was the principal
source of intelligence on the IJN at the beginning of the war in the Pacific. In the
spring of 1942, three centers analyzed Japanese radio traffic, all regularly exchang-
ing data to assist each other in traffic analysis, call-sign recovery, and the decipher-
ing of messages. In Washington, D.C., was Section G, the “Communication
Security Section” (code name NEGAT), within the Office of Naval Com-
munications. The other two stations—HYPO (or Fleet Radio Unit Pacific
[FRUPAC]), at Pearl Harbor, and BELCONNEN (or Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne
[FRUMEL])—served the Allied commands in the Pacific. On the CNO staff,
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Op-20G, the Navy Radio Intelligence Section, was responsible for integrating all
COMINT on the IJN.130
All three COMINT stations in the Pacific focused on intercepting and decod-
ing radio messages sent in the IJN’s Naval Codebook D, or JN-25, cryptographic
system. About half the high-level communications in the IJN used JN-25. In
April 1942, the IJN planned to issue a new Naval Codebook D. However, delays in
distribution postponed the changeover first to 1 May, and eventually to 27
May.131 Had it gone over to the new edition as originally scheduled, U.S. crypt-
analysts would have been in the dark for many weeks at a critical time.
COMINT was the single most valuable source of accurate and timely informa-
tion on the enemy’s intentions for Admirals King and Nimitz and the major naval
commanders in the Pacific. This information was especially critical early in the
war, when the Allies were numerically inferior to the Japanese. Timely informa-
tion on where the Japanese carrier forces were allowed Nimitz and King to employ
carrier forces for raiding newly acquired Japanese positions.132 It would soon al-
low timely deployment of carrier groups to thwart major Japanese thrusts, notably
in the Coral Sea and at Midway. MacArthur relied less on COMINT than did
Nimitz and King and far more on visual reconnaissance, both aerial and from
coastwatchers.133
The Allied cryptanalysts read and decoded a large number of IJN messages in
the spring 1942 that were directly or indirectly related to Japanese plans for the
Second Operational Stage of the war. On 29 January, the Allies decoded the first
messages indicating that the Japanese were conducting searches south of
Rabaul;134 in February, the COMINT centers in Hawaii, in Melbourne, and on
Corregidor issued warnings to King, Nimitz, and Admiral Thomas C. Hart,
commander of the Asiatic Fleet. Admiral Leary, commander of the ANZAC
Area, received warnings of the Japanese future operations in the direction of
Lae, Port Moresby, and the Solomons. Collectively, these warnings convinced
Nimitz in late February that a Japanese offensive was planned for the Port
Moresby area. Within a week, U.S. task forces were alerted.135
The first specific indication of the pending operation against Port Moresby
was a decoded Japanese message of 25 March: “All attack forces continue opera-
tions in accordance with [an unidentified message reference]. . . . On 26th #2
(Air) Attack Force continues to support main task and using fighters assist #5
(Air) Attack Force in RZP campaign and with scouts carry out patrol in your as-
signed area. #5 (Air) Attack Force continue attacks on RZP and . . . and carry out
patrol in your assigned area.”136 Cryptanalysts tentatively located “RZP” in the
Port Moresby area. Initially, they believed that both RZP and RZQ referred to the
Port Moresby area; later they concluded that RZQ was a seaplane base in Port
Moresby and RZP was the town itself.137
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Reportedly, Allied analysts were able to read all the Japanese messages in April
and May 1942. They were able gradually to discern Japanese intentions from the
movements of various naval and air units and arrivals at Truk and Rabaul. They
received such a vast number of messages that even without decoding them all,
they gave Nimitz warning in time to move carrier forces into the Coral Sea.138
The Allied cryptanalysts learned on 5 April about the Combined Fleet’s as-
signment of Kaga to the Fourth Fleet; Kaga was an addressee in communications
between Fourth Fleet and the Combined Fleet regarding the Port Moresby oper-
ation. Within a few days cryptanalysts linked Kaga and the “RZP campaign,”
understood to refer to Port Moresby. On 10 April, the Allied COMINT deduced
that Kaga and a new Sho
_
kaku-class light carrier, identified erroneously as
Ryukaku (actually the small carrier Sho
_
ho
_
) could be used for offensive opera-
tions.139 It was estimated that all the available enemy large carriers were then in
the Indian Ocean and that it would be several weeks before any large carriers
would be available to the South Seas Fleet.140
On 17 April, the Australian Combined Operational Intelligence Centre (es-
tablished on 5 March 1941) in Melbourne outlined “indications of an imminent
move by Japan against Australian territory.” It concluded that the enemy in-
tended to carry out an offensive from the Truk–New Britain area, probably dur-
ing the first week of May, with the major objective of seizing control of the New
Guinea–Torres Strait area, involving the occupation of Port Moresby. The report
estimated that the Japanese naval forces for the pending offensive would consist
of two or three aircraft carriers (Zuikaku, Sho
_
kaku, and “Ryukaku”), five heavy
cruisers, four light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and a submarine force.141
MacArthur’s intelligence section was very skeptical about Japanese inten-
tions against Port Moresby. On 21 April, Colonel Charles A. Willoughby, Mac-
Arthur’s assistant chief for intelligence, prepared for his chief of staff, Lieuten-
ant General R. K. Sutherland, a status report based on (but not attributed to)
COMINT from Melbourne. Willoughby questioned the navy’s view of the re-
ported Japanese naval and ground-based air strength in the Fourth Fleet area.
He believed the buildup posed more of a threat to the coast of Australia and
New Caledonia than to Port Moresby.142
The Allies learned on 25 April that reinforcements continued to arrive at
New Britain. The units of Gunboat Division 8 were en route from Sasebo to
Rabaul.143 On 26 April American analysts deduced that three carriers—
“Ryukaku,” Zuikaku, and Sho
_
kaku—were en route to Truk and would arrive
there about 26 April.144 On 27 April, the commander of the Fourteenth Naval
District (COM 14, with headquarters at Pearl Harbor) believed that air rein-
forcements for New Britain would arrive from the Marianas and Marshalls in
the immediate future. There were more indications that CarDiv 5 and CruDiv 5
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(less Nachi) and destroyers would operate southward of Truk.145 On 28 April,
COM 14 learned that the Fourth Fleet had directed four units to join another
group to search for and engage the enemy eastward of New Britain. The analysts
believed that this other force consisted of units from CruDivs 6 and 18, strength-
ened by at least one carrier, “Ryukaku,” and perhaps two heavy cruisers of
CruDiv 5.146
The main sources for tactical (as opposed to strategic and operational) intel-
ligence were the reports of land-based reconnaissance aircraft based in north-
eastern Australia and at Port Moresby, flying boats at Nouméa, submarines, and
the coastwatcher service. SWPA aircraft flew flank-reconnaissance patrols
around Thursday Island, Port Moresby, and Rabaul. They also extensively recon-
noitered the Solomon Islands and the area southeastward to the boundary of the
Southwest Pacific Area, and the Solomon Sea west of Tulagi. In addition, SWPA’s
aircraft patrolled from Buna, southeastward along the north coast of New
Guinea and the Louisiades, and then westward, south of the Louisiades, to Port
Moresby. The area around Townsville was patrolled out to five hundred miles.
Allied search aircraft conducted routine patrols across the mouth of the Gulf of
Carpentaria and off the Darwin area. SWPA bombers and fighters at Port
Moresby also often conducted photographic and armed reconnaissance around
Salamaua, Lae, Madang, Gasmata, and Buna. After 1 May, however, no searches
of the area east of the Solomon Islands were conducted, either by the RAAF from
Tulagi or by the AAF in Australia or at Port Moresby.147
The coastwatcher service was organized by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN)
in 1939. It used officials of local administration and civilian residents to report
on shipping movements and other unusual activities along some 2,485 miles of
coast in Australian New Guinea, the Admiralties, the Bismarck Archipelago, the
Solomons, and the New Hebrides.148
The Allies had relatively good knowledge of the Japanese air facilities and air
strength in the newly occupied areas of eastern New Guinea, the Bismarck Ar-
chipelago, and the Solomons. They estimated (inaccurately) that on 25 April the
Japanese had sixty-eight aircraft (fourteen fighters, forty bombers, and fourteen
patrol aircraft) deployed in Rabaul and about twenty-four aircraft (all fighters)
at Lae.149
Subordinate to Nimitz was the seaplane tender Tangier at Nouméa; it had six
Catalinas available for search. From 1 through 4 May, they flew daily patrols in a
northwesterly sector out to seven hundred miles. Because of their small number,
the Catalinas could search only once a day. This was not sufficient to ensure de-
tection of enemy forces entering the Coral Sea from the eastward around San
Cristobal Island or through any of the passages northwestward of that island.
Had the Catalinas redeployed to or staged through Efate, their effective search
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could have been extended up to 180 miles on the western leg, far enough to in-
clude Tulagi, and 210 miles on the eastern leg, covering seventy-five miles to sea-
ward of Malaita. In the event, this would probably have resulted in detection of
the Japanese carrier force on 5 May. If the search had been conducted from
Espiritu Santo Island, its radius would have reached the tip of Choiseul Island.150
The divided theater command hampered significantly the ability to obtain
comprehensive and timely information on the whereabouts and movements of
the enemy forces both prior to and during the operation. MacArthur had sole re-
sponsibility for land-based aircraft operating over the Coral Sea. By decision of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nimitz was not allowed to intrude; the consequence was
that a large part of the Coral Sea was not searched.151 Another problem was that
Allied land-based aircraft crews were poorly trained for maritime reconnais-
sance. The long flying times because of the remoteness of bases and operating
areas caused fatigue. Also, the number of land-based search aircraft was limited.
For these reasons, during the operation CTF 17, Rear Admiral Fletcher, would be
forced to supplement them with carrier-based planes.152
ALLIED PLANS AND PREPARATIONS
Despite public statements that he was committed to the defense of Australia by
holding New Guinea, MacArthur deployed only one brigade of militia to Port
Moresby and sent no reinforcements until 14 May, when the battle of the Coral
Sea was over, although he had four experienced Australian Imperial Force bri-
gades and the U.S. 41st Division. The SWPA had to rely almost exclusively on
land-based aircraft and naval forces to defend Port Moresby.153
SWPA’s Allied Air Forces elements under Lieutenant General George Brett (who
had taken the post on 20 April 1942) consisted of six AAF air groups—three pursuit
and one light bombardment, medium bombardment, and heavy bombardment
each—and four RAAF squadrons. This force was impressive, but only on paper.
There were about a hundred medium bombers and forty-eight heavy bombers, but
fewer than half were operational.154 Some units had escaped from the Philippines;
the others were inexperienced. The entire force had great logistical difficulties.
Squadrons were sometimes able to put no more than a single plane in the air. Out of
about five hundred aircraft in the inventories, only about two hundred, or 40 per-
cent of the entire force, could support the Coral Sea operation.155
SWPA’s Allied Naval Forces, under Vice Admiral Leary, were small and inade-
quate for defending Port Moresby from an enemy landing. Most of SWPA’s sur-
face forces were actually controlled by Fletcher. The submarine force consisted
of eleven old S-class boats. Only four to six submarines could be sent on patrol at
any given time; they were usually employed around Rabaul and off the eastern
New Guinea coast.156 The Australians were unable to hold their position in the
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Solomons, because of the lack of air cover; they had at Tulagi only about fifty
men and a seaplane base with four Catalinas, which patrolled out to New Britain
and Bougainville. The Australians decided on 2 May to evacuate Tulagi after re-
ceiving warning from the coastwatchers that an enemy force was on the way
from Rabaul.157
In early April, Nimitz had only one carrier task force at sea—TF 17, with
Yorktown, under Fletcher—in the eastern part of the Coral Sea. TF 11, with
Lexington, had steamed into Pearl Harbor on 26 March. On 3 April, Rear Admi-
ral Aubrey Fitch relieved Vice Admiral Brown as CTF 11. Nimitz directed Fitch
to sail on 15 April and exercise near Palmyra. Four days later he informed
Fletcher that he had taken over command of the SOPAC. Nimitz directed
Fletcher to sail east to Tongatabu for replenishment. TF 17 would depart
Tongatabu on 27 April back to the Coral Sea.
After the 10 March attack on shipping in the Huon Gulf, there were no signifi-
cant actions by Allied carriers in the South Pacific. However, MacArthur wanted
them to remain in the area. On 17 April, he expressed concern that carriers were
leaving the Coral Sea for Tongatabu. He wrote to Nimitz, “[I] consider it neces-
sary that one task force [be] maintained in that area at all times to check further
enemy advance.” Nimitz was surprised at the message but assured MacArthur
that TF 17 was being withdrawn only to replenish and deal with problems with
its fighter aircraft. He strongly agreed on the desirability of maintaining a force
in the Coral Sea and would try to do so. Nimitz privately told King, “It is my con-
viction that enemy advance should be opposed by [a] force containing not less
than two carriers.” He again recommended to King that TF 11 be sent to the
Coral Sea to join TF 17 for upkeep.158
In January 1942 King and his staff planned a diversionary raid (later popu-
larly known as the “Doolittle Raid”) on Japan to raise U.S. morale after the string
of Allied defeats in the Pacific. From decoded enemy radio messages, the Ameri-
can planners knew that the Japanese carriers were still far to the south, but this
diversionary raid tied up half of Nimitz’s carrier strength.
Halsey’s TF 16 (Enterprise, plus Hornet, attached for the Tokyo raid), was ex-
pected to return to Pearl Harbor on 25 April. It could sail to the South Pacific by
the end of April and join Fletcher’s TF 17 on about 14 May. The only concern was
whether Hornet would have its full complement of aircraft. TF 16 would operate
with TF 17 and then relieve it when Fletcher left the South Pacific about 15 May,
because Yorktown needed dry-docking and overhaul. Lexington could stay until
1 June, when it would go to Hawaii for dry-docking as well. The number of the
Catalinas at Nouméa would be increased from six to twelve. SWPA would pro-
vide land-based air support. A group of cruisers and a half-dozen submarines
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would be deployed from Hawaii to the South Pacific and five more to observe
Truk.159
Plans to counter the pending Japanese offensive against Port Moresby were
prepared independently by the SWPA and POA staffs. On 4 April, an Australian
study stressed that the key to the defense of Australia was Port Moresby.160 After
the Japanese occupation of Rabaul and points on the New Guinea coast MacAr-
thur decided to strengthen Allied positions in New Guinea and develop Port
Moresby as a major air and land base. Though, as noted, he sent no troops to
Port Moresby, he directed expansion of air facilities in northeastern Australia,
specifically at Townsville and Cloncurry, for its defense; this program was in its
early stages in late April 1942. MacArthur also made extensive preparations to
thwart the Japanese attempt to seize Port Moresby. Among other things, he di-
rected SWPA’s Allied Air Forces to intensify reconnaissance and concentrate
striking forces at Townsville and Cloncurry airfields. He planned to conduct re-
peated air attacks against Rabaul in early May; long-range heavy bombers would
also attack Lae, Deboyne Island, and convoys in adjacent areas. The garrison
commanders in northeastern Australia and at Port Moresby were alerted to the
possibility of the enemy landings. SWPA’s Allied Naval Forces also sent three
Australian cruisers, known as TF 44, under Rear Admiral John G. Crace (Royal
Navy) to join with TF 17 in the Coral Sea.161
For its part, Nimitz’s staff produced on 22 April a detailed estimate of the
situation. Nimitz assumed that a Japanese offensive in the New Guinea–New
Britain–Solomons area would begin about 3 May. For Nimitz the problem was
how to stop the pending Japanese advance in the southwestern Pacific and yet
ensure the security of Hawaii and the lines of communications with the West
Coast. He delegated authority to conduct operations directly to Fletcher. When
TF 16 arrived, Halsey would be in overall command.162
The U.S. carrier groups in the Coral Sea did not have enough fleet oilers. The
21,077-ton and 16.5-knot Neosho carried 18,000 tons of oil, and the 16,800-ton
and 10-knot Tippecanoe, 11,130 tons. There were also two oilers available in
Australia but they were not equipped for underway replenishment. Carriers and
their escorts consumed very large quantities of fuel, especially at high speed in
combat. Fortunately, carriers and cruisers could carry sufficient amounts of fuel
to give them long range and endurance. For example, Yorktown carried 7,500
tons of fuel, enough for seventeen days at twenty knots. But the 1,900-ton U.S.
destroyers of 1942 carried only about five hundred tons of fuel, giving them an
endurance at fifteen knots of about 4,700 miles, or thirteen days. At thirty-four
knots—in combat action or when screening fast carriers—their endurance was
only thirty-two hours, about 1,100 miles.163 Carriers and cruisers often refueled
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the short-legged destroyers and more quickly than oilers could, but the entire
task group had to be withdrawn from the operating area.
This shortage of fleet oilers, which was true of the Pacific theater as a whole,
was a major Allied weakness and vulnerability. Fletcher tried always to keep an
oiler with his carrier group except during the strike operations. He was also
greatly concerned that the Japanese not discover that he had only two fleet oilers.
If the Japanese attacked them, U.S. carrier operations in the Coral Sea would be
greatly restricted.164
Compared to the Japanese plans, the Allied plan was simple and straightfor-
ward. The single and the most important objective was to prevent the enemy inva-
sion forces from reaching and landing troops at Port Moresby. The prerequisite
was to deny local control of the Coral Sea to the enemy. This objective could be ac-
complished by the destruction or neutralization of the enemy’s greatest, and criti-
cal, strength, his carrier force—in modern terms, his operational center of gravity.
Based on Nimitz’s Operation Order 23-42 of 29 April 1942, Fletcher stated in his
Operation Order 2-42 the mission of TF 17 was to destroy enemy ships, shipping,
and aircraft at favorable opportunities in order to assist in checking further ad-
vances by the enemy in the New Guinea–Solomons area.165 He also wrote, “This
force will operate about seven hundred miles south of Rabaul. Upon receiving in-
telligence of enemy surface forces advancing to the southward, this force will move
into a favorable position for intercepting and destroying the enemy.”166
An annex to the operation order contained information on the Japanese air
strikes against Horn Island, Port Moresby, and Tulagi. It estimated the enemy’s
land-based air strength at 102 aircraft (forty-two fighters, thirty-six bombers),
twenty flying boats, and four floatplanes). The enemy searches would, it as-
sessed, extend up to six hundred miles from Rabaul and the Shortland Islands.
Fletcher anticipated that the enemy offensive would start around 28 April.
Fletcher’s operation order’s estimate of the enemy’s carrier forces was largely
accurate. The frontline carriers Zuikaku and Sho
_
kaku would have sixty-three
aircraft each (twenty-one fighters, twenty-one dive-bombers, and twenty-one
torpedo bombers). “Ryukaku” was falsely estimated to carry eighty-four aircraft
(twenty-one fighters, forty-two dive-bombers, and twenty-one torpedo bomb-
ers); the air complement of the actual Sho
_
ho
_
was much smaller. In addition, it
was believed that the (17,400 ton) converted carrier Kasuga Maru would be pres-
ent, carrying some forty-five aircraft. These forces were supported, the order
stated, by two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, sixteen destroyers, two con-
verted seaplane tenders, one submarine tender, six submarines, eight gunboats,
and nineteen transports and auxiliary vessels.167
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EXECUTION
The Port Moresby–Solomons operation was executed between 28 April, when
the first Japanese force element was deployed, and 11 May, when the Japanese
decided to abandon pursuit of TF 17. Combat took place between 3 and 8 May,
and the decision was reached in a carrier engagement on 8 May (see map 3). In
the process both sides made numerous errors in identifying opposing forces.
Many wrong decisions were made, either because the commander received in-
correct information on the whereabouts and movements of enemy forces or be-
cause he lacked that information entirely or exercised poor judgment.
The major combat involved in the operation can be arbitrarily divided into
three phases. Phase I was the deployment of combat forces and the Japanese land-
ing on Tulagi (27 April–3 May), II the Allied attack on Tulagi and preliminaries
(4–7 May), and III the carrier engagement and withdrawal of forces (8–11 May).
Phase I (27 April–3 May)
The Japanese forces deployed for the Port Moresby-Solomons operation in nine
force elements, each proceeding toward its assigned area independently. On 29
April four submarines of SubRon 8 (I-22, I-24, I-28, and I-29) left Rabaul and
headed to their assigned patrol area some 285 miles southwest of Guadalcanal;
another submarine (I-21) took up a station off Nouméa; in early May, two boats
of SubGru 21 (RO-33 and RO-34) sailed out of Rabaul for the waters south of
Osprey Reef, some 205 miles north-northeast of Cairns, Australia; they were
then to proceed to the approaches off Port Moresby.168 On 29 April, the MO Sup-
port Force sailed from Truk southward to pass west of Buka Island and then turn
south and eastward toward a position west of Tulagi. The next day the MO Main
Force sortied from Truk, steaming southward toward the passage between
Bougainville and Choiseul and then eastward toward a position some 150 miles
west of Tulagi. The Tulagi Invasion Force, with about four hundred troops of the
3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, sortied from Rabaul on 29–30 April. The
MO Carrier Force sailed from Truk on 1 May to pass eastward of San Cristobal
and enter the Coral Sea. Finally, on 4 May, the MO Invasion Force, with five
thousand troops of the South Seas Force and five hundred of the 3rd Kure Spe-
cial Naval Landing Force, sailed from Rabaul and proceeded southward toward
Jomard Passage.
On the Allied side, TF 17 spent seven days at Tongatabu for provisioning and
upkeep. It sailed out of Tongatabu on 27 April and three days later reentered the
Coral Sea. In the meantime TF 11 left Pearl Harbor for the South Pacific. At 0615
on 1 May TF 17 and TF 11 met some three hundred miles southwest of the New
Hebrides. TF 17 and TF 11 were vulnerable there to surprise enemy attack, be-
cause, as noted, Allied land-based patrol aircraft did not cover the central and
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eastern parts of the Coral Sea and there was no coverage of a potential approach
by the enemy carrier forces eastward of the Solomon Islands.169 Fletcher sent TF
11 to join the oiler Tippecanoe, with the cruiser Chicago and destroyer Perkins, at
latitude 16° 00' south, longitude 161° 45' east; take as much fuel as possible from
Tippecanoe before the oiler returned to Efate as directed by Nimitz; and then re-
join TF 17 the next morning. Fletcher wanted to have as much fuel as possible on
Neosho as a reserve.170
Allied cryptanalysts continued to provide valuable information to Nimitz,
Fletcher, and Fitch. For example, on 29 April, COM 14 decoded several messages
sent by the Fourth Fleet clearly indicating that the MO operation was under way.
Fourth Fleet’s Operation Order 13 was read in its entirety. It stated that the ob-
jective of the MO operation was, first, “to restrict the enemy’s movements and
[this] will be accomplished by means of attacks on outlying units and various ar-
eas along the north coast of Australia. The Imperial Navy will operate to its ut-
most until this is accomplished. Further we will continue to operate against all
bases used by enemy aircraft.”171
The MO Carrier Force had been tasked to ferry eighteen Zero fighter aircraft
from Truk to Rabaul, flying them in on 2 May. However, unforeseen events caused
this simple task to disrupt the timetable for the entire operation.172 Everything
went according to plan until 2 May, when the MO Carrier Force reached a position
about 240 miles northeast of Rabaul. That day and the next, Takagi tried to launch
Zeros; both attempts failed because of bad weather, which also prevented the car-
riers from refueling. Takagi then decided to refuel on the 4th and make a third at-
tempt (which was apparently successful) before resuming his southerly advance.
The loss of two days derailed the meticulous synchronization of the plan.173 As it
turned out, the MO Carrier Force could not be within range to protect Tulagi
until 5 May, too late to have any real impact on the situation.174
In the morning of 2 May, TF 17 completed refueling from Neosho, but
Fletcher was disappointed to receive a message from Fitch that TF 11 would not
complete refueling until noon on 4 May. Fletcher also learned, from MacAr-
thur’s dispatches, that the enemy was making final preparations for the advance
on Port Moresby. Because his own force was too far away, he directed Fitch to
fuel his destroyers on a northwesterly course at night and rejoin TF 17 at day-
light, 4 May, at latitude 15 00' south, longitude 157 00' east. Task Force 44 was
also to join TF 17 at that point (see sidebar, “Allied Task Organization”).175
At about 0800 on 3 May, the Japanese forces landed at Tulagi. The MO Sup-
port Force set up a direct screen, while the MO Main Force provided distant
cover to the Tulagi Invasion Force. By dawn on 3 May, the MO Main Force was
about 180 miles west of Tulagi. The aircraft from Sho
_
ho
_
supported the invasion.
However, Goto
_
was unable to stay in the area very long, because he had to support
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the MO Invasion Force.176 Hence, his force moved at about 1100 on 3 May on a
northwesterly course toward Queen Caroline Harbor, Buka Island, for refueling.
The MO Support Force was then located about sixty miles west of the MO Main
Force and was on the way to join the MO Invasion Force, then preparing to sail
out of Rabaul. The MO Carrier Force was about 210 miles northeast of New Ire-
land and about 630 miles northwest of Tulagi, and sailing on a southeasterly
course.177
At about 0800 on 3 May TF 17 was at 16 43' south, 159 24' east (or about five
hundred miles south from Tulagi), on a northwesterly course, while TF 11 was at
16 26' south, 161 50' east, on a westerly heading. The distance between these two
forces was about a hundred miles. Fletcher for some reason did not think it neces-
sary to combine TF 17 and TF 11 into a single force. This is somewhat surprising,
because Nimitz had directed him to combine them, at Point BUTTERCUP, some
320 miles south of San Cristobal Island. Fletcher had received information that
the enemy would probably start his operation by 28 April, and he knew about the
presence of CarDiv 5 at Truk. He should have also assumed that the enemy’s high-
est priority would be to cover his landing forces with his air and surface forces.
With TF 11 and TF 17 as a single force, Fletcher could have delivered a much more
powerful attack against the Japanese forces that landed in Tulagi. TF 11 had com-
pleted refueling early and was ready for action, but that was apparently unknown
to Fletcher. The two forces were beyond visual distance, and it was not desirable to
break radio silence.178
At 1900 on 3 May, Fletcher received a message from MacArthur, who in-
formed him about the presence of five or six enemy ships at 1700 (five in the af-
ternoon) on 2 May off the southern tip of Santa Isabel Island, possibly moving
toward Tulagi. MacArthur also stated that two enemy transports had sighted
barges unloading at Tulagi, at an “unspecified time.” Fletcher now regretted that
the entire force was not combined and able to deliver a powerful strike at day-
light the next day.179
Phase II (4–7 May)
This phase of the operation began with the Allied carrier attack on Tulagi on 4
May. Afterward, and for the next three days, the opposing carrier forces tried to
locate each other. They misidentified ships they sighted, and that led to strikes
against unintended targets. However, by the end of 7 May each side knew the lo-
cation of the other and was prepared for the decisive carrier engagement the
next day.
The MO Invasion Force, escorted by one light cruiser and six destroyers, left
Rabaul on 4 May and sailed southward. It planned to transit the Jomard Passage
around midnight on 6–7 May and sail around the tip of Papua New Guinea
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toward Port Moresby.180 After withdrawal of both the MO Main Force and the
MO Support Force, the Tulagi Invasion Force was left without any cover. Yet this
seemed to the Japanese not to pose any immediate danger, because they ex-
pected no enemy reaction to their landing at Tulagi. In any case, CarDiv 5 was
supposed to be about 120 miles north of Tulagi and from there would be able to
cover it. Unfortunately, for the Japanese, Takagi’s force, having been delayed fer-
rying Zeros to Rabaul, was actually 340 miles north of Tulagi.181
By 0700 on 4 May, TF 17 arrived at position 11 10' south, 158 49' east, or
about 150 miles southwest of Tulagi. At about 0630, Yorktown launched the first
of three strikes against the enemy ships at Tulagi and positions ashore. The
first-wave attack took place between 0815 and 0830. By about 0900, TF 11 and
TF 44 were joined at a position of about 250 miles south of TF 17.182 Yorktown’s
second-wave attack was conducted between 1210 and 1410, and the third be-
tween 1500 and 1515.183 Some sixty aircraft in all took part in these strikes. De-
spite a large number of bombs and torpedoes dropped, the results were dis-
appointing. Only a single enemy destroyer, one auxiliary, and two special-duty
minesweepers were sunk; four other ships were damaged.184 The remaining en-
emy transports, minelayers, and one destroyer immediately left Tulagi harbor.185
The Japanese lost five seaplanes, while the Allies lost three aircraft and eight oth-
ers were damaged.186 Despite damage inflicted, the Japanese continued to build
their seaplane base, which became operational on 6 May and conducted its first
reconnaissance flights.
After receiving a report on the enemy’s attack on Tulagi, Takagi stopped the
refueling and directed his force to sail southeast and search for the enemy carri-
ers in the Solomons area. These searches were unsuccessful. The Japanese were
greatly surprised by the attack on Tulagi. Until then, as noted, they had firmly
believed that the enemy would be forced to react to their moves; they now
learned that the situation was the other way around.187
On 5 May Nimitz informed Fletcher and Fitch about reliable information as
of 3 May that the “Orange [i.e., Japanese] Moresby Striking Force composed of
CruDiv 5 and CarDiv 5 will launch attacks on the Allied bases Port Moresby ar-
eas on X-Ray minus 3 or minus 2 days. These attacks will be launched from the
southeast. X-Ray day is not known but one indication points to 10 May. Above
attacks to be carried out until successful completion by Orange.”188 The Allied
commanders also learned that the MO Carrier Force would be joined by the
Tulagi Invasion Force at 1400 (2 PM) on 6 May. The combined formation would
leave the Coral Sea at about 1800 on 7 May and steam south of Emerald Reef,
Milne Bay.189After receiving this message, Fletcher decided to start refueling,
move toward the Louisiades the next day, and fight a carrier engagement on the
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7th.190 Both Fletcher’s carrier groups sailed on a westerly course; Crace’s TF 44
was about fifty miles ahead.
The ships of TF 17 sailing on southwesterly courses were refueled by Neosho
on 5 and 6 May. At 0735 on 6 May, Fletcher put his Operation Order 2-42 in ef-
fect.191 His task organization combined Task Forces 17, 11, and 44 into an en-
larged TF 17, which now consisted of two large carriers, seven heavy cruisers,
one light cruiser, thirteen destroyers, two fleet tankers, and a seaplane tender.
Tactically, it was divided into five groups (see sidebar, “Allied Task Organiza-
tion”).192 Task Group (TG) 17.2 had a dual mission of operating against the Jap-
anese force advancing southward and protecting the carriers against air and
submarine attacks. The main task of TG 17.3 was to defend the carriers. These
two groups were so organized that they could, depending on the situation, carry
out each other’s missions. Fletcher believed that four destroyers screening each
carrier provided sufficient protection.193 Because he was senior to Fletcher and
the more experienced aviator, Fitch became officer in tactical control of all air
operations. The enlarged TF 17 would operate generally in the Coral Sea about
seven hundred miles south of Rabaul, outside the range of Japanese land-based
aircraft.194
In the early morning of 6 May Takagi’s carrier force was about 120 miles south-
west of the western tip of Guadalcanal. At that point a flying boat from Tulagi de-
tected the U.S. task force and accurately reported its position. Headquarters in
Rabaul received the report and relayed it to Takagi. Allied cryptanalysts picked up
the signal;195 Takagi, however, would not receive this information until 7 May.196
Meanwhile, on the 6th, Takagi started refueling his ships in preparation for a car-
rier engagement the next day.197
At about 1030 four B-17s from Cloncurry and staged through Port Moresby
unsuccessfully attacked Sho
_
ho
_
some sixty miles south of Bougainville. About
1300, Allied search aircraft detected the MO Invasion Force sailing southward
toward Jomard Passage.198
In the meantime, at about 1000, a reconnaissance flying boat from Tulagi de-
tected TF 17. Takagi received that report about 1050; his force was now about
three hundred miles north of TF 17, still refueling. He sent both carriers, with two
destroyers, southward at twenty knots to reduce the distance to the enemy carrier
force. However, according to Japanese reports, Takagi decided that the chance to
attack had been lost and turned north at 1800 to await another opportunity the
following day.199 At that point the presence of Takagi’s force some seventy miles
north of TF 17 was unknown to Fletcher. The Japanese carriers were shielded by
the overcast of a cold front and search aircraft had failed to detect them. Takagi, for
his part, failed to carry out long-range searches on either 5 or 6 May.200
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ALLIED TASK ORGANIZATION
POA FORCES
(Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, CINCPac, Pearl Harbor)
Task Force 17
(Rear Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher, Yorktown)
TG 17.2 (Attack Group, Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid)
TU 17.2.1 (2 CAs—Minneapolis, New Orleans)
TU 17.2.2 (3 CAs—Astoria, Chester, CA-33 Portland)
TU 17.2.4 (5 DDs—Phelps, Dewey, Farragut, Aylwyn, Monaghan)
TG 17.3 (Support Group, Rear Adm. John G. Crace)
17.3.1 (2 CAs—HMAS Australia, Chicago; 1 CL—HMAS Hobart)
17.3.4 (2 DDs—Perkins, Walke)
TG 17.5 (Air Group, Rear Adm. Aubrey W. Fitch)
TU 17.5.1 (2 CVs—Yorktown, Lexington)
(Yorktown—17 F4F Wildcat fighters, 18 SBD-2 Dauntless
dive-bombers, 13 TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bombers)
(Lexington—21 F4F Wildcat fighters, 18 SBD-2 Dauntless
dive-bombers; 17 SBD-2 Dauntless dive-bombers [scouts], 12
TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bombers)
TU 17.5.4 (4 DDs—Morris, Anderson, Hamman, Russell)
TG 17.6 (Fueling Group)
2 AOs (Neosho, Tippecanoe)
2 DDs (Sims, Worden)
TG 17.9 (Search Group)
1 AV (Tangier)
VP-71 (6 PBY-5s)
VP-72 (6 PBY-5s)
SWPA FORCES
(Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Brisbane)
Allied Naval Forces
(Vice Adm. Herbert F. Leary)
TF 42 Eastern Australia Submarine Group
(Rear Adm. Francis W. Rockwell)
Task Group 42.1 (Capt. Ralph Waldo Christie)
1 AS (Griffin, at Brisbane)
SubDiv 53 (S-44, S-45, S-46, S-47)
SubDiv 201 (S-37, S-38, S-39, S-40, S-41)
TF 44
(Rear Adm. John G. Crace, RN; temporarily assigned to TF 17)
1 CA (HMAS Australia)
1 CL (HMAS Hobart)
Allied Air Forces
(Lt. Gen. George H. Brett, Melbourne)
3rd Bombardment Group (light) (Charters Towers) 52 bombers (19 B-25s; 19
A-24s; 14 A-20s)
8th Light Bombardment Squadron
13th Light Bombardment Squadron
90th Light Bombardment Squadron
22nd Bombardment Group (medium) (Townsville Area) 92 bombers (12
B-25s, 80 B-26s)
90th Light Bombardment Squadron
13th Light Bombardment Squadron
19th Bombardment Group (heavy) (Cloncurry) 48 B-17s
30th Bombardment Squadron
40th Reconnaissance Squadron
93rd Bombardment Squadron
435th Bombardment Squadron
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On 6 May Kamikawa Maru of the MO Support Force was detached at Deboyne
Island to establish a seaplane base there; that base became operational the next day.
Afterward, the MO Support Force withdrew to the vicinity of the D’Entrecasteaux
Islands to protect the right flank of the MO Invasion Force.201 By midnight on 6–7
May, the MO Invasion Force was northward of Misima Island; the MO Main Force,
with Sho
_
ho
_
, was some ninety miles northeast of Deboyne Island.202
At 0625 on 7 May, TF 17 was about 115 nautical miles south of Rossel Island.
Fletcher wrote in his postaction report that he planned for the morning air
1 3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
8th Pursuit Group (Townsville Area; Port Moresby) 100 fighters (50 P-39s
each)
35th Fighter Squadron
36th Fighter Squadron
35th Pursuit Group (Sydney) 100 fighters (P-39s/P-38s)
49th Pursuit Group (Darwin) 90 fighters (P-40s)
7th Fighter Squadron
8th Fighter Squadron
9th Fighter Squadron
Photographic Squadron; 4 aircraft Flight A, 8th Bombardment Squadron
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE
No. 11/20 Squadrons (Gavutu-Tanambogo, Tulagi) 4 PBY-5 Catalinas
(withdrawn on 2 May 1942)
No. 24 Squadron (Townsville) 3 Wirraways (trainers used as fighters)
No. 32 Squadron (Port Moresby) Hudson bombers
No. 75 Squadron (Port Moresby) 3 P-40s
TULAGI
2/1 Independent Company, Australian Imperial Force (24 commandos)
(withdrawn on 2 May 1942)
PORT MORESBY
Garrison
(Maj. Gen. B. M. Morris, some 5,000 troops)
39th Infantry Bn.
49th Infantry Bn.
53rd Infantry Bn.
13th Field Regt.
23rd Heavy AA Battery
Detachment, 1st Independent Co.
30th Infantry Bde. Signal Section
30th Infantry Bde. HQ Defense Platoon
Fixed Defenses
Moresby Fixed Defenses Fortress Engineers
Moresby Fixed Defenses AA Artillery (six 3-inch guns)
1st Army Troops Co.
7th Field Co.
New Guinea Volunteer Rifles
Papuan Infantry Bn.
8th Military District Section Intelligence Corps
15th Supply Personnel Co.
Base Hospital
Sources: Bates et al., Battle of the Coral Sea, app. 2, table 1; Coulthard-Clark, “RAN and
RAAF Involvement in the Battle of the Coral Sea,” p. 66.
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search on the 7th to locate the most suitable objective for attack and obtain posi-
tive or negative information regarding enemy carriers, on which he had ob-
tained no information since the previous afternoon. However, searches to the
east and northeastward were not completed, due to bad weather.203
During the night of 6 May, Fletcher received reports from SWPA land-based
aircraft of the enemy transports and light cruisers heading toward Jomard Pas-
sage. For this reason he directed, at 0645 on 7 May, Crace’s TG 17.3 plus the de-
stroyer Farragut to proceed northward and block the Jomard Passage.204 As TG
17.3 approached, a Japanese seaplane detected it, mistakenly reporting “one
battleship, two heavy cruisers and three destroyers.” At about 1430, TG 17.3
was attacked by twelve torpedo bombers and nineteen land-attack aircraft from
Rabaul. All these attacks were skillfully avoided by the Allied ships.205 Crace’s
force was also mistakenly attacked by three high-level B-17 heavy bombers, but
all their bombs fortunately missed their intended targets.206
At 1526, Crace reported to Fletcher that he was unable to complete his mis-
sion without air cover and would withdraw to a position some 220 miles south-
east of Port Moresby. From there TG 17.3 would be able to intercept any enemy
force exiting the Louisiades and advancing toward Port Moresby. TG 17.3’s ships
were low on fuel. Crace also did not have information on the location of TF 17 or
know Fletcher’s intentions. Nonetheless, because of TG 17.3’s presence Inoue
ordered the invasion convoy to loiter north of the Jomard Passage and await the
outcome of the pending carrier battle.207
Fletcher had been well aware that Crace would be operating without air cover,
but he intended that the enemy convoy not slip through the Jomard Passage and
reach Port Moresby. Fletcher later explained that he sent Crace north to ensure
that the invasion was thwarted even if the enemy carriers finished off TF 17 in
the expected duel.208 Fletcher would also claim, in an interview after the war, that
he “feared the opposing carriers would quickly neutralize each other,” recalling
the examples of “many prewar tactical exercises.” In his view, Crace’s group
would be able to prevent the enemy invasion force from exiting the Jomard Pas-
sage whether the Allied carriers intervened or not.209
Nonetheless, Fletcher made a wrong decision in detaching TG 17.3. It was too
risky to employ a surface force without air cover in an area known to be within
effective range of enemy land-based aircraft. It was pure luck (notwithstanding
the skill of his ships) that Crace’s force was not seriously damaged or destroyed;
Fletcher had no way of knowing what would happen. Also, by detaching Crace’s
force Fletcher seriously weakened the AA and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) de-
fense of his carriers, which would in today’s terms be called the “friendly opera-
tional center of gravity.” With the detachment of an additional destroyer during
the night of 7–8 May, TF 17 was left with twelve instead of nineteen escorts for
V E G O 1 3 3
NWC_2012WinterReview_Vego-End.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Winter2012Review\NWC_2012WinterReview.vp
Friday, December 02, 2011 11:08:00 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
139
War College: Winter 2013 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
the decisive engagement that occurred on the 8th.210 Had TF 17’s carriers been
destroyed, the enemy would have had no difficulty destroying TG 17.3 as well.
In the morning on the 7th, Takagi still did not know the whereabouts of the
enemy naval force. He made a decision, based on Admiral Hara’s recommenda-
tion, to search the area southward to make sure that no enemy carrier force was
in his rear as he moved westward to provide cover for the MO Invasion Force.211
Both the Japanese land-based and carrier search aircraft misidentified enemy
ships on several occasions that morning. For example, at 0522, a Japanese land-
based aircraft reported the presence of one enemy carrier about 460 miles south-
west of Tulagi. At 0640, a seaplane reported “one battleship, one cruiser, seven
destroyers, and what looks like one aircraft carrier” about ninety-five miles
south of Rossel Island.212 At 0722, an aircraft from Sho
_
kaku reported enemy
ships about 160 miles away; this was actually TG 17.6, the Fueling Group, Neosho
and the destroyer Sims, misidentified as one cruiser and three destroyers. At
0800, without waiting to confirm the accuracy of the report, Hara launched
seventy-eight aircraft (eighteen fighters, thirty-six dive-bombers, and twenty-
four torpedo bombers). At 0915, they sighted Neosho and Sims and attacked,
twelve torpedo bombers with fighters in the first wave, followed by twenty-six
heavy bombers.213 At 1051, Sho
_
kaku’s pilots realized the mistake in identifica-
tion, but it was too late. Neosho was hit by seven bombs and, heavily damaged,
later sank; Sims was hit by three bombs and sank immediately.
Fletcher believed that the enemy carrier force was somewhere north of his
force near the Louisiades. Actually, Takagi’s force was about three hundred miles
east of TF 17. At 0619 he directed Yorktown to launch ten dive-bombers as
scouts. About 0815, Yorktown search aircraft reported “two carriers and four
heavy cruisers” a short distance northeast of Misima Island, or some 175 miles
northwest of the Allied carriers. Fletcher immediately decided to launch an
all-out attack against these ships. By 1000 ninety-three aircraft (fifty-three dive-
bombers, twenty-two torpedo bombers, and eighteen fighters) were airborne.
At that time, his carriers were in the weather front, hidden by overcast, while
Goto
_
’s force, which he had just detected, was in broad sunlight. However, after
the Allied aircraft were airborne it was discovered that this report had been im-
properly decoded: the pilot had actually observed only two enemy heavy cruisers
and two destroyers, in addition to the reported carrier.214 The attack groups from
both Yorktown and Lexington were directed to attack what proved to be Sho
_
ho
_
.215
At 1055 Sho
_
ho
_
, defended by only about eight fighters and surrounded by
cruisers, was attacked by the Allied aircraft from both carriers.216 Sho
_
ho
_
was hit
with seventeen bombs and five torpedoes. It sank at 1135. Fifteen out of its
twenty-one aircraft went down with it; 638 men were killed and seventy-three
wounded—Japanese destroyers rescued about a hundred men. The Allies lost
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only three aircraft.217 Despite the success in sinking Sho
_
ho
_
, the Allied aircraft
should have also attacked other ships in Goto
_
’s force and thereby inflicted much
higher losses, but they did not. Instead they returned to their carriers about
1340; within an hour all were rearmed and ready for action. But Fletcher was still
in the dark as to the whereabouts of the enemy carrier force. Even if it had been
sighted that afternoon, it would have been too late to launch a successful day at-
tack. He decided to turn southwest and mount a strike the next day.
Shortly after 1500 Takagi received an erroneous report from a seaplane based
on Deboyne that the enemy carrier force (actually TG 17.3) had changed course
to the southeast. Hence, at 1515, Hara sent eight bombers to confirm the report
by searching two-hundred-nautical-mile sectors to the west of the Japanese car-
riers. However, before hearing from them, Hara hastily made an unsound deci-
sion to launch an attack on the supposed enemy carrier group; at 1615 he sent
twelve dive-bombers and fifteen torpedo bombers with his most experienced
pilots and crews to search westward out to 280 miles. In the meantime the first
group of aircraft returned without having found the enemy ships. At 1747, York-
town’s radar detected the second group; at that time the Japanese carriers were
some two hundred miles east of TF 17. Yorktown’s eleven fighters were vectored
to intercept the incoming Japanese aircraft. In the ensuing dogfights, nine en-
emy aircraft were shot down and one was damaged, while the Allies lost three.
The Japanese pilots now became disoriented and lost their way; at about 1900 (7
PM), six tried to land on Yorktown, mistaking it for their own carrier until they
encountered AA fire and turned away. In addition, eleven aircraft were lost try-
ing to make night landings on the Japanese carriers.218 By 2000 (8 PM) on 7 May,
when the last Japanese aircraft landed, the opposing carrier forces were only
about a hundred nautical miles apart.
Phase III (8–11 May)
The two opposing carrier forces did not detect each other until the morning of 8
May. At about 0615, the Japanese carrier force was about 140 miles east of Rossel
Island. Hara launched seven torpedo bombers to search from southeast to
southwest out to 250 miles; several aircraft from Rabaul and Tulagi assisted.
CarDiv 5’s screen was reinforced by two heavy cruisers from Goto
_
’s force. The
MO Invasion Force was directed to steam to a position forty miles east of Wood-
lark Island and await the outcome of the coming battle.
At 0635, Fitch launched eighteen bombers to search in all directions out to
about two hundred nautical miles. The Allied carriers were under mostly clear
skies; visibility was about seventeen miles. In contrast, the enemy carriers were
now under a warm frontal zone, with low-hanging clouds and heavy overcast;
visibility varied from two to fifteen miles. Nonetheless, Lexington’s aircraft
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sighted the enemy carriers at about 0820, and a few minutes later the Japanese
aircraft spotted the American ones. The opposing carriers were then about 210
nautical miles from each other. The two sides were almost even in strength; the
Allied carriers had 126 aircraft (118 were operational), while the Japanese had
121. The Japanese carriers had a screen of four heavy cruisers and six destroyers,
while the American carriers had five heavy cruisers and seven destroyers.
Between 0822 and 0915, the Japanese carriers launched a combined strike
group of sixty-nine aircraft (eighteen fighters, thirty-three dive-bombers, and
eighteen torpedo bombers). In contrast, the Allied carriers launched their
strikes separately. From 0840 through 0915, Yorktown sent forty-one aircraft,
and all but four reached their targets. Lexington launched within the same time
frame forty-three aircraft.219 Yorktown’s dive-bombers arrived first over the Jap-
anese carriers but had to wait for the torpedo bombers. Sho
_
kaku and the Zuikaku
were about ten thousand yards apart, hidden under a rainsquall. They were pro-
tected by about sixteen fighters. Yorktown’s aircraft did not find Zuikaku and fo-
cused all their attention on Sho
_
kaku, attacking at 1100. The torpedo bombers
failed to achieve any hits.220 Yorktown’s dive-bombers obtained only two bomb
hits;221 however, one of them rendered Sho
_
kaku unable to launch aircraft.
Lexington’s aircraft arrived over their targets at 1130; two dive-bombers attacked
Sho
_
kaku and scored one hit; two other dive-bombers attacked Zuikaku but
missed. About half of fifty-two aircraft from Lexington did not find the enemy
carriers.222
In the meantime, at 1044, the Japanese aircraft attacked the Allied carriers.
Lexington’s radar detected the enemy aircraft at a range of about seventy miles,
and nine fighters were sent to intercept. However, six of them flew too low and
missed the enemy aircraft. The Allied carriers were about three thousand yards
apart. At 1113 the Japanese started their attack, giving most of their attention to
Lexington. Yorktown received one bomb hit, but Lexington was struck by two tor-
pedoes and two bombs.223 Lexington was heavily damaged and unsalvageable; it
was sunk by a destroyer that evening to prevent it from falling into enemy
hands.224 After the end of the engagement, the Allied carriers were left with at
least forty-nine operational aircraft, while the Japanese had only thirty-nine
available to fight the next day.225
Takagi mistakenly believed that both enemy carriers were sinking and so de-
cided in the early afternoon that he could send the damaged Sho
_
kaku back to
Truk.226 He was not entirely wrong in doing so. As Takagi and Hara informed
Inoue, they were unable to launch a second strike that afternoon, or probably the
next day either, for reasons of low aircraft strength, pilot fatigue, and low fuel in
the screening ships. Because of the repeated interruptions between 4 and 8 May,
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the MO Carrier Force had never fully refueled; some destroyers had only 20 per-
cent of their fuel capacity remaining, the rest of them 40 percent.227
In late afternoon on 8 May, Inoue and his staff made a detailed estimate of the
situation. Only Zuikaku was left undamaged, and it had only half its aircraft. In
his view, the enemy had lost one carrier and probably another. The question for
Inoue was whether the MO Invasion Force could proceed to Port Moresby. He
believed that a single weakened carrier air group was incapable of protecting it
from the enemy land-based aircraft in Australia. Also, Japanese forces needed to
regroup. Inoue decided to delay the attack on Port Moresby until 3 July. Hence,
he directed the MO Invasion Force to return to Rabaul. Inoue also decided to
hold Tulagi but to abandon the seaplane base at Deboyne as untenable for the
time being.228
Inoue’s decision greatly angered Yamamoto, who was convinced that the Jap-
anese had sunk two enemy carriers and won the battle. Yamamoto did not know
that the Japanese carriers had few aircraft remaining and hence saw no reason
why the operation should not continue. However, he could do nothing about the
postponement of the landing at Port Moresby, but he did not want the enemy
naval forces to escape; he ordered Inoue to resume his pursuit and “annihilate
the remaining enemy force.” At about 2300 on 8 May, Inoue directed Takagi and
Goto
_
to resume their pursuit. At 0200 the next day, Zuikaku and its escorts
changed the course to the southeast and then southwest. About one hour later
Goto
_
’s force was joined by Zuikaku’s group. Shortly afterward, Inoue changed
his mind again and directed both groups to reverse course and head northward.
On 11 May, Takagi received the orders to leave the area entirely.229 The Port
Moresby–Solomons operation was over.
AFTERMATH AND ASSESSMENT
After the loss of Lexington, TF 17 sailed southward to regroup. On the morning
of 9 May a scout plane from Yorktown sighted the enemy carrier force 175 miles
to the northwest. Fletcher prepared his force for possible enemy attack and
launched a strike. He also asked for help from SWPA air forces. Brett responded
by sending fourteen bombers, which reached the targets at the same time as the
Yorktown group. However, the target proved to be a reef. That afternoon Nimitz
directed Fletcher to return to Pearl Harbor or the West Coast with both carriers
(Nimitz had not yet been informed of the loss of Lexington) and the screening
ships of the original TF 17 (i.e., before its enlargement). Kinkaid’s TG 17.2
would join TF 16. The same day, Fletcher detached Crace’s force and brought TF
44 back into existence. Afterward, TF 44 proceeded to Brisbane for refueling.230
On 10 May, Fletcher informed Nimitz that he planned to stop at Tongatabu on
the way to Pearl Harbor.231
V E G O 1 3 7
NWC_2012WinterReview_Vego-End.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Winter2012Review\NWC_2012WinterReview.vp
Friday, December 02, 2011 11:08:00 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
143
War College: Winter 2013 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
The Allies now learned from reading enemy messages that the Port Moresby
operation had been postponed, that the Port Moresby occupation force would re-
turn to Rabaul, and that CruDiv 5 and CarDiv 5 would refuel in the Bougainville
area and then cover the occupation of Ocean and Nauru islands. CruDiv 6, with
two heavy cruisers of the Aoba class, plus gunboats and destroyers, would support
the Nauru–Ocean Island invasion.232 Fletcher did not respond to these move-
ments. At 1600 on 11 May, he detached Kinkaid to Nouméa, while one heavy
cruiser was to rejoin TF 17 at Tongatabu.233
TF 16, with Enterprise and Hornet, sailed out of Pearl Harbor on 30 April for
the Coral Sea but did not reach the scene of action in time. Instead, TF 16 made a
feint toward Nauru and Ocean Island. On 15 May, Inoue received a report from
the search aircraft about the presence of the enemy carriers some 450 miles east
of Tulagi. Shortly afterward, he directed the Nauru–Ocean Island Invasion Force
to return to Truk (these two islands were eventually captured by the Japanese on
25–26 August 1942).234 On 16 May, TF 16 reversed its course toward Pearl Har-
bor and arrived there ten days later.
The battle of the Coral Sea was the first in which surface ships did not see each
other and so did not have the opportunity to use their guns or torpedoes. All
losses on both sides were caused by air strikes. The Japanese sank a fleet oiler and
a destroyer and so heavily damaged a large carrier that it had to be sunk. The Jap-
anese lost only one small carrier and a few small ships at Tulagi. They also lost
sixty-nine aircraft (twelve fighters, twenty-seven dive-bombers, and thirty tor-
pedo bombers) and 1,074 men; the Allies lost sixty-six aircraft and 543 men.235
One Japanese large carrier was heavily damaged, and the losses of aircraft and
experienced pilots were hard to replace; CarDiv 5 did not rejoin the fleet for
more than two months.236 Nonetheless, the Japanese achieved a clear tactical vic-
tory. Operational victory belonged to the Allies, because the Japanese attempt to
capture Port Moresby by sea was stopped and the entire operation delayed. Fur-
ther, the damage inflicted on Sho
_
kaku and losses to Zuikaku’s air wing prevented
both carriers from taking part in the Midway-Aleutians operation the next
month. Had they been available then, the chances of Allied victory would have
been much lower. After Midway, the Japanese decided to seize Port Moresby by
land, across the Owen Stanley Range; that attempt ultimately failed.
CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
The Japanese strategic decision in January 1942 to expand Japan’s defensive
perimeter in the aftermath of its initial great successes in the Pacific War was
due to what has been called “victory disease.” The Japanese were surprised by
their quick victories and low losses. The leaders of the IJN were far more ag-
gressive than those of the army in wishing to exploit early successes by
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preventing the enemy from gaining time and mounting a counteroffensive.
Yamamoto was keenly aware that decisive victory against the U.S. Pacific Fleet
was the key to consolidating Japanese strategic success before the industrial
power of the United States became overwhelming. In trying to expand Japan’s
defensive lines in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, however, naval and army
leaders clearly did not match their strategic ends and means. Differences be-
tween the Naval General Staff and the Combined Fleet on whether the main
thrust in the Second Operational Stage of the war should be in the South, Cen-
tral, or North Pacific resulted in a bad compromise plan. The subsequent
changes in timing of the Port Moresby–Solomons and Midway-Aleutians op-
erations, coupled with Yamamoto’s inability to assign adequate forces to either
major operation, were perhaps the main reason that both ultimately failed. A
major problem for the Japanese was the lack of centralized planning at the
strategic level. The Army and the Naval General Staffs had to negotiate their
differences in planning any major army-navy operation. In the IJN’s case, the
situation was even more complicated because the Combined Fleet led by
Yamamoto exercised often much greater influence in operational planning
than the Naval General Staff did. In sequencing major operations in two widely
separated parts of a theater, strategic leadership should make sure that adequate
forces are available or becoming available for the accomplishment of each opera-
tional objective. Also, sufficient time should be given for redeployment, upkeep,
and rest of forces taking part in the successive major operation. Otherwise, the risk
of ultimate failure in one or both major operations will be considerably increased.
Planning of major operations and campaigns should be vested in a single opera-
tional commander; competing planning responsibilities result in a compromise
plan and often lead to the failure of the operation.
In early 1942, the U.S. problem was how to check further Japanese advances
in the southern and southwestern Pacific. Admiral King was the most vocal pro-
ponent of the view that the Allies should strengthen their defenses in the South
Pacific and prevent any additional gains by the Japanese; otherwise, it would
take much more time and sacrifice to roll back the Japanese conquests. The Allied
strategy of fighting Germany first was fundamentally sound. However, General
Marshall and other Army leaders were too rigid in pursuing their Germany-first
strategy. They fought back King’s efforts to deploy more troops, better equipped
and trained, to the South Pacific. King’s strategy was vindicated by the eventual
Allied success in protecting the links between Australia and New Zealand and the
United States. In determining the main and secondary theaters of war, the strategic
leadership should not go to extremes and assign almost all the best trained and
equipped forces to the main theater; the principle of economy of effort requires that
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numerically sufficient and highly capable forces be assigned to the theater of second-
ary effort as well.
The weather played a prominent role in the both the Japanese and Allied car-
rier operations and greatly influenced the outcome of the engagement on the
8th. If the Allied carriers had been protected by low-hanging clouds and poor
visibility as their Japanese counterparts were the Japanese aircraft might have
not been successful; the opposite was equally true. Planning and preparation for
a major naval operation or campaign require thorough study of all aspects of the op-
erating area. Despite all technological advances, the weather and climate consider-
ably affect the employment of one’s naval forces and aircraft. Operational
commanders and planners should properly evaluate their potential impact on all
phases of a major operation or campaign.
The Port Moresby–Solomons operation was conducted over a major part of
the Coral Sea and the adjacent Louisiade and the Solomons archipelagos, as well
as the southeastern part of New Guinea, and the Bismarck Archipelago. Allied
forces deployed from bases in New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and eastern
Australia. This part of the southwestern Pacific was militarily “undeveloped,”
lacking naval and air bases and support facilities adequate for surface combatants,
submarines, or aircraft. The Japanese controlled a number of well developed naval
bases and airfields in the Bismarcks, in the Carolines, and on the southeastern
coast of New Guinea. The Bismarcks and Solomons provided many natural har-
bors and anchorages that could serve as advance bases or havens for surface ships
and as seaplane bases. The Allies were less fortunate, in that there were very few
good bases and airfields in the South Pacific; those in eastern Australia were too
far away. A major problem for both the Japanese and the Allies was the lack of
any repair facilities for aircraft carriers. Forces taking part in a major operation or
campaign will have great difficulties in accomplishing their objectives without a
well developed theater-wide infrastructure. Hence, whenever possible adequate
numbers of naval bases and airfields and their supporting structures should be de-
veloped already in peacetime.
Relatedly, Japanese naval forces and aircraft occupied central positions and so
operated along relatively short, interior, and divergent lines. Their bases of oper-
ations flanked the sea routes from the U.S. West Coast and the Panama Canal to
Australia and New Zealand. The Allied base of operations in the South Pacific
was unfavorable for the employment of naval forces and aircraft. During the op-
eration, the Allied carrier forces occupied a central position. In contrast, the Al-
lied land-based aircraft deployed in eastern Australia and New Caledonia
occupied an exterior position and operated along very long and converging lines
of operation. Naval warfare is invariably aimed to obtain/maintain or dispute
control of certain ocean/seas. It cannot be conducted without access to bases/ports
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and airfields in the littorals. Positions and their locations still have considerable
influence on the successful employment of one’s naval forces. However, control of
positions means little unless it is combined with the factor of force. The operational
commanders and planners should not overestimate the importance and value of
either central or exterior positions and resulting lines of operation or com-
munications. They should try everything to maximize advantages and minimize
disadvantages of a certain position for the employment of their combat forces. Yet
what counts most is not the geography of the situation but the combat readiness,
morale, and the skills of the operational commanders in employing their forces in
combat.
Both the Japanese and the Allies had undeveloped command structures in the
theater. The Japanese structure was highly fragmented. The parochialism of the
two services, a major problem for the Japanese throughout the war in the Pacific,
was particularly evident at the general-staff level. However, in the planning and
execution of the Port Moresby–Solomons operation, the Japanese ensured unity
of effort through unity of command. Admiral Inoue, as the Fourth Fleet com-
mander, was responsible for command and control of all the navy and army
forces. Yet he depended on the Combined Fleet for additional forces and had no
influence on Yamamoto’s decision to change the operation’s timetable. Opera-
tional commanders should have sufficient organic forces to ensure that assigned ob-
jectives can be accomplished; otherwise, it is difficult to exercise mission command.
Optimally, they should also have full command and control over all subordinate
forces during planning and the execution of a major operation or campaign.
In contrast to the Japanese, the Allies established at least the rudiments of a
theater or operational command organization. The Southwest Pacific Area and
the Pacific Ocean Areas were, in modern terms, “theater-strategic commands.”
Most combat actions were conducted within SWPA, under MacArthur.
Nimitz, as CINCPOA/CINCPac, had exclusive authority over the employment
of Task Forces 17 and 11. As a result, a divided theater command existed both
prior to and during the battle of the Coral Sea. This created numerous prob-
lems in providing comprehensive searches by land-based aircraft and intelli-
gence sharing. Giving operational control over TFs 17 and 11 to MacArthur
was effectively impossible; neither Nimitz nor King would allow the employ-
ment of carrier forces by an Army general; the carriers were the only major
striking force left in the Pacific Fleet and could not be put at risk. Another
problem was the lack of an intermediate commander for the South Pacific.
Nimitz was nominally in command of SOPAC. However, he was some four
thousand miles from the scene of action, and was unable to form an accurate
and timely picture of the situation in the South Pacific. Optimally, in planning
and execution of a major operation or campaign, all subordinate forces should be
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controlled by a single commander. His headquarters should not be too far from the
scene of action. This ensures the most effective control over operational intelli-
gence, fires, logistics, and protection. The boundaries between the adjacent the-
aters should not be so rigid as to prevent friendly forces from crossing them as
needed.
During the preliminaries, Nimitz employed carrier forces to great effect in re-
acting to Japanese advances in the Bismarcks and on the eastern coast of New
Guinea. The Allied carrier raids in the southwest Pacific had much greater effect
on Japanese planning for the pending Port Moresby–Solomons operation than
was realized at the time. The carrier raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942 had a great
psychological effect, on the Japanese strategic leadership and people, and it also
reinforced Yamamoto’s decision to go ahead with his planned Midway operation.
However, the raid deprived the Allies of two large carriers to oppose the enemy ad-
vance into the South Pacific, although Admiral King had reliable information,
from decoded enemy messages, about the planned attack on Port Moresby. Had
the Tokyo raid not taken place, Nimitz would have had four carriers to oppose the
Japanese thrust toward Port Moresby and probably would have inflicted much
greater enemy losses. The highest strategic leadership should give to subordinate
theater commanders full command authority over all forces deployed within their
areas of responsibility. Normally, the major striking forces should be employed in
the theater of main effort. Hence, these forces should not be employed in a secondary
theater, thereby making it difficult or even impossible to reinforce the theater of
main effort as quickly as necessary. This is especially true if intelligence obtains
timely and reliable knowledge of the enemy’s plans and intentions. Also, the time
between two consecutive operations conducted in two separate maritime theaters of
operations should allow for redeployment from one theater to another. This, in
turn, requires sound balancing of the operational factors of space, time, and force
versus an operational/strategic objective.
The Japanese had inadequate knowledge of the situation in the theater. They
knew nothing of the enemy’s plans or intentions, because of their inability to
break Allied codes and the lack of human intelligence. Most of their information
was obtained by scout aircraft and seaplanes based in the Bismarcks–New
Guinea–Solomons. Their information on the physical features of the objective
area and on ground defenses and air strength in the southwest Pacific was accu-
rate, but Japanese knowledge of enemy carriers—their numbers, whereabouts,
and movements—was a different matter. Apparently, the Japanese commanders
and their staffs had too much faith in the reports of their pilots and submariners.
The Japanese seem to have based their decisions and plans on what they as-
sessed as the enemy’s intentions and gave insufficient weight to the enemy’s ca-
pabilities. Generally, and unless the commander possesses reliable and accurate
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knowledge of the enemy’s plans, it is unwise to prepare estimates and make
decisions based on enemy intentions instead of his capabilities. The enemy can use
deception to hide his true intentions and actions.
Japanese planning for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation was deeply
flawed. First, the plan was based on overly optimistic assumptions. The absence
of accurate and reliable information on the whereabouts of the Allied carriers
did not lead Inoue and his staff to assume the possibility of large enemy forces in
the Coral Sea—to the contrary. The Japanese had a penchant for assigning mul-
tiple objectives to be accomplished simultaneously or nearly so; in this instance,
the Japanese tried to accomplish all their objectives in a single major combat
phase; they put too much emphasis on speed of action. They also added such mi-
nor tasks as ferrying Zeros to Rabaul, without taking into account the extra time
they might take. Operational commanders should not draft plans based on either
overly optimistic or pessimistic assumptions. The lack of information on the where-
abouts and the movements of the main enemy forces should counsel a great deal of
caution in drafting operational plans. The factor of speed is critical for the successful
employment of one’s forces. However, a balance should be found between the need
for speedy execution of the operation and avoidance of simultaneous or nearly si-
multaneous pursuit of multiple objectives. The mission given to a subordinate com-
mander should not be changed by adding secondary tasks; the latter usually take
more time than originally envisaged.
The Japanese relied on the factor of surprise (and presumed enemy passiv-
ity), but here they did not prepare an operational deception plan to enhance the
chances of achieving it. Instead, they unrealistically believed that secrecy alone
would suffice. Surprise, judiciously conceived and successfully employed, can be a
most potent factor but should not be counted on. A plan for a major operation or
campaign should include provision for operational deception to enhance the chance
of surprising the enemy, but there must be means to ensure success even if surprise is
not obtained. Secrecy alone is rarely sufficient to achieve surprise.
The Japanese plan for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation was also overly
complex. Its success depended heavily on precise synchronization of move-
ments and actions of a large number of force elements—which made Inoue re-
luctant to change the plan until it was too late to have any effect. No provision
was made for unforeseen events, such as the sudden appearance of the enemy
and his reactions, mistakes made by the Japanese commanders, or bad weather.
Finally, the Japanese task organization was too fragmented. The result was a con-
siderable reduction in the combat potential of the force as a whole. The Japanese
plans could work well only if everything went according to the plan and the en-
emy reacted as prescribed in the plans. Too many intermediate objectives slow
one’s operational tempo and require commitment of larger forces and more time for
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the accomplishment of the ultimate objective. They also result in overly complicated
plans. Task organizations should be simple, straightforward, and logical. The
principle of unity of effort through unity of command should be applied. Division of
a force into several smaller elements should generally be avoided.
The single greatest advantage the Allies had over the Japanese was accurate,
reliable, and timely knowledge of enemy plans and intentions. The Allied com-
manders knew of the high-level Japanese debate about the Second Operational
Stage of the war months and weeks before resulting plans were executed. King
and Nimitz had great faith in the work of their cryptanalysts and so used this tre-
mendous advantage to the fullest; otherwise, they would not have been able to
employ their forces so successfully. By reading and properly analyzing enemy ra-
dio messages they were able to concentrate and prepare TF 17 and TF 11 in the
Coral Sea in time to oppose the advance toward Port Moresby.
MacArthur and his staff, in contrast, apparently had little confidence in
COMINT and instead depended on the relatively unreliable reports of land-
based search aircraft based in northeastern Australia and at Port Moresby. Their
information had only tactical value, limited by inadequate numbers of aircraft,
long flying distances, and poor training of their crews for searches over seas and
oceans. For their part, searches by TF 17 aircraft were limited by divided theater
command. The absence of searches from the Solomons was one of the main rea-
sons that the MO Carrier Force was not detected prior to entering the Coral Sea.
Fletcher, who was never advised by SWPA of the gaps in the coverage by its air-
craft, never had a full operational picture of the situation after the enemy forces
were initially detected. In planning a major operation or campaign, commanders
and their staffs should focus on creating an operational picture of all aspects of the
situation in a given theater of operations. Hence the need to convert information
obtained from strategic and tactical intelligence into operational intelligence; oth-
erwise, a critically important operational perspective on the situation will be miss-
ing. Operational commanders should not arbitrarily decide which sources of
intelligence are more important; all sources of intelligence should be used in obtain-
ing the picture of the operational situation and its trends.
The Allied plans and preparations to counter the enemy thrust into Papua New
Guinea started in late March 1942, when the first reliable information was obtained
about the Japanese intentions in the southern and southwestern Pacific. The sin-
gle major problem was how to concentrate sufficiently potent carrier force in the
Coral Sea. The raid on Tokyo prevented Nimitz from concentrating four large
carriers against two Japanese carriers. The U.S. Navy had only seven large carri-
ers, and not all of them were available for action in the South Pacific. Another
major problem was the shortage of oilers capable of underway replenishment.
There was also an acute shortage of destroyers to be used as screen for the carrier
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forces and for providing escort for the transports. Both Nimitz’s Operation Or-
der 23-42 and Fletcher’s Operation Order 2-42 were classically simple and exe-
cutable plans. Nonetheless, in contrast to the Japanese plan, they had the Allied
carriers operating separately, not as a single group. This greatly weakened their
strike packages in combat with the enemy carrier force. Plans should be compre-
hensive but simple and logical. They should be also flexible enough to accommodate
unforeseen events, due to either natural causes or the actions of commanders. The
success of a major operation at sea is heavily dependent on the logistical support and
sustainment. Operational commanders, not logisticians, are directly responsible for
synchronizing the operations and logistics.
The Japanese execution of the Port Moresby–Solomons operation matched
the meticulousness but also the rigidity with which it had been planned. From
the landing at Tulagi on 3 May until the end of the operation on 11 May, the op-
posing carrier forces made largely unsuccessful efforts to find each other, and
mistaken identifications led to many minor and several major unsound deci-
sions. Hara’s decision to launch a late-afternoon strike against what he believed
to be an enemy carrier force was a reckless gamble that cost a number of hard-to-
replace experienced pilots. Similarly, Fletcher’s decision to detach Crace’s TG
17.3 could have ended in the destruction of Crace’s unprotected group or greater
losses for the carrier force because of the resulting weakening of its ship-based
AA/ASW defense. Neither Hara’s nor Fletcher’s decision can be justified based
on the information each had or did not have at the time.
Further, and although directed by Nimitz, Fletcher ran undue risks by waiting
until 6 May to put his operation order into effect and finally combining TF 17
and TF 11 into an enlarged TF 17. Finally, Inoue was too slow in changing or
modifying the plan in the face of unforeseen events, usually only after it was ob-
vious that the original plan could not be carried out. He did not display “opera-
tional vision”—the ability to assess a situation properly, anticipate the flow of
events accurately, and then react quickly and decisively when something unfore-
seen happens.
In the course of the execution of a major operation or campaign, operational
commanders should keep a running estimate of the situation and make quick deci-
sions. Their focus on the ultimate objective should be unwavering, but they should
be willing to modify or even abandon intermediate ones. Sequencing and synchro-
nization of movements should be flexible; otherwise, the plan is most likely to fail.
Reports from commanders directly involved in carrying out a task should never be
exclusively relied on; if they cannot be cross-checked against other sources of infor-
mation they should be treated as assumptions. As Helmuth von Moltke the Elder
observed and has been often repeated since, no plan survives the first contact with
the enemy. The enemy has a will of his own and will react in ways that rarely can be
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foreseen and might even appear irrational. Though operational commanders and
their staffs should try to obtain the best knowledge and understanding possible of all
aspects of the situation in a theater, there will be always gaps, in which they must
make reasoned assumptions. High-stakes risks must sometimes be taken, but they
should be calculated—an operational commander must find a proper balance be-
tween overcautiousness and recklessness. Finally, friction can be minimized but
never mastered: chance, mistakes, and pure luck are inherent to warfare. The
knowledge, judgment, and skills of commanders and their subordinates therefore
remain, as they have in the past, the keys to success in war.
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COMMENTARY
FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER-RELIEF OPERA-
TIONS LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES
Captain Cathal O’Connor, U.S. Navy
Foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief (FHA/DR) operations are
some of the most complicated operations conducted by the military. These mis-
sions constitute a core Navy mission; their planning and execution differ from
those of a kinetic military campaign, but addressing the key principles early will
enable the successful execution. The following lessons learned are based on my
experiences over the past two years conducting five FHA/DR operations in the
western Pacific.1 Other situations may be different, but these suggestions may
make the next operation more productive and rewarding.
It is helpful to provide the crew and embarked staffs with an overview of cur-
rent U.S. government FHA/DR guidance. The overarching principle is to re-
member one’s place in an operation. The ambassador sets policy and directs the
U.S. government team, while the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) coordinate and
manage the U.S. response. The Department of Defense (DoD) plays a support-
ing role.
In other words, the DoD is part of a comprehensive U.S. approach led by the
Department of State (DOS). The DOS’s lead for FHA/DR is USAID, which dele-
gates FHA/DR to USAID/OFDA. The Office of For-
eign Disaster Assistance may send an individual or a
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to coor-
dinate the U.S. government response.
After DoD directs a geographic component com-
mander (GCC) to provide support, either a compo-
nent or a joint task force (JTF) will be tasked. Based on
Captain O’Connor is the deputy commodore of Am-
phibious Squadron 11, forward deployed to Sasebo, Ja-
pan. On his previous tour he was Chief of Staff, Task
Force 76. He also served as chief of staff during Opera-
tion TOMODACHI and later as director of the Maritime
Response Cell at Joint Support Force Headquarters,
Yokota Air Force Base, Japan.
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Commander, Task Force 76’s (CTF 76’s) experience, a military Humanitarian
Assistance Survey Team (HAST) must arrive quickly in order to link up with the
American embassy staff and the DART, as depicted in the figure.2
Most of these relationships involve coordination and collaboration, so the
first lesson to learn is the importance of exchanging liaison officers (LNOs) early
to establish a trusting relationship, ensure clear communication, and enhance
coordination.
Just as important as inviting the host nation and USAID/DOS personnel to
provide liaison officers on the command ship is sending sailors to the disaster
site. They will speak on the commander’s behalf as to what capabilities the ships
will bring when they get there, so choose wisely when forming a HAST. The team
must embody the personality and skill to coordinate across the different depart-
ments and organizations, as well as interact with nongovernment organizations
(NGOs).
The size of the HAST will depend on the size and scale of the damage. Once
the HAST has assessed the situation and, in coordination with USAID, has iden-
tified where DoD can best support the relief efforts, a forward command ele-
ment (FCE) may be needed to take over command, control, and liaison duties, to
free up the HAST for work in the field along with USAID.
This essay focuses on natural disasters, where the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development plays a major role in the military’s operational planning
and activities.3 As NGOs and international governmental organizations (IGOs)
arrive in the disaster zone, they are organized via the United Nations “cluster”
system, which designates an NGO as the lead of each functional group. HAST
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members should attend cluster meetings with the USAID representatives and
advise them about military support capabilities.
The second lesson—and the hardest to learn, as observed during every
FHA/DR—is to do only what DoD can and then turn over to the host nation and
NGOs as soon as possible. During FHA/DR operations, the host nation, NGOs,
and IGOs generate thousands of requests for assistance. It is not the Department
of Defense’s mission to fill them all. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance,
along with the U.S. government country team, validates all requests for assistance
and prioritizes and lists them in an electronic spreadsheet called the Mission
Tasking Matrix (MITAM). HAST/FCE then reviews them for supportability and
once more prioritizes them and tasks each entry to the appropriate force.
The third lesson flows from the second: Start with an idea of how the event
will end and then determine an exit strategy and what milestones can serve as
ceremonies. Think from the end.
Almost as relief begins to flow to those in need, the Department of Defense
can begin planning its own departure. When the unique capabilities provided by
the military are no longer in high demand or have been replaced by civilian ca-
pacity, when all affected areas are in the recovery stage, and when the host nation
says so, it is time to go. The mission will not be complete, and there will still be
suffering, but it is important to hold a ceremony to mark an end point for U.S.
military assistance.
Given these three key lessons, the following reviews three operations in which
CTF 76 was involved over the past two years. By examining small, medium, and
large-scale FHA/DRs, one can see how these key lessons were followed. There are
some additional take-aways as well.
TYPHOON MORAKOT: TAIWAN (SMALL-SCALE FHA/DR, LED BY
CAPTAIN), AUGUST 2009
The USS Essex (LHD 2) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) was returning from its
second deployment of 2009 to off-load 31 Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in
Okinawa when Typhoon Morakot hit Taiwan 7–8 August with eighty-knot
winds, a storm surge in excess of ten feet, and extensive flooding and landslides.
When Taiwan requested heavy-lift assistance from the U.S. government, the
secretary of defense directed the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) to oversee
military relief efforts. The Seventh Fleet assigned the task to CTF 76. Given the
limited scope of Taiwan’s support request, Task Force 76 redeployed Com-
mander, Amphibious Squadron 11 (CPR11), along with elements of the com-
modore’s staff, and 31 MEU aboard USS Denver (LPD 9), with four helicopters
(two MH-53Es and two MH-60Ss) and an LCAC hovercraft. USS Essex and USS
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Tortuga (LSD 46), the other two ships of the ARG, completed their off-load and
returned to Sasebo.
Arriving off the coast of Taiwan, CPR 11’s commodore assembled a HAST and
flew ashore. He met with USAID, the American Institute in Taiwan, the Taiwan
government, and military personnel to review the status of relief operations. After
discussing the host nation’s priorities with USAID representatives, the commo-
dore decided he could best assist the Taiwan government by using the helicopters
to lift construction vehicles and equipment to outlying areas. This would enable
crews in isolated villages that were cut off from surface transport by flooding and
landslides to perform search, rescue, and recovery operations.
The commodore deployed forty-five sailors and Marines to provide a tactical
air control team, a helicopter rigging team, a helicopter logistics and mainte-
nance team, and a public affairs team at Tainan Air Force Base, where they
worked hand in hand with their Taiwanese counterparts. In light of the political
sensitivities the commodore minimized his “footprint” ashore, flying the de-
tachments in each morning and returning them to sea each night. Additionally,
he directed his public affairs officer to ensure that the Taiwan military was the
focus of media coverage.
The MH-60S provided aerial damage surveys and verification of helicopter
landing zones. This freed the MH-53E to focus on lift missions. In six days the
team flew fifty-five sorties, lifting twenty construction vehicles and twenty boxes
of relief supplies, for a total of 255,800 pounds. As the demand signal waned, the
commodore hosted a series of dignitaries ashore and marked a successful mis-
sion with the Taiwanese government, military, and relief personnel before rede-
ploying to Sasebo.
So, to review: first and foremost, the commodore and his forces acted in sup-
port of the host nation and USAID. Second, the commodore put his liaison offi-
cers side by side with their Taiwanese counterparts and ensured that it was a
Taiwanese face that was seen in the media—an important strategic message.
Third, he used only the assets needed to meet the role that he and USAID identi-
fied. Finally, he held a ceremony to mark the host nation’s decision that U.S. mil-
itary support was no longer required, then left the scene.
ACT 2: EARTHQUAKE (INDONESIA: MEDIUM-SCALE FHA/DR,
LED BY REAR ADMIRAL), SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 2009
A month later, on 26 September, Typhoon Ketsana struck the Philippines with
140-knot winds and a half meter of rain on ground already saturated from three
storms the previous month. Four days later, three earthquakes struck near
Padang, Indonesia, on the western coast of the island of Sumatra. The Philippine
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and Indonesian governments requested assistance from the U.S. government,
and the secretary of defense directed PACOM to oversee military relief efforts.
Given the geographic separation, and in light of cultural sensitivities, the Sev-
enth Fleet and III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) agreed to split the
ARG/MEU, with the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3rd MEB) leading the
Philippines FHA/DR mission and CTF 76 leading the Indonesian FHA/DR.
CPR 11 and 31 MEU, already deployed to the Philippine coast for the bilateral
exercise PHIBLEX, entered Subic Bay and reconfigured forces.
On 3 October, USS Denver, with a command element from CPR 11, elements
of 31 MEU, and Tactical Air Control Squadron 12 (TACRON 12), sortied to In-
donesia with three CH-53E helicopters and a helicopter rigging team. Leverag-
ing the Taiwan FHA/DR lessons learned, Seventh Fleet sent USS McCampbell
(DDG 85) and USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4) with their helicopters to pro-
vide aerial surveys of the damage.
On 4 October, CTF 76 and a ten-member HAST/FCE flew to Padang. The
FCE established a command post in Jakarta, met with the ambassador and his
staff, coordinated with USAID and the TNI (Indonesian army), and participated
in Department of State teleconferences at the embassy.
The HAST pushed forward to Padang and conducted surveys with USAID
and personnel of the consul general’s office. They also attended cluster meetings
to educate NGOs on maritime capabilities, while USAID supported the NGOs
in drafting MITAM requests.
In order to coordinate air operations and relief distribution, secondary com-
mand and control elements were formed at Tabing Military Air Base, Halim, and
Padang airports, as well as in downtown Padang. An air-operations coordina-
tion cell was formed at Padang airport through an informal liaison with ele-
ments of the 353rd Special Operations Group, which was completing a bilateral
exercise with the Indonesians. These sailors and airmen, with their TNI allies,
opened the damaged airport for relief operations.
The HAST verified reports of damage to all four hospitals in Padang, and
once typhoon conditions cleared in Guam, PACOM deployed the portable field
hospital of the Air Force’s Humanitarian Assistance Rapid Response Team
(HARRT) via C-17s. The HARRT arrived 5 October and, through an informal li-
aison, fell under CTF 76 command and control.
By 7 October, the HARRT was treating patients, and by 9 October Denver,
McCampbell, and Richard E. Byrd had begun supporting operations. The CPR 11
staff used McCampbell’s and Richard E. Byrd’s helicopters to assist USAID in
conducting airborne surveys of roads, bridges, and potential landing zones in
isolated areas, while the longer-range CH53E helicopters lifted food, water, and
shelter supplies to isolated communities.
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As operations unfolded, the FCE participated inOffice of the Secretary of De-
fense public affairs roundtables and updated the status of operations via Twitter
and Facebook. The staff in White Beach, Okinawa, supported the FCE and
HAST by managing information collation for situation reports and video
teleconferences and reporting requirements. This enabled the relatively small
staff forward to remain focused on mission execution.
By 13 October, the demand for lift decreased as roads were cleared, and the
HARRT was treating nonemergency patients.With concurrence from the Indo-
nesian government, TNI, USAID, the U.S. embassy, and Seventh Fleet, a formal
handover ceremony to USAID and the NGOs was held to coincide with the am-
bassador’s visit to Padang. By 17 October all U.S. forces had departed. Within
thirteen days the FHA/DR force had provided 150 sorties, lifted 640,000 pounds
of supplies, and ferried 1,117 passengers, while providing medical treatment to
1,945 people. It accomplished this with only 165 personnel permanently ashore.
In retrospect, this was a more complicated FHA/DR than the first we looked
at, with a requirement to provide an FCE to coordinate with the embassy in Ja-
karta and a HAST to work with the consul general and USAID in Padang. Also,
the command and control of multiple service components was done informally.
It worked because of the people involved, but a JTF would have provided
clear-cut command-and-control relationships.
That said, the admiral and his staff were clearly acting in support of the em-
bassy, the host nation, and USAID. Second, LNOs were placed at all the key areas
—Jakarta, Padang, and the airfields and air bases used to distribute aid. Third,
only USAID-approved MITAMs were executed, which kept the FCE out of the
business of validating NGO requests. Finally, when the demand signal for heli-
copter lift and emergency room treatment reached a tipping point, the admiral
hosted the ambassador and local dignitaries in Padang to celebrate the success-
ful completion of the mission. All forces then departed.
SENDAI EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI AND FUKUSHIMA
DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: JAPAN (LARGE-SCALE
FHA/DR, LED BY ADMIRAL), MARCH–APRIL 2011
On 11March 2011, a 9.0-magnitude earthquake off the northeast coast of Japan
triggered a tsunami with waves that reached one hundred feet and traveled up to
six miles inland. Over twenty-six thousand people were killed or reported miss-
ing, and the World Bank estimated damages in excess of $120 billion.
PACOM designated U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as the commander of Opera-
tion TOMODACHI and assigned Seventh Fleet, Fifth Air Force, U.S. Army Forces
Japan (USARJ), and Marine Forces Japan (MARFORJ) as supporting com-
manders. On 19 March elements of JTF-519, headquartered in Pearl Harbor,
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augmented the staff of USFJ to form a joint support force (JSF). Rather than dis-
cuss how USFJ and JTF-519 conducted humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,
consequence management, and the voluntary, assisted departure of dependents,
I will focus on the role of the CTF 76 staff within the JSF.
On 12 March CTF 76 and fourteen staff deployed as Seventh Fleet’s maritime
response cell (MRC) to USFJ. The MRC was the representative of the joint force
maritime component commander (JFMCC) and of the coordination cell within
the headquarters. The MRC also received up to twelve additional officers from
JFMCC subordinate commands as tasking peaked.
After establishing maritime surface and air watch teams in the Bilateral Joint
Operations Command Center (BJOCC), CTF 76 inserted assistant chiefs of staff
into USFJ directorates in order to augment their capabilities and assist in
FHA/DR planning and execution. This gave the MRC ties within the USFJ staff,
and later the JTF-519 led JSF to communicate successfully the JFMCC’s priori-
ties. The maritime response cell also participated in daily video teleconferences
with the embassy staff, component commanders, and the Pacific Command, as
well as boards, briefings, and meetings on behalf of the Joint Forces Maritime
Command. This included the daily Joint Effects Coordination Board, where
USAID, JSF, and component representatives reviewed validated MITAMs and
then tasked them to the appropriate component.
Between 11 March and 7 April JFMCC pursued several lines of operation:
• Damage surveys by P-3C and helicopters
• Search and rescue (afloat and ashore) by ships and helicopters
• Lift support to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) from a dock
landing ship (LSD)
• Relief supply delivery from carriers, amphibious assault ships (LHDs), de-
stroyers, cruisers, and LSDs to shore by helicopters
• Airspace deconfliction and communications relay by E-2C
• Harbor mapping and obstacle clearance by divers from a salvage ship
(T-ARS) and LSD
• Port-clearance operations by the U.S. Marine Corps from LHDs and LSDs
• Lift support to Japanese electrical utility workers from a utility landing
craft.
In each line of operation, liaison officers were exchanged, and the close work-
ing relationships between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and
the Forward Deployed Naval Forces made integration a rapid process. In one
case, USN-JMSDF integrated relief operations were moving so fast that the
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Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF), the JTFC, and the CJTF To-Hoku called for
an operational pause in order to “re-baseline” the staffs and components.
By 7 April the main airport at Sendai had been reopened to civilian aircraft,
the major ports had open channels, and isolated people had received aid. The
Japanese defense minister visited USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) to thank the
U.S. military for its support and requested CJTF To-Hoku, the JSF leadership,
and component commanders to join him. Then the U.S. forces were released
from FHA/DR tasking.
So even in a complicated FHA/DR operation, the basic rules did not change.
The JSF followed the DOS lead, and LNOs were exchanged—in some cases mak-
ing history, embarking JGSDF officers on U.S. Navy ships. In addition, JSF worked
with USAID and JSDF counterparts to identify requirements from the Japanese
government and then tasked them to the components. Finally, JSF supported the
Japanese until they thought the work was done, and then JSF and the Japanese
leadership held a ceremony, after which the U.S. FHA/DR forces departed.
Lessons Learned
To reiterate, the overarching concept and the three key lessons are:
• The ambassador sets policy and directs the U.S. government team. The U.S.
Agency for International Development and the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance coordinate and manage the U.S. government response. The De-
partment of Defense supports.
• Exchange liaison officers to establish a trusting relationship, ensure clear
communication, and enhance coordination.
• Do only what the Department of Defense can and then turn over to the
host nation and NGOs, as soon as possible.
• Start with an idea of how the event will end; then determine an exit strat-
egy and what milestones can serve as ceremonies.
Additional lessons from CTF 76’s five FHA/DR operations of the past two
years:
• If more than one component participates assign a joint task force and es-
tablish clear command-and-control relationships.
• Display all forces and internally displaced personnel on a “common opera-
tional picture.” Add lines of communication and government and military
boundaries to show where additional coordination may be useful.
• Establish and maintain information management and knowledge-
management rules to streamline data flow between components.
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• Aggressively use social media and web pages, accessible to the public in
multiple languages, to disseminate empirical data and combat fear and
confusion.
• Use all sources to sense the environment. On a daily basis the commander
must know what is needed. How are our actions impacting those most af-
fected? Are we postured in the best way to assist the host nation?
• Work closely with the host nation to establish communication objectives,
share information, and coordinate media events and interviews.
NOTE S
1. Taiwan, Typhoon Morakot, 2009; Republic
of the Philippines, Typhoon Ketsana, 2009;
Indonesian earthquakes, 2009; Republic of
the Philippines, Typhoon Megi, 2010; and the
earthquake and tsunami in Japan, 2011.
2. U.S. Defense Dept., Foreign Humanitarian
Assistance, Joint Publication 3-29 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: 17 March 2009).
3. U.S. Agency for International Development,
Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment
and Response, September 2005, available at
www.usaid.gov/.
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REVIEW ESSAY
THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG
Norman Friedman
Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes. Red Star over the Pa-
cific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2010. 292pp. $36.95
This is at once a timely and somewhat disappointing book. The authors quote
numerous Chinese writers as arguing that sea power is essential to a rising
China. They also argue, as Mahan did, that any country as dependent on sea-
bsorne trade as China must also be interested in sea power. These ideas may have
been controversial when the authors began writing, but the recent appearance of
the refitted Chinese aircraft carrier formerly known as Varyag is an indication
that should be obvious to all.
The technique of carefully sifting through a country’s military and technical
literature, as the authors and their colleagues at the China Maritime Studies In-
stitute of the Naval War College do, can be valuable. The authors, for example,
suggest that Chinese fascination with Mahan suggests a much deeper-rooted in-
terest in developing sea power than may be imagined, and that in turn suggests
that the Chinese government is likely to keep investing
in it. But this approach has its limitations. What is
published is in effect the tip of an iceberg. Part of that
iceberg is classified technical and tactical literature;
part is technical information that is not classified but
may not be discussed in the open literature. Part is also
the political and bureaucratic environment within
China, which for many reasons may never be discussed
frankly in public. A full evaluation of the prospects for
Norman Friedman is a widely published naval strate-
gist and historian, specializing in the intersection of
national policy and technology. He has long been a con-
sultant to the U.S. Navy and to several of its major con-
tractors. Dr. Friedman received his PhD in theoretical
physics from Columbia University. He is also the recipi-
ent of the annual prize in military history from the
Royal United Services Institute for his book Fifty-Year
War: A History of the Cold War.
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the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ought to include all of these factors.
Since this is an unclassified study, at the least it should have taken into account
much more completely Chinese internal politics as well as pertinent material
from non-Chinese sources.
Much of this book is devoted to an account of the rise of modern Chinese na-
val weaponry, the most spectacular being the “carrier killing” DF-21 ballistic
missile, and the tactics associated with it. The tactical discussion makes much of
Mao’s doctrines developed for guerrilla warfare. It is surprising that the authors
spend no time at all looking at the style of warfare developed by the Soviets dur-
ing the Cold War. The PLAN began under Soviet tutelage, and much of its tech-
nology is of Russian origin. It is difficult, for example, not to see Cold War Soviet
concepts in Chinese descriptions of a fleet operating under the umbrella of
shore-based weaponry. The current Chinese Su-30 force armed with Russian-
developed AS-17 missiles is not too different in principle from the Cold
War–vintage Soviet Backfires using AS-4s.
The main lesson of Cold War tactical development was that ocean surveillance
was crucial. If it worked, then a moving force at sea could be targeted; if not, the
force was free to operate as it wished. Ocean surveillance makes no appearance
whatever in this book, perhaps because it is not discussed in open Chinese litera-
ture. One might also suspect that open-literature Chinese calculations, e.g., of
how many Su-30s it takes to kill an Aegis cruiser, do not reflect any detailed classi-
fied work, but rather are intended to inspire the reader. The authors may be quite
right that open writing about strategy often reflects reality, but that is much less
the case with tactics. For example, during much of the Cold War U.S. open-ocean
antisubmarine warfare relied heavily on the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS).
For decades it was hardly mentioned in the open literature.
Other slips leave the reader uncomfortable. We are told that the Chinese may
be able to operate carriers under the umbrella of the new antiship missile, as
though it takes a carrier to sink another carrier. U.S. submariners may find that
difficult to believe; the South China Sea is usually described as a paradise for
them. This ability, incidentally, is said to allow the Chinese not to build full-up
supercarriers—as though the size of the carrier is dictated by its need to beat off
opposition, rather than by its potential striking power. Aegis ballistic-missile de-
fense is evaluated mainly as a possible limitation on Chinese intercontinental
ballistic missile effectiveness, but it is probably much more important as a coun-
ter to the antiship ballistic missile, a point not at all clear from this book. These
are only examples.
The authors set up (and destroy) a straw man, that many in the United States
may imagine that the new Chinese navy is being built up specifically to overrun
Taiwan, and that somehow it will vanish as soon as that is achieved. Who is that
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naive? When the Chinese first bought Varyag, the rumor was not that it would
help them conquer Taiwan, but that it was essential for dominance of the South
China Sea (which made a lot more sense). The Chinese navalists certainly ex-
plain how valuable Taiwan could be in their hands, but a cynic would have to
wonder to what extent they are playing to their government’s internal propa-
ganda, with its emphasis on Taiwan.
It would have been interesting to have had some quantitative comparison of
Chinese investment in the different services, because that might have indicated
how far Chinese naval expansion is likely to go; at some point any expansion or
modernization program hits financial limits, and heavy investment in the other
services would limit purely naval investment. The Chinese are currently mod-
ernizing across the board. The authors dismiss future growth in army invest-
ment on the ground that there are no current border problems. However, a
Chinese central government nervous about stability has to see its army as the
force that guarantees its survival. It is worth spending a great deal on more or
less useless toys to keep that army loyal and happy. The army is also the backup if
an enemy does make it ashore, and it is the force needed to conquer Taiwan—if
the Chinese government ever decides to take that chance. It is also the force that
faces Russia in Siberia.
In this reviewer’s opinion, the authors have produced a wake-up book that
alerts readers to the reality and the likely enduring character of Chinese naval ex-
pansion. That certainly matters. Beyond that they seem to falter. Besides the gaps
implied above, there is no discussion of the Chinese industrial base (e.g., the ex-
tent of dependence on foreign technology and the potential for overcoming it).
Yoshihara and Holmes read the Chinese literature; this reviewer does not. But
the main conclusion from that reading—that the Chinese have decided to build
an oceanic navy—now seems so obvious that it is not really worth arguing. To go
further, it is necessary to read other languages, not well reflected in this book,
such as those of naval hardware and of naval tactics.
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FAIR WARNING
Martin Murphy
Kraska, James. Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea. New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011. 464pp. $95
“In the unrelenting struggle of peoples,” the historian Pete Padfield wrote,
“those ascendant at sea have, at least in the modern era, proved consistently suc-
cessful either singly or in alliance against those with a territorial power base.”
This notion, which he took from the renowned strategist Colin S. Gray, drove his
1999 history Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind. Naval
War College law professor James Kraska has written a book that could well have
been entitled “Maritime Myopia and the Closing of the American Mind,” for
that is the story it recounts and the future it foretells unless the United States re-
sponds to the tocsin he sounds.
To be effective, naval power requires access to the littorals in times of peace as
well as war. Their importance is not in doubt; they contain 70 percent of the
world’s human population and most recoverable living and nonliving resources.
Coastal states without wider maritime interests of their own naturally want to
limit access by foreign navies, which for the most part means the U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps. It is, therefore, worrisome but not surprising that the promotion
of navigational freedom increasingly is being referred to in international aca-
demic and policy circles as the “American” problem.
The fundamental debate in oceans policy is the extent and degree to which
coastal states can extend their jurisdictions seaward. The key battleground is the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which altogether accounts for just under 40
percent of the world’s ocean space. This concept was created sui generis during
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) negotiations,
as a compromise between the conflicting demands of coastal and maritime
states. Coastal states were allowed to control the eco-
nomic resources found in and under the sea out to a
limit of two hundred nautical miles but had no right
to impede free movement on and through the water
column.
Kraska demonstrates that this compromise is under
sustained attack. He argues that the liberal order of the
oceans based on the concepts of state sovereignty,
Martin Murphy is a senior fellow at the Atlantic
Council in Washington, D.C., who is an internation-
ally recognized expert on piracy and irregular conflict
at sea. Between 2008 and 2010, he was a senior fellow
at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
Dr. Murphy’s most recent work is Somalia, the New
Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa,
published 2011.
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national self-determination, and legal equality is being replaced by socialist and
dependency-theory models. These push a moral agenda of “fairness,” which is
alien to previous functional conceptions of international law that seek to maxi-
mize order. Like any form of politically inspired collective action, “fairness at sea”
can only be attained through the imposition of greater state control.
In response, Kraska repeats the cardinal question that Ambassador John
Negroponte asked twenty years ago: “Who will protect freedom of the seas?”
Kraska’s answer is that although many states are interested in that freedom, to
the point that some (including Russia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom) will
protest attempts to undermine it, none but the United States have the wide-
spread interests or resources worldwide to back up their objections with action.
Taking action requires institutional understanding and political will. Within
the U.S. government, institutional understanding of the importance of naviga-
tional freedom is limited increasingly to the Department of Defense and, to a de-
gree, the U.S. Coast Guard. While it was encouraging to hear Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton announce during her visit to Hanoi in July 2010 that the “United
States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s mari-
time commons and respect for international law,” the reiteration of this long-
standing commitment comes somewhat out of the blue. For the most part the De-
partment of Defense appears to have lost the support of the State and Commerce
Departments, which have been overwhelmed by pressure from the assiduous ef-
forts of such agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency and National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to put environmental protection at the
pinnacle of U.S. oceans policy. This means that navigational freedom has lost its
preeminence when at the same time the need to build relations with newly asser-
tive (and powerful) coastal states has meant that acquiescence to excessive coastal
claims is being offered in exchange for concessions in other policy areas.
Kraska argues strongly that this creeping oceanic enclosure is a genuine risk
to international security. His judgment is valuable not only because of his schol-
arship but because of his practical experience as a Navy judge advocate specializ-
ing in the negotiation of oceans law matters. By privileging sea mammals over
seamen, parts of the U.S. government, and an international network of like-
minded bureaucrats in other states and international organizations that share
their belief, are just as active in eroding the U.S. Navy’s freedom of maneuver and
undermining U.S. national security interests as are China, Burma, Indonesia,
and the European Union.
It would be foolish to argue that all those who promote greater state control
over the oceans are motivated solely by a desire to keep the U.S. Navy from
approaching their coasts. Some, as Kraska points out, are motivated by simple
nationalism—to keep what they view as their national patrimonies free from
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foreigners. Those at the other end of the spectrum take the view that protecting
the common heritage of mankind is a cause more noble than grubby national
interest. Some coastal states, however, are using increasingly aggressive legal
means—dubbed “lawfare”—to increase control over their EEZs by
• Delegitimization of the use of force and prevention of access by warships
• Sovereignty claims
• Environmental protection.
Kraska highlights the interrelation among all three by pointing out that
China has moved from security to resource-related and environmentally based
arguments in its campaign to exclude U.S. Navy warships and aircraft from its
EEZ. This shift is reflected on the water by its newfound preference for confron-
tation using coast guard cutters, oceanographic ships, fisheries protection ves-
sels, and even “independent” fishing boats rather than warships.
None of these claims are justified under UNCLOS, whose text is unambigu-
ous; references to it in the authoritative commentary offer no comfort to those
who wish to change unilaterally what was agreed. The only course of action for
the Chinese is to assert their authority and defy other states, hoping that in time
their measures will become accepted. Just as World War II Germany gambled
that no one would contest its reoccupation of the Rhineland, so too are these
states being proved right as they territorialize what had previously been interna-
tional waters. Observe China’s recent tactics in the South China Sea. For some in
China, such as one commentator writing in the People’s Daily in December 2010,
willful misreading of the treaty has become commonplace: “The United States
has not signed the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea because it considers ex-
clusive economic zones to be international waters, which, by its hegemonic
logic, should be included in the U.S. sphere of influence.” China’s stance might
be the most egregious on the issue of excessive EEZ claims, but where it leads,
others will follow. As Kraska comments, a “combination of boldness and power
make Beijing the world’s greatest hazard to freedom of navigation in the EEZ.”
This work has its weaknesses: the author’s review of strategic issues lacks pre-
cision, and his summary of relevant maritime history is a Cook’s tour of events
that naval readers would regard as basic. Yet Kraska’s knowledge of events may
be sorely needed by readers unfamiliar with the strategic history and context of
the law of the sea, and indeed the history bears repeating for those who no longer
view the sea as Mahan’s highway. In any case, these reservations are small com-
pared to the author’s thorough understanding of the subject’s legal core and his
clear and forthright exposition of the issues.
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It is no exaggeration to say that this is an important book. The warning it con-
veys may have been sounded before, but never so clearly or so comprehensively.
It is a warning worth repeating again and again until U.S. government policy re-
gains the full-blooded recognition that freedom of navigation is vital for the sus-
tainment of many of the other freedoms that we take for granted. Anyone
concerned with freedom of navigation, and indeed freedom itself, should read
this book. Those who are in a position to act on its recommendations need to do
so without delay.
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BOOK REVIEWS
A GATHERING OF DIFFERENT IDEAS
Rabi, Uzi, ed. International Intervention in Local Conflicts: Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution since
the Cold War. New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010. 326pp. $99
This edited volume presents an insight-
ful collection of case studies assessing
international interventions in the post–
Cold War era, with a strong emphasis
on the Middle East. The essays offer a
broad exploration of international con-
flict management and resolution, taking
a hard look at failure and success. Un-
like many other books, this one brings
together scholars from different coun-
tries, presenting an often unique and
most importantly different viewpoint
on conflicts of U.S. interest. It is im-
practical to review each chapter, but the
following five are particularly compel-
ling for U.S. readership. The attempts
of the European Union (EU) to mediate
the Balkan and ongoing Israel-Palestine
conflicts present a detailed account of
EU conflict management in the larger
context of the difficulties brought about
by institutional challenges and the com-
plex structure of EU policies. A French
perspective on Middle Eastern politics
is elucidated by Jean-Pierre Filiu. The
value of French diplomatic efforts to
conflict resolution is highlighted, with
the example of the direct contact with
Syria and Iran during Operation
GRAPES OF WRATH in 2006. Comparing
France to the United States, the author
points out different narratives, citing
such examples as Beirut 1982. The next
chapter delves into the important topic
of clashes between the Islamic denomi-
nations, Sunni and Shia. The feeling of
alienation between these groups dates
back to the earliest days of Islam. U.S.
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan
are discussed as a starting point for
increased Iranian support for Shias
throughout the Middle East and to con-
fute the common argument that Shias
are more sympathetic to Iran than to
their home countries. No conclusion is
offered about “whether sectarianism is
the cause or symptom of the recent geo-
political changes in the region,” but the
authors do provide informative insight
and point to the importance of under-
standing these dynamics for any con-
flict resolution in the region. Chapter
12 explores the motives of the involve-
ment of regional actors in the Israel-
Palestine conflict. Egypt and Saudi
Arabia both have interests in being
perceived as the indispensable Arab me-
diator. Ultimately, Egypt has a larger
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stake, because of its proximity and do-
mestic politics considerations, and it
has stayed committed throughout,
while Saudi Arabia has less of an incen-
tive to guarantee that efforts become
reality.
The concluding chapter stimulates the
reader to think about the term “inter-
national community.” Rajan Menon of-
fers a sharp yet pessimistic evaluation
of the international community’s
efforts to react to grave human rights
violations and its “inability to act, par-
ticularly when it encounters opposition
from its most powerful states.” While
he displays minimal confidence in gov-
ernments, the author remains optimis-
tic that one day people will change and
cure the “weakness of we-ness,” thereby
initiating real institutional change. A
common ground for all essays is the
critical analysis of international efforts
to resolve conflicts. Every author strives
to answer important questions regard-
ing the motivations of external actors to
become involved. Overall, this volume
presents a valuable contribution and is
essential reading for anyone looking to
understand the struggles of interna-
tional conflict management.
LARISSA FORSTER
Naval War College
Fisher, David, and Brian Wicker, eds. Just War on
Terror? A Christian and Muslim Response. Bur-
lington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2010. 231pp. $29.95
This edited volume provides fourteen
essays on various aspects of combating
terrorism and insurgencies from a just-
war perspective. All the contributors,
with the exception of Philip Bobbitt,
an American, are from the United
Kingdom. Contributors are prominent
members of their respective faculties
and are well-known within the fields of
war and security studies. While the sub-
title accentuates religious traditions
with respect to the just-war tradition,
the volume is not a dialogue between
religious perspectives, nor is every
chapter devoted to religious interpreta-
tions. Rather, the book is a collection of
essays, of which two are authored by
practicing Muslim scholars. Apart from
these essays, the religious dimensions
of combating terrorism are not promi-
nently presented.
The two essays by Islamic scholars are
especially helpful for readers interested
in the religious dynamics of post-9/11
terrorism. In the first, “Terrorism and
Islamic Theologies of Religiously-
Sanctioned War,” Tim Winter, who lec-
tures in Islamic studies at the University
of Cambridge and is an imam at the
Cambridge Mosque, recounts the inter-
action of Islamic jurisprudence with the
emerging international system of the
nineteenth century, as scholars and
leaders in Muslim countries have
sought to integrate various religious in-
terpretations with international politi-
cal realities. He also provides a useful
overview of the concepts of jihad and
hiraba. The second significant essay is
that of Ahmad Achtar, “Challenging
Al-Qa'ida’s Justification of Terror.”
Achtar is a lecturer in Islamic studies at
Heythrop College, University of Lon-
don, and he argues, with documenta-
tion, that al-Qa'ida’s justifications of
terror are not part of mainstream Sunni
religious and legal thought and are not
shared by the majority of Muslims.
Other essays focus more on aspects of
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
and on tenets of the just-war tradition.
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Of these, three essays in particular stand
out as of interest to readers of this jour-
nal: Sir Michael Howard’s “Philip
Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent: A Brief
Critique,” Brian Wicker’s “Just War
and State Sovereignty,” and David
Fisher’s “Terror and Pre-emption: Can
Military Pre-emption Ever Be Just?”
In the final chapter, the editors offer a
reflection on countering terrorism
justly after 9/11. In these few pages they
provide an excellent summary of the
weaknesses of al-Qa'ida and the likeli-
hood of its eventual demise. They also
remind readers of the necessity of
maintaining ethical standards in the
midst of conflict: “A common thread
running through all the lessons learnt
has thus been a rediscovery of the im-
portance of morality even amidst and,
indeed, particularly amidst the pres-
sures and passions of conflict.”
As with most edited volumes, not every
chapter will appeal to everyone. How-
ever, for anyone interested in contem-
porary just-war thought, its viability,
and its relevance to twenty-first-century
warfare, there is much in this volume
on which to reflect.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY
Naval War College
Cheney, Dick, with Liz Cheney. In My Time: A
Personal and Political Memoir. New York:
Threshold Editions, 2011. 565pp. $35
As political memoirs go, Dick Cheney’s
In My Time is arguably one of the more
candid, in a genre that tends to fall into
two categories—the remarkably bland
and the overly fulsome. Cheney avoids
both these pitfalls in a book that will
not change the mind of a single Cheney
hater or his small legion of admirers.
Cheney was at the center of American
politics for almost forty years, and long
before he became the Darth Vader of
American politics he had a reputation
for being one of the ablest and most
reform-minded members of the Repub-
lican Party. He had an “A-list” résumé,
including stints as the youngest chief of
staff in the history of the White House;
as the nation’s seventeenth secretary of
defense, presiding over Operation DES-
ERT STORM; and as a key member of the
GOP’s leadership in the House of Rep-
resentatives. So it was no surprise when
Texas governor George W. Bush asked
Cheney to lead his vice-presidential
search committee in the spring of 2000.
It was a surprise, however, when Bush
selected his search committee chair to
be his running mate, for Cheney
brought few political benefits to the Re-
publican ticket. Yet as In My Time
makes clear, Cheney’s Washington ex-
perience and national-security creden-
tials were seen as an asset to Governor
Bush. “You know, Dick, you’re the so-
lution to my problem” was the way
Bush broached the subject to him.
In short order, Cheney became the
point man for all that was seen as want-
ing in the Bush administration and, in
the view of some, for all that was crimi-
nal. For the tiny cadre of moderate Re-
publicans who urged the administration
to move “to the center” and trim “our
sails” in the wake of the divisive elec-
tion of 2000, Cheney made it clear that
the administration would not alter its
conservative agenda. He infuriated con-
gressional Democrats by refusing to re-
lease the lists of “everyone we met with”
when he chaired the administration’s
energy policy task force, and after the
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attacks of 9/11, when he observed that
the nation would have to work “the
dark side, if you will,” Cheney was seen
by many as a champion of un-American
practices, including water boarding and
warrantless wiretapping. Cheney vigor-
ously defends both programs, arguing
that the wiretapping “saved lives and
prevented attacks. If I had it to do all
over again, I would, in a heartbeat.”
The administration’s “liberation” of
Iraq, which, in concert with the after-
math of Hurricane Katrina, dramatically
eroded public support for President
Bush, is also vigorously defended, al-
though Cheney concedes that “we could
have done things better” in terms of
dealing with Katrina.
Cheney and his loyal lieutenants, I.
Lewis “Scooter” Libby and David
Addington, saw themselves as restoring
the American presidency to the status it
had held prior to Vietnam and Water-
gate. Some refer to this bygone era as
one dominated by an “imperial presi-
dency,” but for Cheney it was the natu-
ral, constitutional, order of things.
Presidential precedents were on their
side but the quiet constitutional revolu-
tion that occurred while Cheney served
as Gerald Ford’s chief of staff—a revo-
lution that produced an adversarial me-
dia with no qualms about releasing the
nation’s most closely held secrets; a ju-
diciary willing to overrule executive and
legislative war powers, while sometimes
invoking elements of international law;
and a Congress eager to challenge presi-
dents on sensitive national-security is-
sues, including intelligence matters—
triumphed in the end. Bush and Cheney
left office as discredited figures, and
while both remain optimistic that his-
tory will vindicate them, this book
makes a strong case that some of the
administration’s actions deserve a sober
second look. However, far too much
seems to be at stake for that to occur.
STEPHEN F. KNOTT
Naval War College
Boyne, Walter J. How the Helicopter Changed
Modern Warfare. Gretna, La.: Pelican, 2011.
352pp. $29.95
“In either case, the helicopter has sig-
nificantly changed the face of modern
warfare. It has done so despite restric-
tions placed on its performance by its
inherent design features. And perhaps
more than anything else, it has done so
because of the brave, talented aircrews
who flew the helicopter in the most in-
tensely dangerous conditions of warfare
that have ever been seen.”
So concludes the final chapter of a new
and timely book by noted aviation
writer and retired U.S. Air Force colo-
nel Walter Boyne. This volume revolves
around two theses. The first is stated in
the title: helicopters, since their intro-
duction, have produced dramatic
changes in the conduct of warfare. The
second thesis suggests that helicopters
themselves have failed to keep pace with
the very changes caused by their intro-
duction. The conclusions drawn from
this corollary idea are likely to prove
controversial.
Boyne’s prose combines accuracy with
regard to technological issues with a
clarity that renders these complex ideas
accessible, even to readers unfamiliar
with the intricacies of rotorcraft aero-
nautics. The scientific and engineering
challenges are interwoven with the sto-
ries of such industry pioneers as Igor
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Sikorsky, Frank Piasecki, and Arthur
Young. The narrative offers a tip of the
hat to the Marine Corps, acknowledg-
ing that institution’s decision to cham-
pion this emerging technology, as well
as the parts played by the Navy and
Coast Guard, but the strength of this
book resides in its examination of the
helicopter’s influence on combat over
land.
The Vietnam War serves as the lens
through which the rapid development
of helicopter-borne operations is stud-
ied. Anecdotes about operational lead-
ers whose vision married capabilities
provided by industry with the arduous
conditions of the Southeast Asian bat-
tlefield provide evidence of how mod-
ern warfare was changed. Anecdotal
evidence is supported by statistics de-
tailing the number of troops and the
amount of material transported within
the theater, as well as the grim losses
suffered in accomplishing these mis-
sions. Within the Vietnam context, the
tactical and operational impacts of rotary-
wing aircraft are clearly demonstrated.
The argument revolves around the
postwar failure to maintain the wartime
momentum.
The discussion of the post-Vietnam de-
velopments asks difficult and uncom-
fortable questions. Delving into the
fiscal disparity between the research
and development efforts supporting
fixed-wing, tactical aircraft and similar
efforts for the benefit of rotary-wing
aviation, the author reaches conclusions
that may be disconcerting for advocates
of traditional airpower. This critique of
overspending on fixed-wing research
and development at the expense of sur-
vivability, lethality, and capability for
rotary-wing aircraft gives the book a
controversial edge.
Walter Boyne has delivered a timely
study that asks difficult, important
questions about the future of military
aviation, especially in an era when the
nature of combat operations is rapidly
evolving. For these questions alone, it is
a worthwhile read. The lucid analysis of
the technological issues and the com-
pelling stories of the pioneers and war-
riors who brought the helicopter to
prominence are icing on the cake.
K. J. DELAMER
Naval War College
Tully, Anthony P. Battle of Surigao Strait. Bloom-
ington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2009. 329pp. $18.45
The sprawling battle of Leyte Gulf was
fought from 23 to 26 October 1944, and
nearly seventy years later it still has the
power both to fire the imagination and
to provide enduring military lessons. As
drama goes, the battle (or more pre-
cisely, a series of engagements, each
deserving a name of its own) is an ap-
parently bottomless cornucopia of
personalities, desperate gambles, and
heroism, as well as of enough “what-ifs”
to spawn a cottage industry of alternate
histories. In at least one way, Leyte Gulf
has similarities to Gettysburg. Both bat-
tles have been written about so exten-
sively that some authors focus on the
smaller engagements that together com-
plete the picture of the larger conflict.
The basic story of Leyte is a familiar
one. Faced with growing U.S. naval
power, a steadily weakening fleet, and
initial American landings in the Philip-
pines, Japanese naval authorities initi-
ated a bold stroke. Using their precious
remaining carriers as bait, they drew off
Admiral William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet
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while they attempted to reach the U.S.
beachhead with powerful surface forces
approaching through the San Bernardino
and Surigao Straits. The majority of
power would be contained in Admiral
Takeo Kurita’s Central Force, which
would force the San Bernardino Strait
and approach the U.S. transports from
the east. Two smaller but still poten-
tially deadly forces, commanded by Ad-
mirals Shoji Nishimura and Kiyohide
Shima, would attempt the Surigao
Strait and attack the Americans from
the south. Kurita’s force came closer to
victory, but, due in part to a gallant de-
fense by inferior U.S. forces, and with
the counsel of his own forces, Kurita
turned back on the doorstep of success.
In contrast, Nishimura never had a
chance. Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf
turned the Surigao Strait into a killing
sack. As Nishimura drove deeper into
the strait, his forces were treated to
wave after wave of attacks that ended in
a crescendo of firepower, as Oldendorf’s
main battle line put an end to the Japa-
nese southern attack.
Rather than write only about the big
picture, Tully puts Surigao Strait under
a microscope. Drawing extensively
from little (or never) -accessed Japanese
records, he painstakingly pulls together
his account of the battle. Each Japanese
ship is discussed in detail, each com-
manding officer is subjected to scrutiny,
and communications are reviewed. The
result is impressive: what emerges is a
convincing and incredibly detailed ac-
count of this segment of the battle.
In re-creating the battle, Tully takes on
several “mysteries” that have endured
since 1944. The first is the fate of the
Japanese battleship Fuso. It is known
that the ship was destroyed, but the ex-
act circumstances of its sinking have
been a matter of conjecture. The next
mystery is the sinking of the Japanese
destroyer Michishiro. In this instance
there is uncertainty regarding the claim
that USS Hutchins (DD 476) sank it. Fi-
nally, Tully seeks to discover the exact
manner in which the Japanese destroyer
Yamashiro was sunk. By Tully’s own
admission, these issues are military mi-
nutiae, but they are important to him.
He obviously wants to know where U.S.
torpedoes struck the doomed Yamashiro
and what happened to Fuso.
Tully’s writing style, for the most part,
is pleasant, analytical, and temperate,
although from time to time the neutral
tone of the distant observer shifts to a
more impassioned vernacular, particu-
larly when Tully is arguing a position or
describing some especially dramatic
moment. However, the result is not
problematic. It is Tully’s personal pas-
sion for the subject that elevates this
book above many naval histories, along
with his eagerness to present the Japa-
nese point of view. This is a perspective
that with few exceptions is lacking in
Western accounts.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Busch, John Laurence. Steam Coffin: Captain Mo-
ses Rogers and the Steamship Savannah Break the
Barrier. New Canaan, Conn.: Hodos Historia,
2010. 726pp. $35
One of the great events in American,
and indeed world, maritime history oc-
curred in the summer of 1819, when the
American steamship Savannah, com-
manded by Captain Moses Rogers, be-
came the first steam-powered vessel to
cross the Atlantic Ocean. Its pioneer
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voyage from Savannah, Georgia, to Liv-
erpool, England, in May and June 1819
is sometimes mentioned as an epoch-
making event that marked the coming
age of the steamship. While the ship
was remembered 140 years later, when
in 1959 its name was given to the first
American nuclear-powered merchant
vessel, the context and the details of the
pioneer voyage were overlooked. The
1819 voyage was quickly dismissed as a
commercial failure in which steam
power was used for only a fraction of
the time; the ship itself was forgotten as
a short-lived phenomenon after its
shipwreck on Long Island in 1821.
Certainly, Savannah was far ahead of its
time, as it would take another twenty
years for steamships to begin regular
transatlantic passages and thirty years
before there was another American
steamship to carry the flag across the
Atlantic. Despite all the innovation that
the 1819 voyage of Savannah repre-
sents, however, there is remarkably
little historical investigation of it.
Savannah’s captain, Moses Rogers, has
been almost completely overlooked as
an innovator. Up until the appearance
of this fine work, Frank O. Braynard’s
1963 study S.S. Savannah the Elegant
Steam Ship was the only major work on
the subject.
For the Connecticut-based independent
historian John Laurence Busch, the tale
of Captain Rogers and his steamship
Savannah is clearly a passionate labor of
love. With exemplary research, Busch
followed an archival trail that led to
twenty-two historical manuscript de-
positories in the United States, ranging
from Portland, Maine, to Savannah,
and which included ten massive record
groups in the National Archives.
Moreover, following the wake of the
ship, Busch’s research carried him to
archives in Denmark, Russia, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. Equally im-
pressive is his productive research in
nearly 150 contemporary newspapers
that matches his archival range and ex-
tends beyond to India, Ireland, and
Norway. All of this, Busch has mar-
shaled into a beautifully written and en-
gaging narrative that places his solidly
based factual details within a broad
context. It is a complex story, but one
that is clearly presented.
The book opens with an evocative de-
scription of Moses Rogers’s involve-
ment in the introduction of the first
steam passenger service between
Charleston, South Carolina, and Savan-
nah, Georgia. The author then traces
back to the early rise of steam propul-
sion in the United States and Moses
Rogers’s story from his birth in New
London, Connecticut, through his ca-
reer as a pioneer steamboat captain on
the Hudson River, then as steamship
designer and founder of the Savannah
Steamship Company. In detailing Sa-
vannah’s pioneer transatlantic voyage,
Busch effectively covers the entire range
of issues from finances to the many dif-
ferent characters in the ship’s company.
Not stopping there, he explores the
public reception and professional inter-
est in the ship’s further onward pas-
sages to Denmark, Sweden, and Russia,
including its return home across the At-
lantic. In conclusion, Busch reflects that
while the achievements of Rogers and
Savannah have sometimes been lost to
collective memory, they broke a
psychological barrier that had hindered
such technological innovation up to
that point.
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Produced by a heretofore-unknown
publisher, Steam Coffin is enhanced by
more than a dozen well-drawn maps, as
well as more than forty illustrations.
Seventy-one pages of endnotes docu-
ment Busch’s prodigious research, but
they are not easy to use, as they are
linked to the text by quoted phrases
rather than numbered positions. Never-
theless, John Laurence Busch has made
a major contribution to American mar-
itime history with this fine book.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 7 5
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC LANDPOWER ESSAY
CONTEST 2012
The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) and the USAWC Foundation have an-
nounced this year’s annual Strategic Landpower essay contest. Essay topics must
relate to the strategic use of landpower; specific topics of interest this year are the
future of landpower, the strategic role of landpower, and the Army’s role in na-
tional security. The USAWC Foundation will award $4,000 to the author of the
best essay and $1,000 to the second-place winner. Essays must be original, be not
over five thousand words in length, and not have been previously published. En-
tries must be postmarked on or before 17 February 2012. For more information,
contact Dr. Michael R. Matheny, U.S. Army War College, Department of Mili-
tary Strategy, Planning and Operations, at (717) 245-3459, DSN 242-3459, or at
michael.matheny@us.army.mil.
AWARD OF THE FIRST HATTENDORF PRIZE
On 20 October, in a brief ceremony during the Naval War College’s twentieth
International Seapower Symposium, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, and the Royal Navy’s First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir
Mark Stanhope, joined the President of the College, Rear Admiral John N.
Christenson, USN, and Professor John B. Hattendorf in recognizing British
naval historian N. A. M. Rodger as the inaugural Hattendorf Prize laureate.
Symposium delegations from 111 nations were present in the audience. (See
our Summer 2011 issue, “Of Special Interest,” for the foundation of the prize
and the choice of Professor Rodger as its first winner.)
Christenson recognized the great generosity of the donor, Pam Ribbey, whose
late grandfather, Captain Charles H. Maddox, was a 1935 and 1939 Naval War
College graduate and a faculty member from 1939 to 1941. The donation of the
prize was made in memory of Captain Maddox, who played an instrumental role
in intelligence collaboration between the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy in the
Pacific in the late 1930s and was serving at Pearl Harbor during the attack. Rec-
ognizing her grandfather’s service, Pam Ribbey endowed the prize on the
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anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, 7 December 2010. This endowment fund
will allow the Naval War College to award the prize at two-year intervals, provid-
ing a $10,000 cash prize with a citation and a bronze medal.
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s Manager for the
CNO’s Navy Professional Reading Program.
This is the land of the free—in more ways than one!One dictionary definition of the word “free” is “enjoying personal rights or
liberty.” America is known as the land of the free, and the nation’s military forces
remain vigilant to maintain this freedom. But another meaning of “free” is “at
no charge or no cost.” A basic tenet of the CNO’s Navy Professional Reading Pro-
gram (NPRP) is that books should be made available for free to sailors through-
out the fleet. Over 1,200 lending libraries of NPRP books have been established
on board ships, in squadrons, and at naval facilities around the globe. Books can
be checked out at no cost from each of these libraries. But there is another way
sailors can borrow books on the NPRP list: thirty-three of the sixty titles are
available at the Navy General Library section of the Navy Knowledge Online
(NKO) website, www.nko.navy.mil.
NKO is a remarkable resource that is available to all active-duty, retired, or re-
serve personnel (and their dependents) of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard. Civil Service personnel and contractors working for the Department of
the Navy are also eligible to open NKO accounts. Once registered, users can go to
the Navy General Library Program site to find over a hundred thousand books,
magazines, periodicals, songs, and videos—for free! The rules vary for the use of
different forms of digital media. Some material can be downloaded for specific
periods of time and expire or are automatically deleted from personal com-
puters or portable devices at the end of the lending period. In other cases, users
can download and keep the material indefinitely. Among the thirty-three titles
available to download through NKO are such popular books as these:
Lone Survivor, by Marcus Luttrell, the story of Navy SEALs in combat in Af-
ghanistan, is available as a downloadable electronic book (e-book) that can be
displayed on computers or on portable devices such as Kindles or iPads and also
as an audiobook that can be downloaded to MP3 players and other audio
devices.
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R E F L E C T I O N S O N R E A D I N G 1 7 9
The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, by James D. Hornfischer, a powerful
book about Navy surface warfare in World War II, is available both as an e-book
and as an audiobook.
Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game, by Michael Lewis (and now a
major motion picture starring Brad Pitt), a great case study of analysis and per-
sonnel management set in a major-league baseball team, is available as an
audiobook.
Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything, by
Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, a best-selling book that offers alternative
ways of looking at fads and trends and encourages readers to consider the possi-
bility that things are not always what they appear to be, is available on NKO as an
audiobook.
The Navy Professional Reading Program was established to encourage all sail-
ors to expand their horizons by reading (or perhaps by listening to) books about
subjects that interest them. With a little searching, you should be able to find an
NPRP library aboard ship or at your base, where you can borrow the books at no
cost. NKO provides another source for this material, and much more. Finally,
books from the NPRP can be purchased at the Navy Exchange at a significant
discount, if you want to retain them as part of your professional library.
It’s a free country—and you are always free to learn!
JOHN E. JACKSON
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